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INTRODUCTION
Given the primacy of internal wars in contemporary international
society,' and the fact that they are responsible for the vast majority
1. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WAR WITHOUT QUARTER: COLOMBIA AND

INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (1998) [hereinafter WAR WITHOUT
QUARTER] (providing a detailed analysis of the internal war in Colombia); Steven R. David, The Primacy of Internal War, in INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
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of the victims of armed conflict in general,2 it is surprising to find
that much of the attention of international law scholars lies elsewhere. Indeed, most discussion in the field of international humanitarian law ("IlL") focuses on subjects not directly related to
the problem of applying it in internal conflicts. Some common
topics include the law of international armed conflicts' and the conduct of hostilities,4 the progressive development of conventional
and customary norms, especially as concerns international criminal
tribunals5 and humanitarian intervention and assistance.' It is true
G. Nueman ed., 1995) (noting the
threat of internal wars on global security); see also John R. Crook, Strengthening
THEORY AND THE THIRD WORLD 77 (Stephanie

Legal Protection in Internal Conflicts: Introductory Remarks: Panel on Internal
Conflicts, 3 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 491 (1997).
2. See David, supra note 1, at 77 (noting that a majonty of the 150 wars after World War II had been internal wars of one type or another).

3. See, e.g., THE HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS
(Dieter Fleck ed., 1995); THE GULF WAR OF 1980-88: THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR IN
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PERSPECTIVE (Ige F. Dekker et al. eds., 1994); HILAIRE
MCCOUBREY & NIGEL D. WHITE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED CONFLICT
(1992); EDWARD KWAKWA, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT:
PERSONAL AND MATERIAL FIELDS OF APPLICATION (1992); Louise DoswaldBeck, CurrentDevelopment: The San Remo Manual on hIternationalLaw Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 192 (1995).
4. See, e.g., ARMED CONFLICT AND THE NEW LAW: ASPECT'S OF THE 1977
GENEVA PROTOCOLS AND THE 1981 WEAPONS CONVENTION (Michael A. Meyer

ed., 1989); R.J. Arajuo, S.J., Anti-Personnel Mines and Peremptory Norms of
International Law: Argument and Catalyst, 30 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1
(1997); Michael J. Matheson, The Opinions of the International Court of Justice
on the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 417 (1997).
5. See, e.g., VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, AN INSIDERS GUIDE
TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
(1995); THE LAW OF WAR CRIMES: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
APPROACHES (Timothy L.H. McCormack et al. eds., 1997); \\AR CRIMES IN

INTERNATIONAL LAW (Yoram Dinstein et al. eds.. 1996): Payam Akhavan, The
International Crimnal Tribunal .for Rwanda: The politics and pragmatics oJ
punishment, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 501 (1996); Christopher Keith Hall, Current
Development: The Sixth Session of the UN PreparatoryComnttee on the Establishment of an International Crimninal Court, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 548 (1998);
Marie-Claude Roberge, Jurisdiction of the ad hoc Tribunals lbr the Former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda over Crimes against Humanity and Genocide, 321 INT'L
REV. RED CROSS 651 (1997); Paul Tavernier, The Erperience of the International Criminal Tribunalsfor the forner Yugoslavia and for Rwanda, 321 INT'L
REV. RED CROSS 605 (1997).
6. See, e.g., FRANCOIS BUNGION, LE COMITE INTERNATIONAL DE LA CROIX-
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that the recent creation of an International Criminal Court, and especially the prior establishment by the United Nations Security
Council of the ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda, have led to new developments in the international criminalization of internal atrocities.7 Yet the fact remains that, this notwithstanding, relatively little attention is paid to how existing humanitarian norms apply in the specific context of internal wars.
The present Article aims to rectify this state of affairs by focusing on the internal war in Colombia as a case study. The longstanding conflict in Colombia provides an ideal factual and conceptual framework within which to examine key issues relating to
the humanitarian law of non-international armed conflicts. By concentrating on several practical questions raised by the application of
the laws of war in Colombia, I want to suggest that, despite formidable obstacles, deeper legal analysis and non-conventional methods of promoting compliance may provide the best route to revitalizing humanitarian norms and increasing their effectiveness in real
conflict situations. The overall objective is to provide a fresh perspective from which to evaluate the terms of the ongoing debate on
the development of humanitarian law in this field.
Part of the problem addressed by this study arises from the fact
that rarely is there an in-depth consultation of concrete cases or
situations occurring within a particular internal conflict aside from
those, of course, covered by the international criminal tribunals.
Leaving the international tribunals aside, most of the literature on
the humanitarian law of non-interstate armed conflict tends to be
cursory or critical, or both. Most scholarly work on this subject,

ROUGE ET LA PROTECTION DES VICTIMES DE LA GUERRE (1995); HILAIRE
MCCOUBREY & NIGEL D. WHITE, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CIVIL

WARS (1995); Ravi Mahalingam, Comment, The Compatibility of the Principle
of Nonintervention with the Right of Humanitarian Intervention, 1 UCLA J.
INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 221 (1996).
7. See Theodore Meron, InternationalCriminalizationof InternalAtrocities,

89 AM. J. INT'L L. 554 (1995); see also Theodor Meron, War Crimes Law Comes
ofAge, 92 AM. J. INT'L L 462 (1998) [hereinafter War Crimes Law]; Jos6 E. Alvaraz, The Likely Legacies of Tadic, 3 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 613 (1997);
Theodore Meron, The Continuing Role of Custom in the Formation of InternationalHumanitarianLaw, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 238 (1996).
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with few exceptions,' is limited in scope and tends not to evolve
beyond a discussion of the historical development or the basic
framework of the pertinent norms.9 When arguments are developed,
emphasis frequently is placed on the normative shortcomings and
other perceived obstacles to application, without more than a passing reference to a specific country or conflict situation.' Humanitarian norms are usually discussed with only a general reference to
certain countries believed to suffer internal conflicts, without establishing as a legal or factual matter why one conflict is deemed a
more fitting example than another is."
8. See, e.g., ROSEMARY ABI-SAAB, DROIT HUMANITAIRE ET CONFLICTS

INTERNES (1986) (tracing the origins and evolution of the law of noninternational conflict); ARACELY MANGAS MARTIN, CONFLICTOS ARNMADOS
INTERNOS Y DERECHO INTERNACIONAL HUMANITARIO (1990); THE LAW OF
NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT: PROTOCOL II TO THE 1949 GENEVA

CONVENTIONS (Howard S. Levie ed., 1987) (containing the negotiating history of
the substantive provisions of Protocol II); Robert Kogod Goldman, International
HumanitarianLaw: Americas Watch's Experience in Monitoring Internal Armed
Conflicts, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 49 (1993).
9. See, e.g., HILAIRE MCCOUBREY, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW

(1990), at 171-86; Georges Abi-Saab, Non-International Armed Conflicts, in
INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF HUMANITARIAN LAW 217-39 (UNESCO, Henry

Dunant Institute, 1988); L.C. Green, Low Intensit ' Conflict and the Law. 3 ILSA
J. INT'L & COMP. L. 493 (1997); Hernan Salinas Burgos, The application of internationalhumanitarian law as compared to human rights law in situations
qualified as internalarmed conflict, internal disturbances and tensions, orpublic
emergency, with special references to war crimes and political crimes, in MISE
EN OEUVRE DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL HUMANITAIRE (Frits Kalshoven et al.

eds.,

1989).
10. See Green, supra note 9, at 16-17; Burgos, supra note 9, at 9, 22-23; Geneva Conventions, Protocol II: The Confrontation of Sovereignty and International Law, in ASIL INSIGHT (American Society of International Law, Washington, D.C.), Nov. 1995, at 1 [hereinafter ASIL INSIGHT]; see also KWAKWA,
supra note 3, at 23-27; MCCOUBREY & WHITE, supra note 3, at vii-x. McCoubrey and White insist that:
[t]he problems of legal prescription are largely set by the very fact of the
non-internationalnature of the armed conflicts in question. There are problems of definition, largely founded upon considerations of intensity....
[T]here remain serious legal difficulties [which] largely turn upon issues of
inevitable sovereign sensitivity.... So far as the conduct of hostilities in
non-international armed conflicts is concerned, even more intractable conceptual and practical difficulties arise.
Id.
11. See KWAKWA, supra note 3, at 23-24 (mentioning conflicts in Angola,
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Legal scholars cite a litany of reasons to explain why the foregoing is so. The principal sources of the humanitarian law in this
field, aside from custom, are common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions of August 12, 1949 for the Protection of Victims of
War,' 2 and Protocol II Additional to the same Geneva Conventions. Although these norms are still an integral part of IHL, the
view seems to prevail among many scholars that non-judicial attempts to apply humanitarian law to internal conflicts are not viable, or, at least, are not viable enough to warrant in-depth study.
Commentators are quick to point out, for example, that States'
reluctance to recognize the international legal consequences of internal strife, coupled with their haste to defend the principles of
sovereignty and non-interference, make any effective national implementation by States of the pertinent rules a remote possibility at
best.' 4 Moreover, the difficulties involved in actually measuring the
intensity of internal conflicts with legal precision make attempts at
classification a largely pointless exercise.'" This situation is further
Mozambique, Afghanistan and El Salvador); MCCOUBREY, supra note 9, at 175

(citing conflicts in Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Nicaragua and Sudan); see also ASIL
INSIGHT, supra note 10, at 1 (citing Chiapas in Mexico and Chechnya in Russia

as "two examples from a long roll call of ethnic and local violence....").
12. See Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Geneva Convention No. I, 6 U.S.T. 3114,
T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 (1949) [hereinafter FirstGeneva Convention];
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Geneva Convention No. II, 6 U.S.T.
3217, T.I.A.S No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S 85 (1949) [hereinafter Second Geneva Convention]; Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Geneva
Convention No. III, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S 135 (1949)
[hereinafter Third Geneva Convention]; Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War, Geneva Convention No. IV, 6 U.S.T. 3516,
T.I.A.S No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S 287 (1949) [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention].
13. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949.
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts,
Protocol II, opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, U.N. Doc. A/32/144, Annexes I
& II, 1977, reprinted in 16 I.L.M, 1442 [hereinafter Protocol II].
14. See KWAKWA, supra note 3, at 22-23; MANGAS MARTIN, supra note 8, at
60-6 1; McCOUBREY, supra note 9, at 175; MCCOUBREY & WHITE, supra note 6,
at viii-ix; Burgos, supra note 9, at 6-7, 9; see also ASIL INSIGHT, supra note
10, at 2,4.
15. See Theodor Meron, On the Inadequate Reach of Humanitarian and Hus-
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complicated by the fact that most commentators interpret Protocol
II's threshold for material application as requiring nothing less than
a full-blown civil war, the highest possible standard, and, as such, a
relatively uncommon phenomenon on today's global scene." On
the other hand, common Article 3's-and even Protocol II' s-provisions are largely insufficient to deal effectively with the complexity of modem internal armed conflict.'" All of this has motivated many observers to begin searching for better alternatives,
such as the development of minimum humanitarian standards."
This Article will show why the foregoing arguments, while reflecting elements of truth, seem nevertheless to miss the point.
There are important reasons in favor of evaluating the relevance of
common Article 3 and Protocol II more positively than most international legal literature does today. Several are developed in the
course of this Article. What follows is a brief presentation of the
three basic issues around which the discussion of these reasons will
man Rights Law and the Need for a New Instranent, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 589,
602-03 (1983); see also Burgos, supra note 9,at 7; KWAKWA, supra note 3,at
24; MANGAS MARTIN, supra note 8, at 60, McCOUBREY & WHITE, supra note 6,
at viii, 19.
16. See Analytical Report of the Secretari-General, submitted pursuant to
Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1997/21, parns. 79-80, UN Doc.
E/CN.4/1998/87 [hereinafter Analytical Report]; MANGAS MARTIN, supra note 8,
at 59-61, 64; Burgos, supra note 9, at 9; Crook, supra note 1, at 491; Green, sitpra note 9, at 16-17; MCCOUBREY, supra note 9,at 172: Meron, supra note 15,
at 599.
17. See Analytical Report, supra note 16, paras. 71,74,75,77. With respect to
common Article 3, see also KEITH SUTER,

AN INTERNATIONAL

LAW OF

GUERRILLA WARFARE 171-76 (1984); ASIL INSIGHT, supra note 10, at 3;
MANGAS MARTIN, supra note 8, at 68; Burgos, supra note 9, at 6-7. As concerns
Protocol II, see also KWAKWA, supra note 3, at 22-23.
18. See David Petrasek, Current Development: Moving Forward on tile Development of Mininium HumanitarianStandards. 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 557 (1998)
(asserting that the development of minimum international humanitarian standards
would provide greater protection for human rights in situations of internal conflict). A dissatisfaction with the humanitarian law of internal conflict has fed recent initiatives to develop a code of minimum humanitarian standards applicable
at all times and in all situations of internal violence. Although originally intended
to fill the "gaps" left by humanitarian and human rights law, the sponsors of this
initiative view it as a way of redressing the normative and logistical shortcomings of Protocol II and common Article 3. See id. at 560-62; see also Asbjorn
Eide et al., Combating Lawlessness in Gray Zone Conlicts Through Minimum
HumanitarianStandards,89 AM. J.INT'L L. 215 (1995).
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revolve. The objective is to demonstrate that the law of noninternational conflict can respond adequately to many of the complex problems raised by modem internal wars like the one in Colombia, and that this response is useful to people and organizations
everywhere that work towards the humanization of conflict.
Conventional wisdom holds that the problem of applying IHL to
situations of internal violence "rests essentially on two points: first,
that there are difficulties in determining under which circumstances
the treaty rules regulating internal conflicts become operable, and
second, that even when these rules do apply they only provide a
minimum of protection."' 9
The first main issue, then, is one of application. Many of the
critical views described are premised on an unnecessarily restrictive
view of the scope of applicability of Protocol II. A careful analysis
of the criteria established in Article 1 of Protocol II will reveal,
however, that this instrument is probably applicable to certain internal armed conflicts excluded by many from its purview, such as
the one in Colombia. ° Contrary to popular belief, there is no definitive reason, legal or practical, to believe that internal conflicts
cannot meet Protocol II's criteria for material applicability without
rising to the elevated level of a classic civil war. Nor is there any
reason to believe that international lawyers and observers should
not or cannot reasonably engage in this type of objective analysis
under Article 1 for purposes of determining when Protocol II applies to a given conflict. This Article intends to show that engaging
in such legal analysis is both possible and necessary.
The second issue raised by conventional wisdom relates to the
interpretation and sufficiency of existing norms. Under this view,
common Article 3's provisions, and even those in Protocol II, are
considered insufficient or deficient for the purpose of protecting the
victims of internal wars, leading to an "unsatisfactory state of af-

19. See Analytical Report, supra note 16, para. 71.
20. See discussion infra Part II.A.3. In 1995, Colombia ratified Protocol lI.
See Cruz Roja Colombiana, Consejeria Presidencial para los Derechos Humanos
and Universidad Jorge Tadeo Lozano, Investigaci6n acad6mica de medidas
nacionales de aplicaci6n del derecho internacional humanitario 38 (1996)
[hereinafter Colombian Red Cross].
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fairs." 2' Yet if even just this "minimum" were to be respected by
the parties to the Colombian conflict, more than two-thirds of all
civilian deaths would be avoided! With respect to this issue, this
Article will explore the responsibility of the parties under international law in order to suggest that, although imperfect, existing humanitarian norms provide ample legal grounds for censuring the
most grievous and systematic violations, which occur in this conflict. The discussion will center on the treatment of Colombia's
notorious paramilitary groups since they are the armed actors most
responsible for these violations. In this regard, it becomes necessary to explore the fundamental question of state responsibility for
the criminal actions of these groups.
This brings us to the third and overarching issue of implementation. One commentator summed up the problem in the following
terms:
The principal difficulty regarding the application of international humanitarian law has been the refusal of states 'to apply the conventions
in situations where they clearly should be applied .... There are, in fact,
so many situations in which the applicability of the Geneva Conventions
as a whole or of their common Article 3 has been denied that the rule
has been the rejection of the law, rather than its formal acknowledgment
and recognition.... Although the conditions for the applicability of
Protocol II are satisfied in a number of internal conflicts, it is unlikely
that many states involved in internal conflicts will be prepared to acknowledge it. Consequently, the prospects for the formal application of
the Protocol are poor.2-

The case will be made here that, notwithstanding this view, humanitarian law plays a critical role in modem internal conflicts,
even in the absence of state recognition and implementation, or of
international enforcement mechanisms. This Article will analyze
the problem of applying humanitarian law in internal wars under a
paradigm that emphasizes the construction of compliance through
the constant interplay of legal and non-legal forces rather than formal implementation or legal enforcement. It will show that these
21. See Analytical Report, supra note 16, para. 81.
22. Meron, supra note 15, at 599-600 (citing Aldrich, Human Rights and
Armed Conflict: Conflicting Views, 67 ASIL PROC. 141, 142 (1973)) (emphasis
added).
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forces, which derive from a great variety of sources at both national
and international levels, tend to reinforce each other and promote
greater acceptance of humanitarian norms and principles. Although
acceptance is not the same as observance or compliance, this Article argues that it is a crucial first step in the right direction, and a
harbinger of increased respect for humanitarian law.
The conflict in Colombia-one of the world's longest running
non-international wars-provides an excellent backdrop for analyzing these issues. This Article begins, therefore, by describing the
pertinent aspects of the war in Colombia and its dire humanitarian
consequences. It then reviews the principal efforts to implement
IHL in Colombia, and the central role that humanitarian law plays
in the ongoing peace talks between the government and the other
parties to the conflict. This lengthy initial part is required to properly introduce the Colombian case study and to set the stage for the
rest of the Article. The second main part then turns to the more specific issues of application and interpretation of humanitarian norms
in this context. In the third and final part, this Article builds on
prior discussion and addresses the major criticisms regarding the
implementation and enforcement of IHL. Drawing upon the Colombian experience, it suggests that compliance can be constructed
and evaluated in significant, non-conventional ways that should be
recognized and encouraged.

I. THE CASE STUDY: CIVIL CONFLICT AND
HUMANITARIAN LAW IN COLOMBIA
A. BACKGROUND

The contemporary conflict in Colombia dates back to the mid1960s when the first Marxist guerrilla organizations were established seeking land reform, as well as greater economic and social
justice." The traditional political system, which is comprised of the
Liberal and the Conservative parties, concentrated privilege and
power in the hands of a small economic elite at the expense of the
23. See Alejandro Reyes, The Geography of Political Violence and Drug

Trafficking in Colombia, Conference at the Johns Hopkins University School of
Advanced International Studies (Apr. 1, 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author).
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majority of the population.' The exclusionary nature of the Colombian political system, together with a repressive military response
to the insurgency movement in the early 1980s, led to a sharp escalation of the conflict. From 1988 to 1997 it is estimated that over
35,000 Colombians died as a result of the political violence, including both combat casualties and civilian victims.4 Since 1988,
when the conflict heated up to its current intensity, the war has
caused an average of over 3,600 deaths per year.2" This means that
since 1988, more people are killed for political reasons in one year
in Colombia than died during the entire 25-year conflict in Northem Ireland.27 Before discussing the war and its humanitarian consequences in more detail, it is necessary to briefly introduce each of
the parties to the conflict.
1. MilitayT and Security Forces
The Colombian Armed Forces consist of 121,000 soldiers,
18,000 Navy sailors and 7,300 Air Force members, all under the
formal command of the Nation's President.2 ' Of these troops, about

24. See id. at 1. Reyes notes:
The history of these problems can be summarized by saying it has been a
very long struggle between large owners and small peasants; between cattle
raising and agriculture; between upper class rural society people who own
most of the land and have political influence in a regional context, against
small peasants who have no influence, resources or access to credit. It is a
very deep struggle in which the state apparatus has been mostly on the side
of the regional landed elite.
Id.
25. See Colombian Commission of Jurists, Evohci6n de la Situaci6n tie Derechos Hunanosy Violencia Sociopoliticaen Colombia: 1970-1997 (unpublished
graph, on file with author) (1998) [hereinafter CCJ Graph I].
26. See id. This figure includes all persons killed as a result of combat, as
well as civilians executed outside the scope of military confrontation, as explained below in Part I.B.
27. Juan Gasparini, Impunidad va en contra de los Derechos Hurmanos: A.
Robinson, EL TIEMPO, Oct. 20, 1998, at Al (presenting excerpts from interview
with Mary Robinson, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, on her first
visit to Colombia).
28. See THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES, THE
MILITARY BALANCE 1997/98, 213-14 (1997), cited in WAR WITHOUT QUARTER,
supra note 1, at 43.
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50,000 actively participate in the conflict as armed combatants. 9
Civilian authorities are politically weak vis-6-vis their military
counterparts, and normally have little say in most military decisions. These decisions tend to be taken by the Commander of the
Armed Forces and by the commanders of the respective branches.0
The Colombian Army, the branch most relevant to this study, is divided into five divisions, arranged in twenty-four brigades; these in
turn are divided into 154 battalions, not including the three mobile
brigades consisting of up to 2,000 professional soldiers and specialized in counterinsurgency actions. 3' A series of recent defeats at
the hands of the major guerrilla groups has underscored the need to
restructure and modernize the armed forces.
The National Police, together with the armed forces, comprise
the state's security forces ('fuerza p~tblica")." Although civilian in
nature, the police were joined with the armed forces into one
"military force" within the Ministry of Defense and under the direct
command of the military Commander of the Armed Forces. 4 The
police number over 100,000 and are present in over ninety percent
of Colombia's municipalities." Since they tend to be the only
authority in remote areas, the National Police are often a primary
military target of guerrilla attacks on small towns. For purposes of
this study, the term "military forces" or "security forces" should be
understood to mean both the armed forces and the National Police.

29. See Radiografia de los actores, EL TIEMPO, Jan. 6, 1999, at A9
[hereinafter Radiografia].
30. See WAR WITHOUT QUARTER, supra note 1, at 43.
31. See id.
32. See COLETTA YOUNGERS, WAGING WAR: U.S. POLICY TOWARD
COLOMBIA 7 (Sept. 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author); Patricia
Lara, Un civil de tres soles, CAMBIO 16, Aug. 17, 1998, at 22-23 (interviewing
the incoming Minister of Defense about, inter alia, his plans to modernize the
Armed Forces).
33. See CONSTITUCION POLiTICA DE COLOMBIA DE 1991, art. 216 [hereinafter
COLOM. CONST.].

34. See WAR WITHOUT QUARTER, supra note 1, at 76-77.
35. See id. at 77.
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2. Guerrilla Groups
The Colombian insurgency movement is composed primarily of
two guerrilla groups, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de
Colombia ("Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia" or
"FARC") and the Ejkrcito de Liberaci6n Nacional ("National Liberation Army" or "ELN"). Respectively, they accounted for sixtysix percent and twenty-eight percent of all guerrilla military actions
carried out during most of 1997; other splinter groups account for
the remaining six percent.1
The FARC guerrillas are the oldest, largest and strongest guerrilla movement in Colombia. They are estimated to have anywhere
between 10,000 and 15,000 troops organized in sixty-two rural
fronts, three urban fronts, and nine elite units." They possess a unified central command structure called the "General Secretariat"
("Secretariado General") headed by Manuel "Tirofijo" Marulanda
Velez, who helped found the guerrilla group in 1964.3' He and the
six other members of the Secretariat divide command responsibilities among themselves by subject and by region; they are supported
by a general staff ("estado mayor") responsible for military operations, and by blocks ("bloques ") that are regional military alliances
between FARC fronts. ' 9 Various sources confirm that the FARC's
high command imposes a tight control on the military and political
activities of the organization, notwithstanding the vast territory
within which it operates.' °
The FARC operate in many different regions of the country, but
dominate in the southern territories of Colombia where their mili-

36. See Mary S.nchez, Estado del Conflicto Armado 2 (Aug. 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (reviewing the military activity of the
armed groups participating in the conflict); see also WAR WITHOUT QUARTER.
supra note 1, at 184-86. The smallest of the active guerrilla groups is the Popular
Liberation Army ("EPL") with less than 1,000 active members and fronts in only
a few departments. See id.
37. See WAR WITHOUT QUARTER, supra note 1,at 131; see also YOUNGERS,
supra note 32, at 7.
38. See WAR WITHOUT QUARTER. supra note 1,at 131-32; Jesfis Ortiz
Nieves, iPor qui ahora?,CAMBIO 16, July 13, 1998, at 20.
39. See WAR WITHOUT QUARTER supra note 1, at 132.
40. See id.
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tary presence is the strongest, and where they are the de facto
authority in many areas. 4' Their ranks are primarily made up of
peasants ("campesinos"). Socio-economic inequality and agrarian
reform traditionally have been the main issues of concern to this
guerrilla group. 41 In recent years, however, the FARC have expanded their agenda to cover a broader range of topics, including
social policy towards the cultivation of illicit crops by campesinos,
as well as constitutional and political reform.4 3 They are not dependent on external financing sources, deriving their income from
kidnapping, extortion, and special "taxes" levied on drug cultivation and trafficking activities carried out in the areas under their
control. 44 They do not, however, appear to engage in international
trafficking, and thus are not comparable to Colombia's infamous
drug cartels.45
Since 1996, the FARC have displayed an increased capacity to
wage war, attacking and inflicting important losses on the Colombian military forces. In recent years, the FARC have handed the
Army a series of unprecedented and devastating military defeats,
which have led to the capture and detention of several hundred
military personnel by the guerrilla group. 46 In one surprise attack on
a counter-narcotics base run jointly by the Army and the National
Police in August of 1998, over 1,000 FARC guerrillas completely
41. See id. at 13 1. In the regions under their control, young men go off to join
the guerrilla ranks "just as naturally as high school graduates who sign up for
[obligatory] military service." Radiografia, supra note 29, at A9; see also discussion infra Part II.A.3.
42. See Radiografia,supra note 29, at A9.
43. See infra notes 252-53 and accompanying text for a discussion on the
current negotiation agenda of the FARC.
44. See WAR WITHOUT QUARTER, supra note 1, at 132-33.
45. See YOUNGERS, supra note 32, at 7 (explaining that both the FARC and
the ELN are essentially political organizations and, according to a U.S. study
conducted by the DEA, neither the FARC nor the ELN are involved in international drug trafficking). The FARC are very distinct from the Colombian drug
mafia. Their involvement in the drug trafficking process is primarily through the
levying of "taxes" as a means to finance their war machinery. For this reason,
despite the overlap, they are best viewed as "two absolutely different phenomena." Reyes, supra note 23, at 6.
46. See infra notes 419-22 and accompanying text; see also LLa hora de /a
paz?, SEMANA, Aug. 10, 1998; El sindrome deJacobo, SEMANA, Nov. 9, 1998.
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destroyed the military installations, killed at least 30 members of
the armed forces, and took another 130 or so prisoner." Negotiations are currently under way between the government and the
FARC to exchange captured military personnel, which by 1999 totaled over 400 persons, for imprisoned political prisoners."
The ELN is the second most important guerrilla group after the
FARC. This group contains at least 5,000 armed militants, and is
divided into approximately thirty-five rural fronts, five urban fronts
and several urban militias. 9 The ELN forces are concentrated in
several of Colombia's northern territories, especially those bordering Venezuela, which is the location of most Colombian oil reserves.5 The top leadership of the ELN is organized in the group's
National Directorate ("Direccidn Nacional"), headed by two veteran guerrillas, Nicol.s Rodriguez Bautista, alias "Gabino," and
Antonio Garcia." Subordinate to the Directorate is the Central
Command ("Comando Central") composed of the leaders of the
ELN's military units or fronts; these leaders enjoy more autonomy
in their respective regions than their FARC counterparts, giving rise
to contradictions in policy and action between them and the Directorate. 52 One frequent subject of discussion regards the practice of
kidnapping
civilians for ransom, a major source of income for the
53
ELN.
The ELN's main issue has been traditionally the exploitation of
the country's natural resources, especially its petroleum reserves by
state companies and foreign multinationals. As a result, they regularly extort protection money from multinational corporations in-

47. See la Muertese tom6 la selva, ELTIEMPO, Aug. 6, 1998, at Al, A6.
48. See 'Tirofijo' se destapa, SEMANA, Jan. 18, 1999; ina note 429 and accompanying text.
49. See WAR WITHOUT QUARTER, supra note 1, at 161; see also YOUNGERS,
supra note 32, at 7. The most recent estimates put the total at 6,000 combatants
spread out over 45 fronts, both urban and rural. See Radiografla,supra note 29,
at A9.
50. See Reyes, supra note 23, at 5.
51. See Nieves, supra note 38, at 18-19; see also WAR
supra note 1, at 161.
52. See WAR WITHOUT QUARTER. supra note 1, at 162.
53. See id.
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volved in the extraction and transport of oil, Colombia's principal
export.14 "When they refuse to pay, the oil installations. . . are subject to sabotage and destruction."" This is why the ELN is the principal source of attacks on oil and gas pipelines in the country56
Nonetheless, their current demands on the government include the
need for more general political and economic reforms, in addition
to the nationalization of natural resources 7 They have been especially hard hit in recent years by the counter insurgency efforts of
the paramilitary groups that operate in many of the ELN's traditional zones of influence. 8
3. ParamilitaryGroups
Paramilitary groups have a long history in Colombia (though not
as long as that of the guerrillas). They began in the early 1980s as
private armies organized by local drug barons for the purpose of
protecting their regional economic interests from guerrilla threats
and extortion." They rapidly allied themselves with the Colombian
Army, which helped train and arm the paramilitary groups, and
which coordinated much of their activity during the 1980s. 60 The
paramilitary groups traditionally were-and continue to be-financed by drug traffickers, large landowners ("hacendados") and
cattlemen ("ganaderos")in the regions where they operate.' There
is also significant evidence that many paramilitary groups, including the Autodefensas Campesinas de C6rdoba y Urabd ("Peasant
54. See THE ECONOMIST, WORLD INFIGURES: 1999, 121 (1999).
55. Reyes, supra note 23, at 6.
56. DEFENSORiA DEL PUEBLO, EN

DEFENSA DEL PUEBLO ACUSO: IMPACTOS DE
LA VIOLENCIA DE OLEODUCTOS EN COLOMBIA 22 (1997).

57. See Nieves, supra note 38, at 18.
58. See Radiografia,supra note 29, at A9.
59. See N.C.O.S. et al., TRAS LOS PASOS PERDIDOS DE LA GUERRA SUCIA 115139 (1995). See generaIl' CARLOS MEDINA GALLEGO, AUTODEFENSAS,

(1990) (describing the evolution of the relationship between the paramilitary groups and the Colombian
Armed Forces).
PARAMILITARES Y NARCOTRAFICO EN COLOMBIA

60. See Reyes, supra note 23, at 10; see also N.C.O.S. et al., supra note 59

(describing the relationship between the Colombian Armed Forces and the paramilitary groups in the 1980s).
61.

See Reyes, supra note 23, at 9-12.
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Self-Defense Group of C6rdoba y Urabd" or "ACCU"), participate
in, and derive income from, drug trafficking activities, although
their leadership persistently denies such allegations?:
The Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia ("United Self-Defense
Groups of Colombia"or "AUC") are a federation of several regional paramilitary groups, the most important of which is the
ACCU. 63 Carlos Castaho is the leader of the ACCU and the commander-in-chief of the AUC, which by most accounts is currently
made up of at least 5,000 thousand armed men, spread out over
twenty-nine fronts.6' Although organized regionally, these groups
coordinate their strategy through a general staff or war council
("estado mayor conjunto"). They are self-proclaimed "armed political organizations of a civilian nature dedicated to combating
subversion."65
A recent study by Human Rights Watch reveals the levels of sophistication attained by contemporary Colombian paramilitaries:
[L]ike the guerrillas they consciously emulate, the AUC has a general
staff (estado mayor conjunto) made up of leaders of each regional paramilitary group. Regional groups also have a general staff (estados mayores regionales). The fighting force is divided into two types of units:
stationary groups, known as local self-defense associations (juntas de
autodefensas locales), and support groups (grupos de apoyo); and mobile groups (frentes de choque), better trained, equipped, and able to
move quickly throughout Colombia ....
Both local and special fighters
receive a base salary plus food, a uniform, weapons, and munitions. The
funds to cover these expenses come from local ranchers and businesspeople.66

Paramilitary groups combat the guerrillas by targeting the civil62. See WAR WITHOUT QUARTER, supra note 1, at 107 (claiming that
Castafio's involvement in drug trafficking has earned his family millions); Habla
Castaio, SEMANA, Aug. 17, 1998, at 41 (denying that the paramilitary groups
receive funding from the drug trade); see also THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 16, 1999, at
34 (stating that paramilitary groups often rely on drug trafficking to fund their
operations).
63. See WAR WITHOUT QUARTER, supra note 1,at 100.
64. See Radiografia, supra note 29, at A9.
65. Id.
66. WAR WITHOUT QUARTER. supra note 1,at 106.
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ian population, which they view as sympathetic to the insurgency
movement. These groups systematically engage in death threats,
summary executions, massacres, torture, and the forced disappearance of civilians as a way to spread terror among the population.67
Their links with the Colombian armed forces are notorious, and the
two continue to operate in frequent coordination. According to the
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, there is
evidence that the aforementioned atrocities often are perpetrated in
joint actions carried out by members of the security forces and paramilitaries or in direct actions by paramilitaries enjoying the support or acquiescence of the state forces.68
B.

INTERNAL CONFLICT AND HUMANITARIAN LAW

The conflict in Colombia is an intense and cruel one. 69 In the tenyear period between 1988 and 1997, approximately 11,500 combatants and civilians were killed as a direct result of the hostilities, an
average of 1,144 a year or three persons a day. 7' During 1997, there
were a total of 368 open combat situations registered between state
forces and the guerrilla groups. In addition to these direct military
67. See WAR WITHOUT QUARTER, supra note 1, at 100-31.
68. See Report by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.
U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 54th Sess., Agenda Item 3, at 27, U.N. Doc.
E!CN.4/1998/16 (1998) (hereinafter HCHR Report]; see also discussion infra
Part II.B. 1.
69. The following statistics are derived from two major sources: the Banco de
Datos de Derechos Humanos y Violencia Politica (Human Rights and Political
Violence Data Bank), run jointly by the Centro de Investigaci6n y Educaci6n
Popular (Center for Research and Popular Education - CINEP), and the Comisi6n Interconcregacional de Justicia y Paz (Inter-congregational Commission
for Justice and Peace, "Justice and Peace") [hereinafter CINEP and Justice and
Peace Data Bank]; and the Data Bank on political violence of the Colombian
Commission of Jurists (Comisi6n Colombiana de Juristas) [hereinafter CCJ Data
Bank]. The CCJ's Data Bank relies heavily on the CINEP-Justice and Peace Data
Bank as a primary source, but complements its information with other sources as
well. Moreover, it applies a slightly different legal methodology for the classification of the violations.
70. See CCJ Graph I, supra note 25.
71. See CINEP and Justice and Peace Data Bank, NOCHE Y NIEBLA:
PANORAMA DE DERECHOS HUMANOS Y VIOLENCIA POLTICA EN COLOMBIA, Jan.Mar. 1997, at 127-50; NOCHE Y NIEBLA: PANORAMA DE DERECHOS HUMANOS Y
VIOLENCIA POLiTICA EN COLOMBIA, Apr.-June, 1997, at 136-53; NOCHE Y
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confrontations, the guerrillas were active harassing military personnel with hit and ran tactics; ambushing enemy targets, such as
transport vehicles and troops; taking over towns and villages; and
setting up roadblocks. As was already pointed out, the FARC currently have over 400 members of the Colombian military and police
in their custody as a result of many of these actions." In sum, almost 750 belligerent actions ("acciones bdlicas") by the parties
were registered during 1997, affecting 27 of Colombia's 32 departments.74 These actions resulted in the death of at least 1,100
people and injuries to approximately another 660."'
All evidence indicates that the war actually intensified during
1998. By September of that year, 1,078 people already had been
killed as a result of military actions like those just described, and
another 832 were injured.76 At least 260 open combat situations
between guerrilla and state forces were registered, bringing the total
of belligerent actions for this period to 555. The conflict continued
to affect over eighty percent of the country's departments in one
way or another."
Most of the killing in Colombia's conflict, however, does not

NIEBLA: PANORAMA DE DERECHOS

HUMANOS

Y VIOLENCIA

POLITICA

EN

COLOMBIA, July-Sept., 1997, at 140-67; NOCHE Y NIEBLA: PANORAMA DE
DERECHOs HUMANOS Y VIOLENCIA POLiTICA EN COLOMBIA, Oct.-Dec., 1997, at

140-61.
72. See id.
73. See 'Tirofijo'se destapa, supra note 48.
74. See supra note 71. The belligerent actions referred to in these statistics do
not include violations of IHL, such as the blowing up of oil pipelines, extrajudicial executions or the kidnapping of civilians for ransom. See h These are
considered separately below.
75. See Mary Sinchez, supra note 36, at 3. These casualties' figures are a
one-year estimate based on data received for the period between October 1996
and September 1997. See id.
76. See CINEP and Justice and Peace Data Bank, supra note 71; NOCHE Y
NIEBLA: PANORAMA DE DERECHOS

HUMANOS

Y VIOLENCIA

POLiTICA

EN

COLOMBIA, Jan.-June, 1998, at 14, 17; NOCHE Y NIEBLA: PANORAMA DE
DERECHOs HUMANOs Y VIOLENCIA POLITICA EN COLOMBIA, July-Sept., 1998, at

16, 19.
77. See CINEP and Justice and Peace Data Bank, supra note 71; Noche Y
NIEBLA: PANORAMA DE DERECHOS HUMANOS Y VIOLENCIA POLiTICA EN
COLOMBIA, Jan.-June, 1998, at 18.
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take place on the battlefield or in other belligerent activity. A
deeper analysis of the available statistics reveals why. The total of
politically motivated deaths for the ten-year period between 1988
and 1997 was over 35,000.8 During that period, the average of politically motivated or presumably politically motivated deaths was
3,628 a year, including combat casualties. This averages out to ten
victims per day for ten years! Of these victims, only three correspond to civilian and military casualties as a result of combat. 9 The
substantial remainder-six to seven persons a day-corresponds
primarily to executions in violation of human rights and/or humanitarian law. Thus, for example, between October of 1996 and
September of 1997, there were six extra-judicial executions or political homicides a day in addition to the three deaths resulting from
combat between the parties, plus a person forcibly disappeared
every other day.80
Most politically motivated deaths are, in fact, the result of widespread human rights and humanitarian law violations resulting from
attacks on civilians outside the scope of combat or direct action
against the enemy."' Less than a third of politically motivated killings in Colombia are a consequence of actual combat or other
military activities not prohibited by IHL: human rights and humanitarian law violations account for over seventy percent of all
such deaths. The victims of these political executions or homicides
tend to be members of the civilian population who do not directly
take part in the hostilities, such as peasants and rural workers,
community activists and leaders, trade unionists, leftist opposition

78. See CCJ GRAPH I, supra note 25 and accompanying text.
79. See id.
80. See Colombian Commission of Jurists, Derechos humanos y violencia
sociopolitica: Derecho a ]a vida, Sept. 1996 - Oct. 1997 (Aug. 1998) (unpublished graph, on file with author) [hereinafter CCJ Graph II].
81. See Guerra Sucia, SEMANA, Apr. 27, 1998, at 24 (discussing that in Colombia, this phenomenon of politically motivated deaths is sometimes referred to
as the "dirty war"). The author defines "dirty war" in the Colombian context as

politically motivated attacks by frequently unidentified armed actors against social and political activists, or other persons viewed as sympathetic to the rebels or

aiding their cause. The term "dirty war" is inherited from the clandestine, brutal
repression of the Southern Cone dictatorships against their civilian populations,
especially Chile and Argentina, during the 1970s and 1980s.
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leaders, human fights defenders, and indigenous persons. , All
available evidence indicates that the same pace and pattern of killings continued during 1998." .
Who is responsible for all these killings? Although it is not possible to have a precise statistical account, reliable Colombian nongovernmental sources have made a point of tracking these cases in
order to gain a reasonable indication of authorship.' Their research
shows that for the past five years, paramilitary groups have been
the armed actors most identified with these violations of the right to
life, accounting for an estimated seventy-six percent of all politically motivated homicides in 1997. '5It is important to note that this
figure has increased steadily during this period, inversely mirroring
a commensurate drop in the percentage of actions attributable to
state actors, namely the Army.

82. See Report of the United Nations High CommissionerJbr Human Rights
on the Office in Colombia, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/8, para. 45 [hereinafter
HCHR 1999]; see also COLOMBIAN COMMISSION OF JURISTS, COLOMBIA,
DERECHOS HUMANOS, Y DERECHO HUMANITARIO: 1996, 19-30 (1997) [hereinafter
CCJ 1996].
83. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT:
1999, 109 (1999) [hereinafter HRW 1999] (citing Colombian NGO sources as
reporting 619 killings carried out presumably for political reasons during the first
six months of 1998, not including combatants killed in action).
84. See

COMIsI6N

COLOMBIANA

DE

JURISTAS,

COLOMBIA,

DERECHOS

HUMANOS Y DERECHO HUMANIrARIO: 1995 3-9 (1996) [hereinafter CCJ 1995];

CCJ 1996, supra note 82, at 3-19 (calculating estimates of responsibility based
on those cases in which some evidence of authorship was available). Between
1993 and 1995, cases where some evidence of authorship was available represented only 28% of the total. In 1996, however, this figure rose to 65%, thanks
largely to the drastic increase in paramilitary activity and its express objective of
disseminating terror among the civilian population. Based on these cases, projections are made to arrive at the proportional responsibility figures cited in the CCJ
graphs.
85. See COMISION COLOMBIANA DE JURISTAS, COLOMBIA, DERECHOS
HUMANOS Y DERECHO HUMANITARIO: 1995, 3-9 (1996) [hereinafter CCJ 1995];
CCJ 1996, supra note 82, at 3-19. Preliminary finding for 1998 confirm that
paramilitary responsibility for violations of the right to life continues to hover
around 70%. See HRW 1999, supra note 83, at 109.
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Table I

EVOLUTION OF THE RESPONSIBILITY OF ARMED ACTORS FOR EXTRA-JUDICIAL
EXECUTIONS AND POLITICAL HOMICIDES IN CASES WHERE THE AUTHOR WAS
IDENTIFIED: 1993-1997'6

Year

1

2

State agents

Paramilitary
groups

Guerrillagroups

1993

54.26%

17.91%

27.48%

1994

32.76%

35.33%

31.91%

1995

15.68%

46.03%

38.29%

1996

10.52%

62.69%

26.79%

1997

4.18%

76.07%

19.75%

3

To many observers, these statistics are merely a reflection of
what already has been established through evidence compiled over
many years by national and international investigators: paramilitary
groups are a central component of the Colombian security forces'
anti-insurgency strategy, notwithstanding the civilian and military
authorities' staunch and consistent denial of this relationship. "7 The
Colombian Human Rights Ombudsman ("Dqfensor del Pueblo "),
an independent state watchdog on these issues, summarized it best
when he informed the Colombian Congress that paramilitary
groups:
[Have] become the illegal arm of the armed forces and police, for whom
they carry out the dirty work, which the armed forces and police cannot
do as authorities subject to the rule of law. This is about a new form of
exercising illegal repression with no strings attached which some analysts have called, quite rightly, violence through delegation. ""

86. See COMISION COLOMBIANA DE JURISTAS, DATA BANK, BogotAi, 1998

[hereinafter CCJ DATA BANK]; see also CCJ 1996, supra note 82, at 7.
87. See HCHR Report, supra note 68, paras. 27, 178,190, Recommendations 7
and 8; WAR WITHOUT QUARTER, supra note 1, at 43-48, 100-09; see also CCJ
1996, supra note 82, at 5-7.
88.

DEFENSORiA DEL PUEBLO,

IV INFORME ANUAL DEL DEFENSOR DEL

1999]

HoRs DE LOGIQUE

The collaboration, complicity and acquiescence of important
sectors of the Colombian security forces, and some government officials, must be taken into account when analyzing the abuses and
violations committed by paramilitary groups. In certain cases,
paramilitary groups act as de facto state agents and commit violations of human rights and humanitarian law directly imputable to
the state.89 Even where there is no agency relationship, it is evident
that Colombia violates its international obligations by permitting
the paramilitaries to commit grave abuses of human rights and humanitarian norms, and by not pursuing the perpetrators to bring
them to justice. 9° These issues are addressed in the second part of
the Article. For purposes of the current discussion, it is sufficient to
note that the primary responsibility for the majority of political
homicides attributed today to paramilitary groups in Colombia entails serious legal consequences for the state as well.
This symbiotic relationship between security and paramilitary
forces is central to understanding one of the most egregious of humanitarian violations prevalent in Colombia: the massacre of civilians. The Human Rights Ombudsman's Office registered 288 massacres of at least three persons during 1997, with the number of
victims totaling well over a thousand.9 ' The Colombian Commission of Jurists ("CCJ"), a Bogotd based human rights nongovernmental organization, counted 117 massacres of four or more
persons for the year period between October 1996 and September
1997, for a total of 669 victims. 2" By all accounts, the paramilitary
groups were responsible for the vast majority of these massacres.
PUEBLO AL CONGRESO DE COLOMBIA 59-60 (1997) (translation by author).

89. See infra notes 470-49 and accompanying text (discussing the responsibility of the Colombian State for the illegal actions of paramilitaries who,
through their collaboration with the State, act as its agents under international
law).
90. See infra notes 480-85 and accompanying text (showing that the Colombian State, in the absence of collaboration, is still responsible for the illegal ac-

tions of paramilitaries, because of widespread state acquiescence).
91. See DEFENSORIA DEL PUEBLO, INFORWE DE LA COMISION DE ESTUDIOS
No. 053 PARA LAS MASACRES DE 1997 (1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author) (containing 1997 massacre statistics).
92. See COMISION COLOMBIANA DE JURISTAS, STUDY ON MASSACRES (1998)
[hereinafter CCJ STUDY 1998] (unpublished study, on file with author) (containing massacre statistics for Oct. 1996- Sept. 1997).

AM. U. INT'L L. REV.

[15:1

The CCJ found in its study that, while state security forces were
apparently responsible for only four massacres and 22 victims, 86
massacres with over 500 victims were attributable to the paramilitaries.93
This trend shows no signs of relenting. During the first eight
months of 1998, for example, paramilitary groups "were linked to
most of the massacres committed [including many in which] bodies
were also dismembered, decapitated, and mutilated with machetes,
chain saws, and acid. 9 4 Over the course of one long weekend in
early January 1999, paramilitary forces went on a rampage. In less
than seventy-two hours, they carried out a series of massacres in
several different regions of the country, which left 139 civilians
dead.95 The breadth, range, and duration of paramilitary action reflected in these statistics would not be possible without the support
and acquiescence of many Colombian military and civilian authorities. Paramilitary groups do not only violate IHL through the massacres and selective assassinations; other frequent practices in violation of humanitarian law include systematic torture and death
threats, hostage taking, and the internal displacement of the civilian
population residing in conflictive zones.96
Following the paramilitary groups, the guerrillas are the second
most frequent violators of IHL. According to the CCJ study cited
above, the guerrillas were accountable for eleven massacres and
forty-eight civilian deaths. 7 Human Rights Watch identified twelve
FARC sponsored massacres and one sponsored by the ELN in
1997.98 The execution of combatant's hors de combat by guerrilla
forces, as well as selective political killings by guerrilla forces of

93. See id.
94. HRW 1999, supra note 83, at 111; see also HCHR 1999, supra note 82,
para. 49 (stating that in March 1999, the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights identified paramilitary group members as responsible for twothirds of all executions).
95. See Garrotey mano extendida a 'paras" EL TIEMPO, Jan. 12, 1999, at
A8.
96. See WAR WITHOUT QUARTER, supra note 1, at 109-30; see also HCHR
Report, supra note 68, paras. 97-102.
97. See CCJ DATA BANK, supra note 86.
98. See WAR WITHOUT QUARTER, supra note 1, at 135, 171.
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alleged army and paramilitary collaborators, are common. ' The
ELN has gone so far as to torture and execute the girlfriends of soldiers and officers for consorting with the enemy.'"' As indicated
earlier, these two guerrilla organizations were responsible for approximately nineteen percent of all violations of the right to life
under humanitarian law in 1997, encompassing both massacres and
selective political homicides or executions.' This situation does
not appear to have improved substantially during 1998."2
Once other violations of IHL are tabulated, especially regarding
the common practice of kidnapping for ransom, the guerrillas' responsibility skyrockets. Kidnapping for extortion purposes is considered hostage taking under the relevant humanitarian law instruments and, as such, is an egregious violation of the law.' 0 ' Between
October 1995 and September 1996, 1436 kidnappings for ransom
took place in Colombia, of which 583 or forty percent were attributable to guerrilla forces.'0 For the period between October of 1996
and September 1997, the number dropped to 814 kidnappings of
which 363 or forty-five percent were attributable to guerrilla
forces.' 5 The number rose again, however, during the first seven
months of 1998 to 1,088 kidnappings, half for which the guerrillas
allegedly were responsible.O' It is relevant to note that almost fifty
percent of all kidnappings
for ransom carried out in the world today
07
take place in Colombia.
99. Seeid. at 133-51, 162-75.
100. See id. at 170.
101. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
102. See HRW 1999, supra note 83, at 109 (interpreting preliminary findings
for 1998 to suggest that guerrilla responsibility for executions in violation of the
right to life is about 17%).
103. See INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, THIRD REPORT ON
THE SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN COLOMBIA. ch. IV, paras. 120-23 (1999)
<http://wiv.cidh.org>[hereinafter IACHR THIRD REPORT].
104. CCJ 1996, supra note 82, at 65-66.

105. See

MARY SANCHEZ, INFRACCIONES AL

DIH (Aug. 1998) (unpublished

manuscript, on file with author).
106. See HRW 1999, supra note 83, at 112.
107. See Arturo Carrillo Su~rez, Apuntes sobre el secuestroy el derecho internacionalhunanitario en el conflicto armado colonibiano, in CCJ 1996, supra
note 82, at 181.
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Other violations of IHL by guerrillas include death threats
against civilians who do not comply with their demands or who are
considered "military targets"; torture, sometimes as a prelude to
execution; the indiscriminate use of antipersonnel mines and indiscriminate attacks prejudicing civilians and civilian property; the recruitment of minors and the violation of due process guarantees
when trials are undertaken; the internal displacement of civilian
population; attacks on protected medical personnel, vehicles and
installations; and perfidy.' 8 With the exception of death threats,
these violations are quantitatively less significant than those relating to political killings and hostage-taking. Finally, it should be
noted that the ELN continues to attack oil installations and infrastructure, such as pipelines carrying petroleum and gas, often resulting in grave consequences for civilians and the surrounding environment."
The Colombian security forces, notwithstanding a quantitative
drop in the level of abuses directly attributable to their members in
recent years, continue to commit serious violations of human rights
and humanitarian law, including massacres, summary executions,
forced disappearances, torture, death threats, and arbitrary detentions, all with little apparent effort or desire to punish those responsible."' In addition, there is also substantial evidence that state security forces, especially the army, have carried out indiscriminate
and disproportionate attacks resulting in the loss of civilian lives
and damage to civilian installations, in some cases through intense
aerial bombings."' On occasion, the indiscriminate and disproportionate use of lethal force at military roadblocks produces civilian
casualties in violation of basic humanitarian principles." 12
108. See HCHR Report, supra note 68, paras. 97, 102; WAR WITHOUT
QUARTER, supra note 1, at 131-91.

109. See HRW 1999, supra note 83, at 112 (noting that in 1998 alone, one
particular pipeline was bombed over forty times); see also Marisol G6mez Gi-

raldo, A Machuca la arras6elfuego, EL TIEMPO, Oct. 19, 1998, at A l (reporting
a case where a resulting spill caught on fire and incinerated 69 villagers sleeping
nearby).
110. See IACHR THIRD REPORT, supra note 103, paras. 166-233; see also
IRW 1999, supra note 83, at 109-10.
111. See IACHR THIRD REPORT, supra note 103, ch. IV, paras. 178-89.
112. See id. paras. 190-95.
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Frequently at the heart of these violations is the "Colombian
army's consistent and pervasive failure or unwillingness to distinguish civilians from combatants in accordance with the laws of
war.""

3

This view is grounded in the army's publicly stated belief

that only fifteen percent of the insurgents against whom they are
waging the war are armed guerrilla fighters; the other eighty-five
percent engage in what the army calls the "political war" carried
out-they say-by members of Colombian human rights nongovernmental organizations ("NGOs"), trade unions, and political
parties."4 It is this attitude ingrained in the armed forces, which has
fueled the "dirty war" in Colombia. During 1998, in those regions
where paramilitary forces were weak,
the army was directly implicated in the killing of civilians and prisoners
taken hors de combat, as well as torture and death threats. In the rest of
the country, where paramilitaries had developed a pronounced presence
over the past decade, the army still failed to move against them and tolerated their activity, including egregious violations of international humanitarian law; provided some paramilitary groups with intelligence
and logistical support to carry out operations: and actively promoted and
coordinated joint maneuvers with them."'
The National Police, to a lesser degree, were also implicated in

human rights and humanitarian law violations during 1998, including extra-judicial executions, death threats, and association
with paramilitary groups in much the same way as the Colombian
116
army.
The intense levels of political violence described above contributed to the increase in the already significant numbers of internally
displaced persons ("IDPs") in Colombia, such that by 1998, the7
displaced population in the country totaled well over one million."'
As in years past, the principal causes of internal displacement continued to be violations of human rights and the laws of war by all

113. WAR WITHOUT QUARTER, supra note 1,at 44.
114. See HCHR Report, supra note 68, para. 112.
115. HRW 1999, supra note 83, at 109-10.
116. Seeid.atlll.
117. See id. at 112; see also HCHR Report, supra note 68, at 96, 103.
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parties to the conflict. ' 8 Not surprisingly, the paramilitaries are responsible for generating the vast majority of internal displacement,
followed by the guerrillas and the army." 9 In this respect, the High
Commissioner for Human Rights expressed concern that "[t]he enforced displacement of the civilian population is being used as a
war strategy
by the armed forces, police and paramilitary
120
groups.'
Impunity is a longstanding phenomenon in Colombia, which
both underlies and compounds this crisis. Official statistics corroborated by independent observation of international experts confirm that impunity for violent crimes in Colombia is-and has been
for many years-nearly 100 percent, especially when those crimes
are carried out for political reasons.' The Human Rights Unit of
the Office of the Prosecutor General reported that between October
1995 and September 1997, it was aware of only 260 criminal investigations being carried out for crimes considered human rights
or humanitarian law violations, of which 137 were still in their preliminary stages. Of these investigations, twenty-seven were for
massacres, thirty for cases of forced disappearances, and eightyeight for politically motivated homicides.' 22 Even though slight progress has recently been made by the Prosecutor's Office in the judicial pursuit of paramilitary members and their supporters,"' the vast
majority of politically motivated crimes carried out by illegal
armed groups, as well as state agents, continues to go unpunished.'24
118. See HRW 1999, supra note 83, at 112.
119. See HCHR Report, supra note 68, para. 102.
120. Id. para. 97.
121. See IACHR THIRD REPORT, supra note 103, ch. V,paras. 12-14; see also
HCHR Report, supra note 68, paras. 117-24.
122. See HCHR Report, supra note 68, para. 120.
123. See No coinciden cifras de Fiscalia y Mindefensa sobre "paras", El Espectador, Jan. 15, 1999, at 7A (reporting that 418 persons were arrested during
1998 on charges related to paramilitary activity, according to the Prosecutor's
Office).
124. A major underlying factor is the incapacity of the military justice system
to operate impartially and independently and, consequently, its flagrant disregard
for alleged human rights and IHL violations. As a general rule with no known
exceptions, military personnel charged with crimes relating to these types of
violations are routinely absolved, even where the evidence of participation in
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C. NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION OF

IHL

The foregoing sections outlined the nature of the conflict and described the human rights and humanitarian law crisis it has generated. This section addresses national efforts to implement IHL and
opens with an introduction to the Colombian political system. The
next and final section of Part I touches upon the ongoing peace process initiated by recently elected President Andr~s Pastrana. It concentrates on the positions adopted by the parties to the conflict in
relation to humanitarian law.
It will be evident throughout the remainder of Part I that the
broad normative overlap between IIL and the international law of
human rights reflects an essential concept underpinning the discussion.'2 In practice, the lines dividing these two related domains of
international law are frequently blurred, especially in noninternational conflicts like the one in Colombia. For purposes of
this study, the reader should assume, as is usually the case, that
human rights violations committed by state agents in the course of
the armed conflict also constitute violations of the applicable laws
of war. Although there may be cases where state agents transgress
humanitarian norms without violating human rights (by failing to
respect the neutrality of medical personnel, for example), all the
grave violations of humanitarian law by the Colombian security
forces entail serious violations of human rights law as well.
Consequently, all measures directed at curbing or sanctioning
conventional human rights violations in Colombia should be construed as directly relevant to the analysis of humanitarian law violations, which result from the action of state forces. On the other
hand, the abuses and atrocities committed by paramilitary groups,
when they are not acting as state agents, or by the guerrillas, are
only violations of the laws of war in the terms described below in
these crimes is "irrefutable." See HRW 1999, supra note 83, at 110; HCHR
1999, supra note 82, paras. 61, 151.
125. See generally THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNAL STRIFE:
THEIR INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION (1987); see also Antonio Augusto Cancado

Trindade, Aproxintaciones o convergencias entre el derecho internacional humanitarioy la protecci6n internacional de los derechos hunnanos, MEMORIA:
SEMINARIO INTERAMERICANO SOBRE LA PROTECCION DE LA PERSONA EN
SITUACIONES DE EMERGENCtA 33 (1996).
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Part II, Section B.2, of this Article. While it is true that individuals
who commit crimes against humanity or war crimes will be subject
to international criminal responsibility,'26 under traditional principles of international law, private actors do not violate human rights
because human rights obligations attach primarily to government
and state agents.127 IHL, on the other hand, contemplates intemational responsibility for individuals and non-state actors who act in
contravention of its provisions. The nature of these obligations with
respect to state, paramilitary and guerrilla forces are explored ftirther in Part II.
1. Introduction to the Colombian PoliticalSystem
The 1991 Constitution establishes Colombia as a socialdemocratic state based on the rule of law ("Estado social de derecho"). 2' It provides for the separation of the executive, legislative
and judicial branches and their respective autonomy and independence.' 29 The Congress is bicameral, consisting of the Senate and the
House of Representatives ("Ccimara de Representantes"); it is
charged with making the laws and exercising "political control"
over the government and its administration. 3 The President,"' who

126. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, UN Doc.
A/CONF. 183/9, arts. 7, 8 [hereinafter ICC Statute]; see also Kadic v. Karadzic,
70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that Karadzic may be found liable for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity in his private capacity). This subject is developed infra in Part II.B.3.
127. It is beyond the purview of this Article to engage the vanguard question
of whether individuals or private entities violate international human rights. For
one view that private individuals may violate another's human rights, see
ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PRIVATE SPHERE (1993). For the

contrary view, see Ramiro de Jesus Pazos and Juan Fernando Jaramillo, Responsabilidadde agentesparticularesen violaciones de derechos humanos y conflict
arinado, Serie: Investigaciones Plataforma de Derechos Humanos, Democracia y
Desarrollo (No.2), Novib, Santiago, Chile (1995).
128. See COLOM. CONST. art. 1.
129. See id. arts. 113-16, 228. See generally TULIO ELI CHINCHILLA,
CONSTITUCI6N POLITICA DE COLOMBIA COMENTADA POR LA COMISION
COLOMBIANA DE JURISTAS: DE LA ORGANIZACION DEL ESTADO 30-33 (1996)
[hereinafter ORGANIZATION OF THE STATE].
130. COLOM. CONST. art. 114.

131. See id. art. 115.
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is directly elected every four years, heads the government along
with his ministers and the directors of administrative departments." 2
The judicial branch is comprised of the Constitutional Court, the
Supreme Court, the Council of State ("Consejo de Estado"), the Office of the Prosecutor General ("FiscaliaGeneral de la Naci6n"),
the Superior Judiciary Council ("Consejo Superior de la Judicatura"), the lower tribunals and the judges who administer justice."'
The court system is composed essentially of two main jurisdictions,
the ordinary and the military.'
In the ordinary jurisdiction, the Supreme Court of Justice is the
highest judicial organ, followed by the appellate level courts and
the trial level courts consisting of one judge. These appellate and
trial level courts have jurisdiction over civil, criminal, family,
agrarian and labor matters. The Military Courts function separately
with jurisdiction over members of the armed forces and police
charged with crimes carried out "in relation to" their public service.'35 The military jurisdiction is organized into lower courts, one
appellate level court called the Military Appeals Court ("Tribunal
Superior Militar"), and the Supreme Court of Justice as a court of
cassation ("casaci6n"). A parallel system of Public Order, or "Regional" courts as they are officially known, operates within the ordinary criminal jurisdiction for crimes deemed to represent a threat
to national security, such as terrorism, drug trafficking, kidnapping
and subversion.'
The Council of State is the maximum administrative law body,"'
while the Superior Judiciary Council is charged with the admini-

132. See id. arts. 115, 190.
133. See id. arts. 116, 228.
134. See generally Report of the Special rapporteuron the independence of
judges and laityers, Mr. Param Cumaraswany. to the 54th Commission on Human Rights on the mission to Colombia, E/CN.4/1998/39/Add.2 [hereinafter Cumaraswamy] (providing a detailed description of the Colombian political and judicial system).
135. See COLOM. CONST. art. 221.
136. See Cumarasvwany, supra note 134, Part II (noting that these courts are
infamous for relying on "faceless" or anonymous judges, prosecutors and even
witnesses).
137. See COLOM. CONST. art. 237.
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stration of the judiciary in general,'38 which includes selecting candidates for vacant posts and internal disciplinary matters. "9 The Superior Judiciary Council also decides conflict of law cases between
the military and ordinary jurisdictions.'40 Criminal proceedings are
brought by the Office of the General Prosecutor ("FiscaliaGeneral
de la Naci6n"), 41 which is responsible, directly or as a result of a
complaint or a claim, for investigating offenses and bringing
charges against suspects in the competent tribunals.'4 As already
noted, prosecutors try crimes deemed to present a threat to national
security in the Regional Court system. 43 It is necessary to point out,
however, that in the investigative phase, the Prosecutor acts as the
judicial authority and can issue arrest warrants and writs of detention, order searches, and embargo property. When the case is elevated to trial status, a judge is assigned and the Prosecutor then assumes the exclusive role of accusing.'"
The Constitutional Court has become in many ways the backbone of the Colombian judiciary since its establishment in 1991
under the new Constitution. The Court is composed of nine judges
elected for one period only of eight years by the Senate, upon proposals made by the President, the Supreme Court and the Council
of State. 45 Article 241 affirms that the Constitutional Court is
charged with "guarding the integrity and supremacy of the Constitution.' ' 4 6 Article 241 also deems the Constitutional Court the final
arbiter of constitutionality with respect to proposed constitutional
amendments, executive declarations of a state of emergency, legislative decrees, referendums, international treaties ratified by Congress, ordinary laws and special constitutional remedies.' 47 The pur-

138. See id. art. 254.
139. See id. art. 256.
140. Seeid.
141. See id. art. 249.
142. See COLOM. CONST. art. 250.
143. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
144. See COLOM. CONST. art. 251.
145. See id. arts. 231,233.
146. See id. art. 241 (translation by author).
147. See id.
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pose behind establishing a special jurisdiction and centralized judiciary body for constitutional review was to remove these and other
related issues from the ambit of political deliberation."'
Rounding out the constitutional system in Colombia is the Public
Ministry ("Ministerio Pblico"), an authority with oversight functions established by the Constitution as a sort of "fourth branch"
independent of the others.'49 The Public Ministry is headed by the
Procurator General ("Procurador General") who is the highest
authority on disciplinary matters relating to the official conduct of
persons in public service. 50 As maximum guardian of the public
interest, human fights and the rule of law, the Procurator's Office
monitors the official conduct of public servants, including members
of the police and the armed forces.'"' It has the authority to investigate misconduct and impose the appropriate administrative sanctions, such as suspension or dismissal from office. More generally,
the Procurator may also present draft laws to Congress on any
matter relating to its legal mandate.':
Just below the Procurator in the Public Ministry is the Human
Rights Ombudsman or Defender of the People ("Defensor del
Pueblo").'53 The Ombudsman's Office is constitutionally mandated
to oversee the "promotion, exercise and dissemination of human
rights," which under Colombian constitutional jurisprudence are
interpreted as including humanitarian law norms. '" In furtherance
of this objective, the Constitution expressly authorizes the Ombudsman to counsel citizens and the public with respect to their
rights, and to assume the public defense of indigents in criminal
cases. Like the Procurator, the Ombudsman's constitutional faculties include the promotion of draft laws before Congress relating to
any of the subjects within his or her competence. By law, the Om-

148. See ORGANIZATION OF THE STATE, supra note 129, at 46 (commenting on
the motives behind the creation of a constitutional court).
149. See COLOM. CONST. arts. 275-79.
150. See id. art. 275, 277.
151. See id. art. 277.
152. See id. art. 278.
153. See id. art. 281.
154. See id. art. 282; infra note 160 and accompanying text.
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budsman's Office can receive and give course to individual complaints of human rights and humanitarian law violations."' Although it does not act as a jurisdictional body on these matters, it
can refer these cases to the appropriate judicial or disciplinary
authorities for action.
2. Implementation of InternationalHumanitarianLaw
In this section, national implementation of IHL is examined with
reference to three distinct types of actors: government and state
authorities, non-state actors, in particular NGOs, and the International Committee of the Red Cross ("ICRC"). With respect to the
national authorities, implementation refers to all legal and non-legal
measures-legislative, judicial, administrative, disciplinary, promotional, or practical-adopted in furtherance of the state's international obligations to apply and respect IHL, and to guarantee that
it is complied with. Non-governmental actors such as NGOs and
the ICRC are considered to the extent that they direct their activities and efforts at promoting the application of IHL by all the parties to the conflict. Finally, it should be underscored that the armed
non-state actors who are parties to the conflict-the guerrilla and
certain paramilitary groups-are under a duty to "implement" humanitarian law by adopting the practices and regulations required
to ensure respect 6for its provisions insofar as their belligerent activity is concerned.1
a. Government and State Authorities
Colombia falls squarely within the international regime for the
regulation of non-international armed conflict. Colombia is a party
155. Law 24 of 1992 established four distinct bureaus or dependencies within
the Ombudsman's Office, one of which is the National Directorate for the Reception and Processing of Complaints [Direcci6n Nacional de Atencidn y
Trmite de Quejas]. See Defensoria Del Pueblo, IV Informe Annual Del Defensor Del Pueblo Al Congreso de Colombia, 77 (1997).
156. See Colombian Red Cross, supra note 20, at 16-20; see also Adam Roberts, The Laws of War: Problems of Implementation in Contemporary Conflicts,
6 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 14 (1995) (explaining how the actions of nongovernmental bodies not directly involved in a conflict can affect implementation
through efforts to secure compliance by belligerents, including situations where
belligerents have committed major violations of the rules).

1999]

HORS DE LOGIQU'E

to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 for the Protection of
Victims of War, 57 and to Protocol Il Additional to the same Geneva
Conventions.' 8 Article 93 of the Colombian Constitution states that
the "international treaties and conventions ratified by Congress
which recognize human rights... will prevail in the internal [legal]
order [over ordinary laws]. The rights and duties consecrated in this
Charter shall be interpreted in conformity with the international
human rights treaties ratified by Colombia."' " The Constitutional
Court has held that Article 93 covers humanitarian law treaties as
well since they are part of the same generic body of norms as human rights and belong to the same international regime for the
protection of the rights of all human beings."
Moreover, the Constitutional Court has expressly held that all
IlIL has constitutional rank in Colombia and is, therefore, the supreme law of the land. 611 The Court found that humanitarian norms
are an integral part of what it calls the ."bloc of constitutionality'
which comprises those rules which, whether formally articulated in
the Constitution or not, are used as parameters to test the constitutionality of the laws.' 62 The Court arrives at this conclusion by interpreting the express terms of Article 214, cited below, in light of
Article 93, as follows:
In the case of Colombia, these humanitarian norms are especially im-

157. The four Geneva Conventions of 1949, supra note 12, were ratified in
Colombia by Law 5 of 1960.
158. Protocol II, supra note 13, was ratified by Law 171 of 1994 and has been
in force since February 15, 1996.
159. COLOM. CONST. art. 93 (translation by author).
160. See C.C., 1993, C-027, quoted
SARMIENTO, CONSTITUCION POLTICA
COMIS1ON COLOMBIANA DE JURISTAS:
GARANTiAS Y LOS DEBERES 436 (1997)

in MANUEL BARRETO AND LIBARDO
DE COLOMBIA COMENTADA POR LA
TITULO 1l:DE LOS DERECHOS, LAS
[hereinafter TITLE I1](discussing the

scope and nature of the Constitutional Court's human rights jurisdiction).
161. See C.C., 1995, C-225, at 41-42.
162. Frits Kalshoven, Protocol II, the CDDH and Colombia 11 (undated)
[hereinafter Kalshoven Protocol II]; see also, Frits Kalshoven, El Protocolo II,
/a
CDDH y Colombia, in DERECHO INTERNACIONAL HUMANITARIO APLICADO:
CASOS DE COLOMBIA, EL SALVADOR. GUATEMALA. YUGOSLAVIA Y RUANDA

(Alvaro Villarraga ed., 1998) (all subsequent citations will be to the original text
in English).
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perative; since article 214 paragraph 2 of the Constitution states that,
'the rules of international humanitarian law shall in all cases be respected'. This means ... that in Colombia international humanitarian
law not only is valid at all times but also that it is automatically incorporated into 'the internal national order' ....

Consequently, the members

of the irregular armed groups as well as all state officials, especially all
the members of the security forces who are the natural subjects of humanitarian norms, are obligated to respect the rules of international humanitarian law at all times and in all places.'

The foregoing establishes that there is a constitutional obligation
on the government, as well as on the legislative and judicial
authorities, to ensure that humanitarian law is fully integrated into
the internal legal order and duly enforced. In addition to the Constitutional Court, a few other national authorities such as the Council of State, the Office of the Procurator General and the Human
Rights Ombudsman have made efforts to interpret domestic norms
in conformity with Colombia's obligations under IHL.'6 Unfortunately, this incipient practice, while significant, is not indicative of
the prevalent view and practice displayed by many other authorities, including the government, that tend to restrict the legal operation of IHL in the country. In particular, it contrasts sharply with
the absence of any formal legislation implementing IHL and with
the general lack of judicial enforcement of humanitarian norms by
most courts.
The progressive jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court with
respect to IHL has not been matched by the formal legislative and
regulatory efforts necessary, as a practical matter, to implement
humanitarian norms and to have them applied as law by most Colombian authorities. Colombia has, at the very least, been subject to

163. C.C., 1995, C-225, at 40 (translation by author); see also TITLE lI, supra
note 160, at 436. It is interesting to note that in the same decision, the Court, referring to the Geneva Conventions and both Protocols, expressed the view that
humanitarian law has achieved peremptory status under international law and is
consideredjus cogens. See id.
164. See Cruz Roja Colombiana, Estudio Consuetudinario sobre Derecho Internacional Humanitario en Colombia, Bogotd (1998) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with author) [hereinafter CRC Study]. This study was commissioned by
the ICRC as part of an ongoing world-wide review of the status of humanitarian
norms under customary international law.
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the common Article 3 regime of protection since the late 1960s.'
Yet a 1995 study carried out by the Colombian Red Cross in conjunction with government authorities and a local university found
that there was no legislation incorporating humanitarian law violations per se into Colombian criminal law.'" It is true that related
crimes such as homicide, kidnapping and torture, among others, are
proscribed in the Colombian Penal Code and the new Military Penal Code. 67 No specific legal consideration, however, is given to
the laws of war in these criminal codes, except for a handful of articles in the latter promisingly entitled "Crimes Against the Civilian
Population." Unfortunately, the only IHL-inspired crimes stipulated
in this section are the wanton destruction of temples, monuments or
other structures of "public utility," attacks against hospitals, pillage
and plunder, and the unwarranted search of persons."" This nod to
Geneva-based IHL replaces an equally minimalist article in the
previous Military Penal6 Code that focused on norms derived from
the Law of the Hague.1 9
165. See Alvaro Villarraga, Antecedentes v elenentos de ,hagn6stico: rasgos
del conflicto armado y del derecho humianitario en Colonbia, in DERECHO
INTERNACIONAL

HUMANITARIO

APLICADO:

CASOS

SALVADOR, GUATEMALA, YUGOSLAVIA Y RUANDA

DE

COLOMBIA,

EL

262 (Alvaro Villarraga ed.,

1998).
166. See Colombian Red Cross, supra note 20, at 27-28.
167. See, e.g., COLOMBIAN PENAL CODE (C.P.C.), arts. 268, 269 (kidnapping),
and 323 (homicide). The new Military Penal Code [C.P.M.] which became law in
August of 1999 (Law 522 of August 12, 1999) states in Article 195: "When a
member of the Security Forces in active service and in relation to this service
commits a crime established in the ordinary Penal Code [... ], he or she shall be
investigated and tried in conformity with the provisions of the Military Penal
Code." Id. (translation by author). A similar rule prevailed under the prior Code
as well.
168. See C.P.M. arts. 174-79 (translation by author). For a further discussion
of the Military Penal Code, see infra notes 192-96 and accompanying text.
169. The only reference to the IHL in the prior Military Penal Code adopted in
1988 was Article 169, which read:
Modalities: Imprisonment from one (1) to five (5) years will be imposed on
anyone who 1) Obligates a prisoner of war to engage in combat against his
own country, or submits him to physical or moral mistreatment, or relieves
him of his belongings with the intent to appropriate them for himself. 2)
Takes the belongings of dead persons on the battlefield. 3) Employs in undue fashion the insignias, flags or emblems of the Red Cross or of organiza-
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The second obstacle to the practical application of IHL in Colombia is that without specific implementing legislation, most national courts will not apply international law norms "directly" in
specific 1cases,
even where they are of constitutional rank, as is the
70
case here. Many Colombian jurists believe that these norms are
"directly and immediately applicable" by judges, and that they do
not "require any type of additional legislative development .... '"7
This was, in fact, the import of the holding in the 1995 Constitutional Court case cited at the outset of this section. Yet the Colombian Supreme Court previously held that international law "is for-

tions [organismos] accepted under international law. 4) Employs weapons
prohibited by international law for making war or carries it out contrary to
the law of nations [der-echo de gentes].
Id. (translation by author). Neither this article nor any of its contents appears in
the new Military Penal Code.
170. See Mario Madrid-Malo, Aplicaci6n actual de los instrumentos internationales sobr-e derechos humanos y derecho humanitario, in ESPACIOS
INTERNACIONALES PARA LA JUSTICIA COLOMBIANA: VOL. III 31 (1992) [hereinafter Madrid-Malo]; See also Kalshoven, supra note 162, at 17. Humanitarian
law treaties, like human rights treaties, must necessarily be applied by the courts
once they have been ratified by the state and "acquired formal validity in the domestic legal system." See Benedetto Conforti, National Courts and the International Law of Human Rights, in ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGiITS IN
DOMESTIC COURTS 7 (Benedetto Conforti & Francesco Francioni eds., 1997).

171.

See, e.g., Ivan Orozco Abad, El derecho humanitario en la nueva Con-

stitucin nacional, in EsPACIOS INTERNACIONALES PARA LA JUSTICIA
COLOMBIANA VOL. III 187 (1993) (translation by author). Several complex con-

stitutional questions arise from the obligation to apply self-executing conventional norms of IHL. For a relevant and useful discussion of these questions in
relation to international human rights treaties and their enforcement in national
courts, see generally Conforti, supra note 170. It seems evident, for instance, that
the direct application of IHL in criminal proceedings may contravene the general
principle that there can be no crime without a law to prescribe it (nullum crinen
sine lege). Specifically at issue is the principle of maximum certainty or legality,
since the alleged offenses, strictly speaking, would not be found in the codified
criminal law. See ANDREW ASHWORTH, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 59, 64

(1991) (outlining the non-retroactivity and maximum certainty principles). In
both civil and criminal actions (where the latter is allowed, say, under a ts cogens theory), the direct application of IHL by national courts would give rise to
the question of whether they are competent to fashion a remedy or impose a penalty in the absence of specific legislation, a question which presents thorny separation of powers problems in many jurisdictions. I am particularly indebted to
Professors Lori Damrosch and Peter Danchin for their contribution to the analysis of these considerations.
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eign to the Court's national jurisdiction," and had in several instances refused to apply it."2 As a general rule, most lower courts
and judicial officials today continue to conform to the tenets reflected in the latter view, and will not base their decisions on IHL
in the absence of a national norm to support it.'' As a result, Colombian jurists in the past have observed that "some sort of juridical technology" impedes international humanitarian norms from
transforming into "authentic law" within Colombian legal society
in the absence of express legislative action,'" an observation that
largely holds true today.
An example of this complex legal dynamic is provided by the
Special Human Rights Unit of the Office of the Prosecutor General,
established in 1995. The Human Rights Unit defines its subject
matter as covering humanitarian law violations by the parties to the
conflict, including those committed by the guerrillas, despite the
fact that it can only act based on the Colombian Penal Code."'
Thus, the Human Rights Unit may carry out investigations of military personnel, guerrillas, and paramilitaries for alleged IHL violations, but can only prosecute these actors when their acts constitute
crimes defined under Colombian criminal law:
The lack of proscription of the grave infractions of IHL in the ordinary
penal code may constitute the principal limitation on the Prosecutor's
Office to pursue the conduct of state agents. private individuals acting
illegally with the formers support or tolerance, and members of insurgent groups who
commit with each passing day greater attacks on the
76
laws of war.'

That fact that humanitarian law has not been formally integrated
into Colombian criminal law is a major impediment to its legal enforcement in the country. Notwithstanding this factor, some public

172. Colombian Supreme Court, Judgement of September 12, 1991, quoted in
Madrid-Malo, supra note 170, at 31.
173. See Interview with Ral Hernndez Rodriguez, Consultant to the Colombian Red Cross, in Bogota, Colombia (Jan. 14, 1999) [hereinafter Ratil
Hem.ndez].
174. Madrid-Malo, supra note 170, at 31 (translation by author).
175. See Colombian Red Cross, supra note 20, at 101.
176. Id. (translation by author).
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authorities have succeeded in incorporating IHL standards into national jurisprudence and applying them in practice. The Constitutional Court has been at the vanguard of such efforts, and is particularly active in this respect. Similarly, the administrative courts,
including the Council of State, have repeatedly found the state responsible and ordered compensation for breaches of public duty by
its agents through the interpretation and application of humanitarian
standards under Colombian law. 77 Since 1995, administrative investigations leading to sanctions, such as dismissal from public office, in theory can be carried out by the Human Rights Unit of the
Procurator General's Office for violations of the pertinent human7
1
rights and humanitarian law instruments ratified by Colombia.1
Since public officials in the Procurator's Office are wary of exercising this unorthodox capacity, they have tended to base their often-controversial decisions on the more conventional rules contained in the Unified Disciplinary Code rather than citing to
humanitarian norms.7 9 According to public statements recently
made by the Deputy Procurator, however, efforts are underway to
reform the Code in order to incorporate IHL formally into its provisions and this allows for the adoption of disciplinary measures expressly on the basis of humanitarian law violations.
Overall, most government and state authorities that have the legal authority to promote a greater implementation of humanitarian
norms by adopting internal regulations or sponsoring legislative
initiatives to this effect have not done so.'" With a few notable exceptions discussed below, the Executive Branch's general lack of
initiative in this respect has been notorious.' 8' The Ministry of the
Interior, for instance, has constitutional competence over the subject of IHL and its application in the domestic sphere, but by the
end of 1998 had failed to act upon it. One exception to this institutional lack of initiative is the Prosecutor General (part of the Judicial Branch) who recently took concrete steps to advance the inte-

177. CRC Study, supra note 164, passim.
178. See Colombian Red Cross, supra note 20, at 103-04.
179. See id. at 105-06.
180. See id. at 27-28.
181.

See generall),id.at 37-95.
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gration of IHL into the domestic legal order. The Prosecutor General presented a proposed reform of the Colombian Penal Code to
the Colombian Congress, which, if passed, would incorporate many
humanitarian norms into ordinary criminal law.' " The proposed
legislation, aimed at strengthening the legal bases for prosecution
of guerrillas and non-state agents who are members of the paramilitary groups, is currently under consideration by the Colombian
Congress. 183
The Colombian government's acceptance of IHL has been better
than its efforts at implementation. Former President Ernesto Samper (1994-1998) established that Protocol II would apply to all
public servants, particularly those in the armed forces and police, as
a matter of constitutional law and presidential policyY" Under the
Samper Administration, the President issued an order in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief stating that public servants would be
bound to "unilaterally" apply the rules of Protocol II.'" The government (like its predecessors) did not want to accept that Protocol
II applies objectively under the terms of Article 1 defining the
scope of material application, nor engage in what it considered a
"political debate" on the issue.' 6 In all fairness, the government under President Samper did initiate a study of legal mechanisms for
incorporating IHL into Colombian legislation,"" although this particular process seems to have been sidelined after the election of the
current President and his installation in August of 1998.

182. See HCHR 1999, supra note 82, para. 135. "The new draft Penal Code,
which has still not been enacted, criminalizes genocide, enforced disappearance,
torture, the killing of protected persons, hostage-taking, forced displacement and
other acts against persons and property protected by international humanitarian
law." Id.
183. See id.
184. See Colombian Red Cross, supra note 20. at 25-26.
185. See id.
186. Id. at 26.
187. See, e.g., id. This study was commissioned as a first step towards defining
a government policy for the legal implementation of IHL norms, a process for
which the Colombian government has received technical assistance from the
ICRC. See RaAl Hernndez, supra note 173. Mr. Hemndez is one of the authors
of the report sponsored by the Colombian Red Cross and the Colombian Government cited, supra note 20, an updated version of which is due out in 1999.
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Recently elected President Andres Pastrana (1998-2002) apparently maintains the view that Protocol II applies to the internal war
as a matter of express government policy. In its most recent report
on the situation in Colombia, the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights affirmed that:
[i]t is not necessary [to] establish if the nature and intensity of the domestic violence in Colombia constitute an internal armed conflict nor
identify the specific rules of humanitarian law which govern the conflict. This is because Colombia... has openly recognized the factual reality that it is engaged in a conflict of said nature and that common Article 3 ... , Protocol II ... , and other customary rules and principles
which govern internal armed conflicts are applicable.""

It must be emphasized, however, that the question of whether
Protocol II applies directly to the conflict under international law is
still contested in many circles. The outstanding issue remains
whether Article l's criteria for application are met by the conditions of Colombia's war.'89 In any case, President Pastrana has
given IHL high political priority by making it the first item on the
government's agenda in its negotiations with the FARC guerrillas
which began in January of 1999.'90 The new government's policy
with respect to IHL is further examined in the last section of this
part, which discusses the ongoing peace process.
Given their role in the conflict, special attention should be paid
to the efforts made by the Ministry of Defense and the Colombian
military forces in furthering the civilian government's policy of
improving the level of respect for human rights and humanitarian
law. In 1995, the government of President Samper, responding to
intense national and international pressure to establish formal accountability over violations of human rights and IHL, undertook a
process to reform the Military Penal Code in order to align it with
international standards.'9 ' The resulting commission charged with

188. IACHR THIRD REPORT, supra note 103, ch. IV, para. 20.
189. See Gustavo Gall6n Giraldo & Carlos Rodriguez Mejia, Aplicaci6n dl
derecho internacionalhumanitario en Colombia: posibilidadesy dificultades, in
CCJ 1996, supra note 82, at 199-214; Villarraga, supra note 165, at 277.
190. See discussion infra Part I.D. 1.
191. See CCJ 1995, supra note 84, at 71-73.
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the reform produced a draft military penal code that made some
headway in this direction. The proposed draft code eventually presented to Congress by the Samper Administration, for example, incorporated egregious human rights and humanitarian law violations
into its substantive provisions.1 9 This modernization of the Military
Penal Code met strong resistance in the Congress, where it appeared to be mired in parliamentary procedure with little possibility
of passage in the near future.'9 ' In June of 1999, however, the Colombian Congress, with little advance warning and virtually no debate, adopted a totally revised version of the draft penal code in
which almost all reference to IHL was removed, except for a small
handful of minor crimes already mentioned." The new Military
Penal Code, whose furtive adoption and rapid ratification left many
observers baffled, was signed into law in August of 1999.'
More progress has been made in the field of promotion and dissemination of humanitarian norms. In 1995, the Ministry of Defense issued a key directive or internal regulation aimed at developing the government's policy with respect to human rights and
IHL.' 96 The 1995 Directive developed three central points. First, it

192. See Draft text of the military penal code (Feb. 1999) (unpublished text, on
file with author). Title II of the proposed draft code under discussion was dedicated to crimes arising from the violations of humanitarian law protections, i.e.,
ch. V, art. 133, which deals with the treatment of prisoners of war.
193. See HCHR 1999, supra note 82, pam. 137; see also HRW 1999, supra
note 83, at 111; Patricia Lara, supra note 32, at 23-24.
194. See generally Lo felicito, EL TIENIPO, June 19, 1999. at A9; Tortura,
fuera dejusticia militar EL TIEMPO, June 17, 1999, at A7. On June 16, 1999, the
Senate approved the draft code "in a blink of an eye," notwithstanding that it
contains over 650 articles. Lofelicito at A9. Its sudden appearance the same day
before the House of Representatives was, to say the least, surprising, but it was
nonetheless adopted almost immediately and without debate. See Pupitrazo a 36
proyectos, EL TIEMPO, June 16, 1999, at A7.
195. See Interview with Andr~s Sdnchez, Congressional Liason for the Colombian Commission of Jurists, August 30, 1990, Bogoti, Colombia. According
to Andr~s Sdnchez, the new Military Penal Code was quietly mmmed through
Congress before any opposition could be rallied, apparently as a result of a political compromise between the Pastrana government and its congressional supporters, and the military High Command.
196. See Directiva Permanente No. 024 Julio 5 de 1995, Desarrollo de la
politica gubernamental en materia de derechos humanos y derecho internacional
humanitario en el Ministerio de Defensa Nacional (July 1995) (copy on file with
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established the Secretariat for Human Rights and Political Affairs
as the principal advisor to the Minister of Defense on these issues.
Second, it promoted the establishment of operative Human Rights
and Humanitarian Law Offices ("HRHL Offices") in every military
and police unit. Third, it sought to orient the operation of the Military Criminal Justice system towards greater respect for human
rights and humanitarian law.'97
Although it advanced related proposals made by prior administrations, the 1995 Directive was the first comprehensive policy
statement with institutional consequences adopted by the Colombian government for its military forces on the subject.' 9 It includes
detailed guidelines that take into account international human rights
and humanitarian standards. These guidelines instruct the Secretariat, the HRHL Offices and the military legal authorities on the activities expected of them in order to carry out their duties accordingly. 99 The institutional and policy innovations of this and other
similar Directives contributed, albeit in a largely formal sense, to
making respect for these standards a part of the operational framework of the military forces at key levels.2°°
The most tangible results of the 1995 Directive and its kin have
been the creation of HRHL Offices in most military and police
units. By the end of 1995, the Armed Forces alone had established
over 140 Human Rights and Humanitarian Law Offices, carrying
out extensive training and education in this field.20 ' The Army continues to promote training in IHL for all of its members, and officers seeking promotion must take courses in the laws of war.0 2 The
author) [hereinafter 1995 Directive].
197. See id. at 6-8.
198. Two of the more relevant orders preceding the 1995 Directive are Directiva Permanente No. 018 del 25 de mayo de 1994: Reestructuraci6n y Ampliaci6n de la Oficina de Derechos Humanos del Ministerio de Defensa y
Creaci6n de las mismas en las Fuerzas Armadas (May 1994); and Directiva Permanente No. 100-5 de septiembre 8 de 1993, sobre Normas del Derecho Internacional Humanitario (Sept. 1993), cited in Colombian Red Cross, supra note 20, at
52 n.78.
199. See 1995 Directive, supra note 196, Annexes A, B, and C.
200. See Colombian Red Cross, supra note 20, at 52.
201. See CCJ 1995, supra note 84, at 74.
202. See WAR WITHOUT QUARTER, supra note 1, at 43.
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International Committee of the Red Cross, which participates actively in the training of Army personnel,:"' has found that its curriculum has been adopted by the military for its educational purposes.2tM Similarly, the National Police have not only made
advances in adopting the language of human rights and humanitarian law,205but also conduct regular training for its members on the
subject
Despite some progress, the overall impact of the 1995 Directive
and other internal regulations should not be overstated. Overwhelming difficulties remain to an effective implementation of humanitarian standards by the Colombian military. By the end of
1998 the Army had yet to develop its own operations manual to
guide the application of IHL in conflict situations by official
forces.06 With respect to the HRHL Offices, "itappears that the
primary work of the human rights offices established in military installations involves the collection of information regarding attacks
by armed dissident groups, which are treated by the military as
"human rights violations," rather than addressing abuses committed
by members of the military. 2 17 This situation reflects the fact that
11M is still viewed suspiciously by many officials in the Ministry of
Defense and the armed forces that believe that it is inappropriate
when applied to non-international armed conflicts. These officials
insist that humanitarian norms impede military efficiency in the
context of internal war, and bestow military advantages and increased political status upon the insurgents. 2",
The reality is that the human rights and humanitarian law situation has shown no substantial improvement for over a decade,
throwing doubt on the effectiveness of the measures discussed. It is

203. See Roland Bigler, Disseminating International Humanitarian Law in
Colombia, 319 INT'L REV. RED CROSs 421, 423-25 (1997), available in,

<http://www.icrc.org> [hereinafter Bigler].
204. See WAR WITHOUT QUARTER, supra note 1,at 44.
205. See id. at 76.
206. See id. at 48; see also Rail Hernindez, supra note 173 (noting that the

armed forces have not developed their own operations manual which includes
international humanitarian norms).
207. IACHR THIRD REPORT, supra note 103. ch. IV,para. 163.
208. See Colombian Red Cross, supra note 20, at 50, 54, 102.
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true, as noted above, that the responsibility for human rights and
IHL violations by state agents has dropped in recent years."' Yet,
there is substantial evidence indicating that the paramilitary groups,
with notorious support and complicity on the part of the military
authorities, have assumed many illegal activities and "dirty war"
tactics. The Army's steadfast resistance to pursuing these groups
belies its continued and fundamental lack of commitment to the
humanitarian values protected by human rights and humanitarian
law. 21' The existence of political will to implement IHL on the part
of the government and its security forces, as well as its capacity to
guarantee respect for humanitarian norms, is thus frequently questioned.
It is for these and other related reasons that observers continue to
perceive a strong internal resistance to accepting a greater implementation of humanitarian norms in practice within the Colombian
military establishment. Further evidence is provided by the fact that
the Directive has not had much if any impact on the operation of
the military justice system. The unwillingness of military authorities to pursue violators of IHL within the army ranks feeds impunity, which, as was seen, remains virtually absolute." 2 Most recently, the failure to reform the Military Penal Code to expressly
incorporate fundamental humanitarian law norms, is, quite unfortunately, eloquent testimony to this continued resistance. While it is
true that the reform produced some important structural and normative changes, in essence the government of Colombia successfully sidestepped a clear opportunity to comply with its international and constitutional obligations that require implementation of
humanitarian law (and many key human rights) by formally integrating them into domestic legal order.2 - Moreover, it is unlikely

209. See supra notes 86 and accompanying text.
210. See sup-a notes 85-88 and accompanying text; see also discussion infra
Part II.B. 1.
211. See HCHR Report, supra note 68, paras. 175, 178; WAR WITHOUT
QUARTER, supra note 1, at 47.
212. See supra notes 121-24 and accompanying text.
213. In contrast, President Pastrana has publicly stated that his government
will promote the proposed codification of humanitarian law violations in the
Colombian Penal Code by supporting legislative initiatives directed at establish-
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that the changes that were affected will alter the Colombian Military's longstanding record of blatant disregard for human rights and
humanitarian law standards, or impede impunity. 4 Insofar as its
stated objectives are concerned, then, the 1995 Directive overall
has had little practical effect on improving-be it de jure or de
facto-the overall situation in Colombia.
The Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman has also contributed significantly to implementation measures. An institution established only in 1991, it has facilitated the dissemination of humanitarian law within Colombian society by publishing studies on
the matter, and through the reception of claims of violations of
IHL2 5 Unfortunately, these efforts have not been part of a concerted or long-term institutional strategy, and have suffered from
inconsistencies as well as substantive deficiencies. Under the current Ombudsman, for example, a project to develop a humanitarian
law methodology for application in the internal conflict by the Office's field personnel has stalled.1 ' The recent creation of a department of humanitarian affairs within the Ombudsman's Office
should contribute to improving its handling of this critical subject
matter.2 7
ing certain IHL-derived crimes. See Gobierno tras acuerdo humanilario, EL
TIEMPO, Aug. 13, 1999, at B 11.

214. The U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights in March of 1999 noted
"with the utmost concern the alarming level of impunity regarding violations of
human rights and breaches of international humanitarian law" in Colombia.
HCHR 1999, supra note 82, para. 151; HRW 1999,supra note 83, at I10-11; see
also HCHR Report, supra note 68, paras. 121-23.

215. See, e.g., DEFENSORiA DEL PUEBLO, EN DEFENSA DE LA POBLACION CIVIL:
INFORME SOBRE INFRACCIONES DEL DERECHO INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIO EN
1992 (1993); DEFENSORiA DEL PUEBLO, EN DEFENSA DEL PUEBLO ACUSO:
IMPACTOS DE LA VIOLENCIA DE OLEODUCTOS EN COLOMBIA (1997); DEFENSOR
DEL PUEBLO, CUARTO INFORME ANUAL DEL DEFENSOR DEL PUEBLO AL
CONGRESO DE COLOMBIA 59-73 (1997).
216. See Interview with Ines Margarita Uprimny, Staff Attorney, Colombian
Commission of Jurists (formerly with the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman), in BogotA, Colombia (June 16, 1998) (commenting that during Uprimny's
time as a staff attorney with the Ombudsman, she was called upon to work on the
IHL project, which was subsequently shelved).
217. See Interview with Roberto Molina, Director of Research, Colombian
Commission of Jurists, in BogotA, Colombia (Jan. 14, 1999) (discussing recent
changes within the Ombudsman office relating to humanitarian lawv).
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The purpose of this sub-section has been to examine the extent to
which IHL has been incorporated into the domestic legal and political orders. Emphasis has been placed on the role of the government
and other relevant authorities upon whom the obligation to guarantee respect for humanitarian law is most incumbent. In the next two
sub-sections, the contribution of local non-governmental organizations in implementing IHL, and the role of the International Committee of the Red Cross in this process, are reviewed.
b. Non-state actors
The important role played by NGOs and civil society in promoting the application of IHL in Colombia is difficult to define but impossible to dismiss. One example is the campaign organized by
NGOs around the ratification of Protocol II. This instrument was
ratified in 1994, seventeen years after Colombia participated in the
1977 Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts ("CDDH"). At the time, Colombia expressed serious misgivings about the interpretation of Article I (Material field of
application), and declined to become a signatory to the Protocols." '
Since then, the military and their civilian allies in the government
maintained that the ratification of Protocol II was unnecessary and
inappropriate, not least because it would bestow upon the guerrillas
the condition of belligerents and open the door to international intervention. 9 This position continued to impede ratification of Protocol II for nearly two decades. By the end of the 1980s, however,
national and international pressure on successive governments in
favor of both Protocols had reached a head. Csar Gaviria (19901994) was the first President to submit them to Congress for approval in 1990, although only Protocol I was ratified. 2 It then fell

218. See Kalshoven, supra note 162, at 4-5.
219. See Colombian Red Cross, supra note 20, at 33, 36; see also Hernando
Valencia Villa, The law of armed conflict and its application in Colombia, 274
INT'L REV. RED CROss 5, 13 (1991).
220. See ALEJANDRO VALENCIA VILLA, LA HUMANIZACION DE LA GUERRA

77-80 (199 1). With respect to the Protocols, the author states:
As a result of the visit by Cornelio Sommaruga in May of 1989, and the
pressures from civil society itself, the Barco government created an internal
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upon the Government of Ernesto Samper to resubmit Protocol II in
August of 1994.2'
Some NGOs and sectors of civil society made ratification of
Protocol II a battle cry during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Their
primary objective was to dispel the legal and political misgivings
raised by the Ministry of Defense in opposition to its ratification,
for instance by debunking the Ministry's claim that ratification
would confer legal and political status upon the insurgents! " One
well-known NGO, the Colombian Section of the Andean Commission of Jurists organized a seminar series over the course of several
years (the first three were held betveen 1989 and 1992) dedicated
to the subject of applying international human rights and humanitarian law instruments in Colombia.'" These influential seminars
brought together renowned experts who exposed the Colombian
authorities and public to the mechanics of international law and its
interplay with domestic jurisdiction.- At the time, this was a
largely unfamiliar and unexplored domain for the majority of the
Colombian legal community. Not surprisingly, special attention
was given in these seminars to the plight of Protocol IL.-5
After intense debate in the Colombian Congress during 1994,
Protocol II was finally approved without reservation in December

commission to study the possibility of submitting the Protocols for legislative approval in 1990. Nevertheless, the task was left for decision by the
government of C~sar Gaviria Trujillo....
Id. (translation by author).
221. See Colombian Red Cross, supra note 20, at 36.
222. See Hernando Valencia Villa, supra note 219, at 10-13 (exemplifying the
pre-1994 argument for why Colombia should ratify Protocol II).
223. Hernando Valencia Villa, whose article is cited supra note 219, is a
founding member of the Andean Commission of Jurists Colombian Section,
CAJ-SC, (since 1995 known as the Colombian Commission of Jurists). Valencia's article is based on a lecture given at the First Seminar on the Application of
International Human Rights Instruments in Colombia organized by the CAJ-SC
in BogotA from the March 30 to the April 1, 1989.
224. Other experts on IHL participating in the CAJ-SC-sponsored event included Professor Robert Goldman, Phillipe Gaillard of the ICRC, and Rodolfo
Mattarollo.
225. See, e.g., Madrid-Malo, supra note 170.
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of that year.226 Thus:
[d]uring [Congress'] discussion, national and international human rights
NGOs carried out an important job of persuasion vis-d-vis the Congressmen and participated actively in the sessions held by... the Senate
and the House, underlining the importance and necessity of endowing
the Colombian State with an instrument of international character to
protect the civilian population victim of the intense armed conflict ongoing in the country."'

Although the law formalizing the ratification of Protocol II was
given Presidential sanction on December 16, 1994, in a high profile
public signing, the NGO's struggle was not yet finished.2 ' In the
final stage of the ratification process, Protocol II was subjected to
review by the Constitutional Court, at which time several NGOs
went before the Court and presented oral arguments in favor of its
constitutionality. 29 Many of the arguments raised by this "impressive series of non-governmental voices" were recounted in the
Court's decision of May 18, 1995, confirming the treaty's constitutionality."O Protocol 11 finally entered into force in Colombia on
February 15, 1996."'
There can be little doubt that these activities by local NGOs in
support of Protocol II dovetailed with those of international entities
such as the ICRC, and produced a significant impact at various levels on the national debate that took place during the long ratification process. Something similar continues to take place with respect
to the Fact-Finding Commission ("Commission") created by Arti-

226. See Colombian Red Cross, supra note 20, at 37.
227. CCJ 1995, supra note 84, at 106 (translation by author).
228. See Colombian Red Cross, supra note 20, at 37.
229. See Kalshoven, supra note 162, at 9-10 (citing arguments by the Colombian Red Cross, the Episcopal Conference of Colombia, the Andean Commission
of Jurists, the Colombian Association of Democratic Lawyers, and the Comit
Nacional de Victinas de la Guerrilla).Article 241 of the Colombian Constitution
dictates that the Constitutional Court must review the constitutionality of international instruments adopted by Congress and any implementing legislation.
230. See id.
231. See Colombian Red Cross, supra note 20, at 38.
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cle 90 of Protocol 1.2 Article 90 establishes the Commission as a
mechanism designed to monitor compliance with that Protocol and
the Geneva Conventions, and to verify grave breaches or other serious violations of the same. Its operation requires 'ipso frcto and
without special agreement," that a Party to Protocol I recognize the
competence of the Commission to inquire into the allegations of
non-compliance or breach.2 " Paragraph 2(d) of Article 90 states
further that "[iln other situations, the Commission shall institute an
inquiry at the request of a Party to the conflict only with consent of
the other Party or Parties concerned." 2-4
Since its installation in 1991, the Fact-Finding Commission has
interpreted paragraph 2(d) as making it "equally competent to perform its functions in situation of internal armed conflict."2' Immediately following Congress' adoption of Protocol I,some NGOs
began to push the Colombian government to accept the competence
of the Protocol's Article 90 mechanism in accordance with the
Protocol's terms and the Commission's interpretation.!" This, they
argued, would enhance the probability and practicality of deploying
an impartial, international body prepared to monitor and verify
compliance with IHL during the conflict in the event that the other
parties to the conflict were to agree.1-" As was the case with Protocol II, the synchronized insistence from international and national
non-governmental sources apparently had a positive effect. On February 16, 1996, during his speech acknowledging Colombia's adherence to Protocol II and its entry into force, President Samper announced his government's intention to recognize the competence of
232. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3,7, 16 I.L.M. 1391, 1396 [hereinafter Protocol 1]; see also Ley 011 de
1992 (Colom.), Diario Oficial [D.O.] 405 10, July 28, 1992.
233. Protocol I, supra note 232, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 43 (Art. 90 sec. 2(d)), 16
I.L.M. at 1430.
234. Id. at 44.
235. Kalshoven, supra note 162, at 15.
236. See, e.g., CCJ 1996, supra note 82, at 155 (recommending that the Commission verify an eventual humanitarian agreement, and noting that the government accepted its competence "as repeatedly suggested by Colombian human
rights organizations.").
237. Gall6n Giraldo & Rodriguez Mejia, supra note 189. at 213-14.
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the Commission, and the government did so officially three months
later. 38
Since accepting the competence of the Commission in 1996,
Colombia has been one of the primary candidates for potential
Commission action. Through one of its most prestigious members,
Professor Frits Kalshoven, the Commission has repeatedly, albeit
discretely, expressed interest in a future role for itself in Colombia's internal conflict. For instance, Professor Kalshoven's visits,
during what he calls his "propaganda tour" of Colombia in April
1995, were critical to achieving the government's recognition of the
Commission's competence. 39 At that time, as well as on subsequent
visits, he met with both government and NGO representatives in
order to rally support for this objective.
It is possible to exaggerate the impact of the NGO community in
Colombia. NGOs are by no means unified on all issues or even on
the particulars of IHL implementation. One observer suggested recently that, while acknowledging that NGOs "in their own way
have made concrete and efficient contributions" to the promotion
and application of IHL, their participation in this process historically has been "weak. '2 40 While it is true that Colombian NGOs do
not have the political or legal weight to participate directly in governmental decision-making processes, this limited view seems
nonetheless unfair. It does not, for example, give due credit to
NGOs for their role in the promotion of IHL instruments and
mechanisms previously described. Nor does this view seem to take
into account the rapid evolution of non-governmental work with respect to the application of IHL, both in Colombia and abroad.
NGOs have labored both individually and in concert to provide
the only systematic public monitoring of IHL violations in Colombia. Two prominent NGOs, Centro de Investigati6n y Educaci6n
Popular ("CINEP") and the Justice and Peace Commission, have
established an important data bank on political violence, which explicitly covers violations of IHL by the parties to the conflict.24'
238. See Kalshoven, supra note 162, at 15-16.
239. See id. at 16.
240. Villarraga, supra note 165, at 278.
241. See supra notes 69, 71-72, 74 and accompanying text.
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Published quarterly, their bulletin on political violence is a critical
source of data for any person or institution interested in the human
rights and humanitarian law situation in Colombia. : Other wellknown human rights NGOs such as the Colombian Commission of
Jurists and the Lawyer's Collective have highlighted IHL violations
by the parties to the conflict in their reports and other publications.2 43 These too are essential reference materials for intergovernmental agencies and NGOs covering the human rights situation in
Colombia.
It is clear that many organizations and individuals in the Colombian non-governmental and academic community have expanded
their range of activities in recent years to include humanitarian law.
While initially slow, this evolution has rapidly gained momentum
and undoubtedly shaped national and international perceptions of
the internal conflict. Through research, publication, education, and
participation in political debates, the NGOs and their allies have
exerted, and continue to exert, a positive influence on Colombian
government and society. This influence has been critical to elevating IHL acceptance to where it is today. The NGO's influence in
Colombia and the role of the international community in reinforcing and supporting national civic movements like the NGOs, are
discussed further in the final part of this Article.
c. The International Committee of the Red Cross
It will come as a surprise to few people that the International
Committee of the Red Cross ("ICRC") carries out a significant part
of the work being done today in Colombia with respect to IHL. The
ICRC began its work in Colombia in 1969 by visiting detainees, but
it did not establish a permanent delegation in Bogotdi, until 1980. 2
242. See, e.g., HRV 1999, supra note 83, at 109 (citing statistics drawn from
the CINEP and Justice and Peace Data Bank). See generally Part I.B of this Article, which relies heavily on the Data Bank's information. Many sources cited in
the Article do the same, such as the reports published by the CCJ. See supra note
69.
243. See generally CCJ 1995, supra note 84, 37-61; CCJ 1996, supra note 82,
at 55-81; COLECTIVO DE ABOGADOS "JoSE ALVEAR RESTREPO," DE ESPALDAS
AL CIELO DE CARA A LA MUERTE 113-16 (1997).

244. See International Committee of the Red Cross, ICRC Special Report: The
Role of a Neutral Internlediar' in Colombia (visited Dec. 4, 1998)
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The ICRC delegation was first expanded in 1991, but it was not
until 1996 that it grew to its current proportions after a seminal
framework agreement was signed with the Colombian government
in February of that year. The February 1996 Memorandum of
Understanding greatly expanded the ICRC's legal basis and the
scope of its humanitarian assistance and dissemination operations
in the country.146 As a result, the ICRC initiated unprecedented levels of activity, including increased dissemination of knowledge of
IHL, confidential documentation and reporting of human rights
violations, humanitarian assistance to civilian victims, and acting as
a "neutral intermediary" between the parties to the conflict .247
The ICRC's role as a neutral mediator, made possible by the
1996 Agreement, is of critical importance. The ICRC has developed and maintained close ties with all the parties to the conflict,
including civilian and military authorities, the major paramilitary
groups, and the guerrilla groups, which are spread out over at least
one hundred military "fronts": "Through [these] contacts.., and
because of its international status, the ICRC has acquired the universally recognized status of neutral intermediary, to whom groups
naturally turn in their attempts to make contact and solve their differences by non-violent means. 2 48 This role of neutral intermediary, for example, was essential in permitting the ICRC to mediate
the liberation in June of 1997 of seventy captured state agents by
the FARC guerrillas.2 49 All in all, the ICRC helped liberate some
300 persons deprived of their liberty as a result of the conflict during 1997 through such contacts.250
<http://Iii,w.icrc.org/unicc/icrcnews/.nsf/5> at 12 [hereinafter ICRC Special Report].
245. See id. (noting that the ICRC's Colombian delegation, as of March 1998,
included 44 delegates and 110 Colombian employees in 12 offices).
246. See Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Colombia: signed in Bogotd (visited
Dec. 4, 1998) <http://vww.icrc.org/icrceng.nsf/Index/>.
247. See ICRC Annual Report 1996 (visited Dec. 4, 1998), <http:I/www.
icrc.org/unicc/icrcnews.nsf/5>.
248. ICRC Special Report, supra note 244, at 12.
249. See Thomas Jenatsch, The ICRC as a HumanitarianMediator in the Colombian conflict: Possibilitiesand Limits, 323 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 306, 30406 (1998).
250. See ICRC Annual Report 1997 (visited Dec. 4,
1998)
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By 1998, the ICRC planned to have nearly fifty delegates working in fifteen regional offices throughout the country, making it the
largest wartime presence in the hemisphere and an ICRC priority in
the Americas.2' Its expanded presence and contacts permit the
ICRC to carry out its promotion and dissemination activities
throughout Colombia. These activities are directed not just at the
Colombian Armed Forces and Police, but are also carried out with
respect to paramilitary and guerrilla groups.25- Others are more
geared towards reaching Colombian civil society at all levels-universities, NGOs, and the media.":" In 1997 alone the ICRC, in conjunction with the Colombian Red Cross, held some 950 dissemination sessions and events for over 47,000 people.'"
The role of non-state actors and of the ICRC in the promotion
and implementation of IHL undeniably complements that of the
Colombian authorities. Having reviewed the principal actors and
advances made in this field, this Article now turns to the final section of this first part, which examines the nascent peace process in
Colombia.
D. THE NEW PEACE PROCESS 2"

Current efforts towards a negotiated solution to Colombia's internal war represent the first significant move in this direction since
1995. President Andrrs Pastrana, elected in June 1998 and in office
since that August, made the achievement of peace one of his immediate priorities. His initiatives have opened channels for dialogue
with the FARC and ELN guerrilla groups, despite their persistent
military actions, which frequently cause civilian casualties. The
<http://www.icrc.org/unicc/icrcnews.nsf/5>[hereinafter Annual Report 1997].
25 1. See id.; ICRC Special Report, supra note 244.
252. See ICRC Special Report, supra note 244.
253. See Bigler, supra note 203, at 423-31.
254. See Annual Report 1997, supra note 250.
255. The following account of the current peace process in Colombia is drawn
from principally four sources: EL TIEMPO and EL ESPECTADOR, Colombia's two
largest dailies, and SEMANA and CAMBIO 16, the two most important weekly
magazines. The period covered is from May of 1998 to the August 1999. The
material on which this discussion is based is on file with the author. For practical
purposes specific citations will be made where necessary.
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treatment that the government has in mind for the paramilitary
forces who insist on equal political status with the guerrillas in the
negotiation process, and who continue to carry out their scorched
earth campaign against civilians, is not yet clear. Both the FARC
and the ELN appear unalterably opposed to any independent recognition within the peace process for the paramilitaries. Pastrana has
stated, however, that the government must initiate dialogue with all
the armed actors in the
conflict, even if it requires a separate nego256
tiating table for each.
The objective of this section is to canvass the principal events
taking place under the Pastrana Administration in relation to the
quest for peace and a negotiated solution to the armed conflict. The
discussion focuses on the positions and actions adopted by the different armed actors with respect to IHL.
1. The FARC
On January 7, 1999, President Andr~s Pastrana and the maximum leader of the FARC, Manuel Marulanda, were scheduled to
meet in a small rural town situated in the "demilitarized zone," an
area cleared of army and police units for purposes of initiating talks
between the government of Colombia and its largest and oldest insurgent group. The encounter was the product of difficult negotiations between the recently elected President Pastrana and the FARC
High Command carried out during the latter half of 1998. Although
the historic meeting did not take place (Marulanda did not show up
at the last minute, citing security reasons), the peace talks nonetheless got under way. Immediately after the ceremony inaugurating
the peace talks, and a preliminary agreement on procedural protocol, the two delegations exchanged their respective agendas for the
substantive negotiations, with a view toward defining a common
agenda and a corresponding timetable for its discussion. 7
First on the government's ten-item agenda was the issue of "unconditional respect for human rights and international humanitarian

256. See Paras bajo fuego, SEMANA
(visited Feb. 2,
1999)
<http://vww.semana.com/users/semana/semana99/ene25/nacion2.htm>.
257. See Jos& Navia, Buscan unificar agendas, EL TIEMPO, Jan. 12, 1999, at
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law." The government made it perfectly clear that its priority in
this respect was to reach an agreement that would put an end to the

guerrillas' practice of kidnapping and extortion.2 5 The FARC responded with a ten-point document entitled "Platform for a Government of Reconciliation and National Reconstruction," which included among its leading issues the need to reform the armed forces
and to guarantee full respect for human rights.2' Related to this is

the FARC's constant insistence that the government dismantle the
paramilitary groups, which they view as direct extensions of the
state's security forces rather than a third party' to the conflict.2
Following an offensive by paramilitary forces in January 1999, the
FARC unilaterally suspended the peace talks, and demanded effective action against paramilitary groups as a precondition for recommencing the negotiation process in April.:"
T

The FARC in their proposed agenda of January 1999 avoided
mentioning international humanitarian law. One reason for this
omission is discernible from recent press statements made by
members of the FARC's High Command. Both Marulanda and the
FARC's primary military strategist and second-in-command, Jorge
Bricefio, (a.k.a. "El Mono Jojoy") have publicly insisted that they
do not accept IHL as applicable to them because the Colombian
258. Esto propone Pastrana a las Farc, EL TIEMPO, Jan. 12, 1999, at 6A
(translation by author). The other nine items included (ii) the analysis of the social and economic issues such as poverty and unequal wealth distribution; (iii)
political reform and the strengthening of democratic institutions; (iv) a crop substitution policy to combat the cultivation of coca and amapola; (v) protection of
the environment, (vi) the combating of corruption and the strengthening of the
justice system; (vii) agrarian reform; (viii) combating the paramilitary groups;
and (ix) international support for the peace process; and (x) ensuring broad participation by civil society in the negotiation and signing of any peace agreements.
See id.
259. See Desafiosde la agendapara la paz, EL TIEMPO, Jan. 13, 1999, at 8A.
260. Esto proponePastranaa las Farc,supra note 258, at A6. Other items on
the FARC's platform addresss political and tax reform, social development and
investment, reform of agrarian and natural resources policy, and the issue of the
cultivation of illicit crops used in the drug trade. See d.
261. See 'Tirofijo' se destapa, SEMANA (visited Feb. 2. 1999) <http://www.
semana.com/users/semana/semana99/ene I8/nacion.htn>.
262. See Parasbajofuego, supra note 256; see also La guerra de lasfechas,
SEMANA,
(visited
Feb.
2,
1999)
<http://www.semana.com/users/semana/semana99/ feb I /nacion4.htm>.
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government has not recognized the FARC's status as belligerents in
the conflict:"' "[w]e have our own humanitarian law statute. We do
not accept any other, for the time being [because] we have not been
recognized as a belligerent force. We have our own disciplinary
rules, our own documents." ' The FARC insist that their military
might and territorial control elevate them to the level of belligerents
in the classical sense, thereby suggesting that the only humanitarian
law they consider relevant is that pertaining to international conflicts.265 In past negotiations, however, a humanitarian agreement
has been one of the items on the FARC's agenda for talks with the
government. 26
For a variety of reasons relating to the conditions under which
negotiations were to take place, the peace talks remained stalled
during the second trimester of 1999. In a bold attempt to jumpstart
the talks and overcome the impasse, President Pastrana proposed
that the FARC and the government negotiate humanitarian agreements to protect the civilian population constructed around five basic points: (1) special protection for children, pregnant women, and
elderly persons; (2) the establishment of "protection zones" for the
internally displaced population; (3) the prohibition against the recruitment of minors under the age of 18; (4) prevention of sexual
exploitation of women and violence against children participating
in, or affected by, the conflict; and (5) eradication of anti-personnel
landmines. 267 It is equally significant that, at the same time, diverse
263. See 'Tirofijo' se destapa, supra note 261; see also Cese alfiego con las

Farcestci lejano, EL ESPECTADOR, Jan. 10, 1999, at 5A.
264. See Cese alfuego con las Farcestci lejano, supra note 263, at 5A.

265. See 'Tirofijo'se destapa, supra note 261 (setting forth the FARC's positions that until the Colombian government recognizes the FARC as belligerents,
they will not accept the intervention of international organizations); see also El
golazo del canje, SEMANA

(visited July 31,

1999) <http://www.semana.

com/users/semana/semana99/enel8/nacion2.htm> (opining that once the Colombian government recognizes the FARC as a belligerent, the internal conflict converts into an international armed conflict and FARC guerrillas would benefit
from the protections for prisoners of war).
266. See Jos6 Ortiz Nieves, iPor qu6 ahora?,CAMBIO 16, July 13, 1998, at 20

(listing a prior 10-point platform proposed by the FARC, which includes negotiating a humanitarian agreement).
267. See Cinco propuestaspara humanizar el conflicto, EL TIEMPo, Aug. 27,

1999, at Al (translation by author). It is important to note that President Pastrana
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sectors of Colombian civil society have spoken out on the need to
begin negotiations immediately, urging the parties to work towards
a humanitarian agreement as a first step in the right direction.: ' The
FARC, unfortunately, have responded negatively to the government's specific proposals regarding IHL.
The position of the FARC vis-d-vis humanitarian law is a complicated one, though the basis of their refusal to submit to lHL is
without merit. The FARC at times purport to respect humanitarian
norms, and seem to do so when it is practical or politically convenient. '69 Yet they have made clear that they do not consider themselves bound by common Article 3 or Protocol II, as the statements
cited in the previous paragraph indicate. When questioned on this
point by Human Rights Watch, an international human rights organization, the FARC, through their international spokesperson responded that, in their view, these basic instruments and norms were
"open to interpretation. 2 70 In a letter to the civilian population published in July of 1998, the FARC explain that they "do not avail
themselves of the technical terms of International Humanitarian
Law," although some of their internal regulations "coincide with
basic Humanitarian Law principles."" When Human Rights Watch
reviewed a FARC combat manual, however, it found only one minor reference to such principles, which was qualified and contradicted by the other rules. 2
In sum, it is evident that the FARC, as they maintain, will only
recognize and apply international humanitarian norms "in accor-

originally proposed only the application of Protocol II in the demilitarized zone
where the FARC has established a firm foothold. See Conisi6n ia no es condici6n, EL TIEMPo, Aug. 8, 1999, at A8.He subsequently expanded upon the original proposal and offered the negotiation of the aforementioned agreements that
are broader and directed at protecting the civilian population throughout the entire country.
268. See Cinco propuestaspara humnanizar el conflicto, supra note 267.

269. See WAR WITHOUT QUARTER, supra note I,at 133.
270. Id.
271. See Comisi6n International de las FARC, A la poblacidn civil (visited
Dec. 15, 1998) <http:/Aw .burn.ucsd.ed'llfarc-ep/cozunicados>[hereinafter
FARC] (translation by author).
272. See WAR WITHOUT QUARTER, supra note 1,at 134.
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dance with the conditions of [their] revolutionary war.... Moreover, as a practical matter, the FARC's flagrant and persistent violations of IHL, including periodic massacres, reveal a profound disdain for its provisions.2 4 Nonetheless, recent events confirm that
the subject of respect for basic humanitarian norms remains at the
heart of the nascent peace talks with Colombia's largest insurgent
group.
2. The ELN

The ELN traditionally has been much more receptive to IHL in
its political and military discourse than the FARC. The ELN leadership has reiterated on numerous occasions its position that humanitarian law should be respected by the parties to the conflict,
and even called for negotiations on the subject before the Colombian government was prepared to ratify Protocol II2-" It has incorporated humanitarian norms into a number of its internal codes and
regulations. 76 In a lengthy 1996 treatise entitled "Humanization of
the War: A Path towards Peace," the ELN presents a comprehensive and sophisticated analysis of the application of IHL in Colombia insofar as its own activities are concerned. It concludes by proposing that the parties to the conflict should "proceed to elaborate,
subscribe and put into effect a special agreement" implementing
humanitarian law. 7
In that document, the ELN concludes: "We are a politicalmilitary organization with responsible command and territorial
control, guided by a political and ideological line according to
which we have been constructing a Popular Power [base] for several decades; this gives us the capacity to apply Protocol II for purposes of regulating the internal conflict. 2 78 The document goes on
to explain and defend the rebel's position with respect to paramili-

273. See FARC, supra note 271, at 2.
274. See discussion supra Part I.B.
275. See Valencia Villa, supra note 220, at 74.
276. See WAR WITHOUT QUARTER, supra note 1, at 162-63.
277. See Humanizacidn de la guerra: Un camino hacia la paz, 18 (May 1996)
<http://wivw.voces.org>[hereinafter ELN].
278. Id. at 12 (translation by author).
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tary groups, hostage taking, trials and the meting out of "revolutionary justice," as well as the use of anti-personnel land mines.
The ELN has gone so far as to express regret for acts constituting
violations of IHIL. After indiscriminate attacks resulted in the death
and injury of several children in 1997, this guerrilla group recognized that they had been "killed or wounded as a result of our acts
of war and we feel that it is an imperative to recognize these as serious errors of lack of foresight or crossfire in the midst of conflict.... [W]e will279make an effort to avoid repeating this type of
regrettable action.,
Although the ELN's express commitment to IHL stands in sharp
contrast to that of the FARC, its conduct on the war front is equally
at odds with humanitarian practice. There is convincing evidence
that "the UC-ELN flouts the laws of war in the field by targeting
and killing civilians and combatants hors de combat, taking hostages and launching indiscriminate attacks" affecting the civilian
population.2 0 Their persistent attacks on the petroleum producing
and transport infrastructure, as well as their corresponding extortion
of the oil companies, are further examples of acts in violation of
basic IHL principles.2' Moreover, ELN leaders have stated that although they accept Protocol II, and humanitarian law in general,
they take issue with certain of its definitions and categories, especially those relating to "hostage-taking." Echoing the views of
some paramilitary leaders (discussed below), top ELN commanders
have insisted that IHL is an "unattainable ideal" that has to be
adapted to the Colombian situation before it can ever become a reality.8 2
Although contradictory, the ELN's position has provided fertile
grounds for jump-starting its own peace process. In July 1998, in
Mainz, Germany, the ELN signed an agreement with a group of individuals invited to participate as the "representatives" of Colombian civil society.23 Although it was more of a written "under-

279. WAR WITHOUT QUARTER, supra note 1. at 164.
280.
281.
282.
283.

Id. at 164.
See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
See WAR WITHOUT QUARTER, supra note 1, at 165.
Among the 30 or so representatives present at the historic meeting were
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standing" between the ad hoc group of civilians and the ELN than a
formal peace accord, in the resulting document, the ELN accepted
that it would unilaterally respect important norms of humanitarian
law. The most significant commitment in this regard was the one
not to carry out kidnappings for ransom under certain circumstances, namely, where the potential victims were elderly persons,
pregnant women, or children. Other commitments assumed by the
ELN included those to cease using anti-personnel mines in civilian
areas and to stop recruiting children into the guerrilla ranks." It is
remarkable that in the text of the agreement, the ELN "reaffirms its
unilateral acceptance of the recommendations made by Amnesty
International [in 1994] with respect to the insurgency movement,"
and then restates them one by one.28
The Puerta del Cielo or "Heaven's Gate" agreement was heralded as the first humanitarian agreement signed by a guerrilla
group in Colombia, and the commencement of the peace process
with the ELN.286 But it was also strongly criticized by some observers, including the Pastrana Government, for its selective and nontechnical use of humanitarian norms that failed to take into account
the proper legal character of the obligations involved. 87 One influential academic publication that has contributed to defining the official position highlights the technical inaccuracies and inconsistencies in several of the agreement's provisions. 28 Countenancing a
high-ranking members of the Colombian Catholic Church, which was instrumental in organizing the meeting, a Constitutional Court magistrate, the Procurator General, ex government Ministers, leading journalists, business leaders
from the private sector, trade union leaders, members of opposition political parties, and well-respected academics. No official from the government was invited
or allowed to participate.
284. See Primerpaso con el ELN, EL TIEMPO, July 16, 1998 at Al.
285. See id. (reproducing the text of the agreement in full).
286. See id.
287. See generally Acuerdo de Mainz tiene serias inconsistencias,EL TIEMPO,
Aug. 24, 1998, at Al.
288. See Emest6 Borda Medina, Comentariossobre los aspectos humanitarios
del "Acuerdo de puerta del cielo, " (July 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author). Ernest6 Borda is Director of the Alfredo Vazquez Carrizosa Institute for Human Rights and International Relations of the prestigious Pontificia
Universidad Javeriana in Bogotd. It was circulated among the representatives
who were present in Mainz, as well as key members of the Pastrana Government.
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practice of "selective" kidnappings, for example, was deemed an
unacceptable variant on the unconditional prohibition against hostage taking. 29 The study warned further that the agreement contained "nothing with respect to the reaffirmation of the commitments each of the parties has under International Humanitarian
Law, a key initial element in order to dispel all doubt regarding the
objective of the agreement, which cannot be to 'liberate' any of the
parties from its obligations in force. " :2'
The Pastrana government has made strides in advancing towards
a humanitarian agreement with the ELN. In October 1998, it permitted the temporary release of two jailed ELN leaders from prison
under the condition that they give their word to return. It did so to
permit them to participate in the meeting held as a follow-up to the
one three months earlier in Mainz, Germany, again with members
of Colombian civil-society.29 The main objective of this clandestine
follow-up meeting between the ELN High-Command and a delegation of the civilian representatives was to plan the organization of
the "National Convention" with over 200 representatives of civil
society, an event first announced in the "Heaven's Gate" agreement.292 The encounter was an apparent success, and the eightmonth Convention-which is an ELN pre-condition for starting
peace talks with the government-was scheduled to start in February 1999.293 Heading up the tentative agenda agreed upon in the
October meeting of the parties is the subject of IHL and human

In early 1999, the government named Borda its special commissioner for talks
with the ELN guerrillas.
289. Ernest6 Borda Medina states that, "In a document [like the Heaven's Gate
agreement], there can be no commitments, not even unilateral ones, which limit
or condition imperative norms [of IHL] without expressly and clearly indicating
beforehand that said commitments do not modify the [legal] effects of these
norms vis-a-vis the party in violation." Id. at 7 (translation by author).
290. See id. at 6.
291. See Vestida para la Paz, SEMANA, Oct. 19, 1998 <http://wwv. senana.conz> (reporting that the participation of Felipe Torres and Francisco Galan
of the ELN High Command boosted confidence in the peace process); see also
Valle del Rio Verde: escenario de paz con el ELN, EL ESPECTADOR, Oct. 12,
1998, at Al.
292. See Primerpasocon el ELN, EL TIEMPO, July 16, 1998, at A3-A4.
293. See 'Paras'yEIN,unpulso alproceso, ELTIEMPO, Jan. 10, 1999, at A6.
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rights.9
3. The AUC/ACCU

The paramilitary groups, as part of their quest for political recognition, have jumped on the IHL bandwagon. Several official
AUC documents emphasize the importance of humanitarian law in
regulating the conflict, and even the need to protect the civilian
population from its dangers.295 In one policy paper entitled "Positions on the political and negotiated solution to the internal armed
conflict," the AUC go so far as to propose a "regional humanitarian
29 6
agreement" between the parties as a means of implementing it.
Carlos Castafho, leader of both the ACCU and the AUC, has insisted publicly on numerous occasions that these groups respect
humanitarian principles, and it appears that paramilitary troops
even receive training in IHL from the ICRC. 97 Yet affirmations to
the contrary, and especially the AUC's horrendous track record, reveal a deliberate, calculated and systematic paramilitary strategy
premised expressly on the flagrant violation of the laws of war in
order to obtain the stated objective of defeating the guerrillas.29"
"Throughout 1996 and 1997, AUC units established a clear pattern of violations of the laws of war. A unit would enter a village,
execute civilians believed to support guerrillas, and leave."2 9"
Castahio defends the paramilitary modus operandi of targeting and
executing unarmed civilians by alleging that they only kill "combatants hors de combat" and persons suspected of sympathizing or
aiding the guerrillas.3°° This amounts to the proverbial "exception"
294. See Vestidapara la Paz, supra note 291, at 7 (listing the tentative agenda

items for the convention as proposed by the ELN).
295. See, e.g., Naturaleza Politico-Militardel Movimiento, June 26, 1997, at

4-5 [hereinafter Political Nature] <http://www.colombialibre.org>; see also
Planteamientossobre la soluci6npolitica negociadaal conflicto armado interno,

Apr. 13, 1998, at 4 <http://wivw.colombialibre.org>[hereinafter Positions].
296. Positions,supra note 295, at 4 (translation by author).
297. See WAR WITHOUT QUARTER, supra note 1, at 109.
298. See generally WAR WITHOUT QUARTER, supra note 1,at 100-30; supra

Part I.B.
299. See WAR WITHOUT QUARTER, supra note 1, at 109.

300. See id. at 100. This was the same justification Castafio gave after the 72
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that swallows the rule, given that the AUC/ACCU statutes define
any person simply living in a region with a guerrilla presence to be
suspect as "potential combatants"---even if they do not take part in
the hostilities-and thus a valid military target." Castafio responds
to such observations by arguing that the irregular nature of Colombia's war-combatants not clearly identified or out of uniformmake application of IHL impracticable if not impossible; he
advocates, therefore, the need to apply a "Colombianized" version
of humanitarian law to the conflict.:
Less than two weeks after the signing of the "Heaven's Gate"
Agreement with the ELN, on July 16, 1998, members of the same
group of civil society representatives met with Carlos Castafho and
other paramilitary leaders at their stronghold known as El Nudo de
Paramillo (Department of C6rdoba). There they signed a humanitarian agreement even more ambitious than the one that had been
signed ten days earlier in Mainz, Germany, with the ELN. In the
agreement, Castaflo and fifteen other paramilitary leaders commit
themselves to abide by 1HL as an "ethical minimum," with specific
provisions for protecting the civilian population and persons hors
de combat. °3 The agreement was hailed as the commencement of a
peace process with the paramilitary movement. TM
Three weeks after, Castafio confessed in an interview with Semana magazine that he had no intention of complying with the provisions of the accord.0 5 This position was subsequently qualified in
a letter from the AUC General Staff ("Estado Mayor") to the leaders of the civil society delegation in which, among other points,
they purport to reaffirm the organization's commitment to IHL and

hour killing spree of January, 1999, in which nearly 140 civilians were executed
by paramilitary forces. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
301. PoliticalNature, supra note 295, at 4.
302. See WAR WITHOUT QUARTER, supra note 1, at 110 (noting the exact term

used is version criolla, sometimes translated as a "creole" version of IHL). The
idea is that of a modified or "home-grown" version of this body of law, adapted
to the perceived idiosyncrasies of the Colombian conflict. See id.
303. See Acuerdo del Nudo de Paranillo(July 26, 1998) <http:/www. colombialibre.org>(visited Nov. 29, 1998).
304. See Aproxinzaci6n con losjefes "paras',EL TIEMPO, July 28, at Al.
305. See Habla Castafto,supra note 62, at 42.
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to the Nudo del Paramilloagreement. In it, the AUC General Staff
explained that while the conflict continues, it "is difficult to achieve
full compliance with what has been agreed to in el Paramillodue to
the fact that the ELN has not fulfilled its commitments assumed in
the [Mainz] agreement and the FARC have not committed themselves to respecting IHL."3 ° Subsequent events, such as the wave of
massacres carried out by the AUC in January of 1999, confirm that
the AUC's commitment to humanitarian principles is, at best, rhetorical.
This review of the ongoing peace process with its emphasis on
humanitarian law closes for the moment the presentation of the
Colombian case study. Part II below addresses the first two seminal
issues identified in the Introduction, namely, those dealing with the
application and interpretation of IHL, respectively. Each will be
explored with reference to the conflict in Colombia as outlined
above. The case study will be revisited in Part III, which analyzes
the third and final issue of implementation.

II. THE APPLICATION AND INTERPRETATION
OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN CIVIL CONFLICT
In this second part of the Article, our attention will turn to the
study of certain legal issues arising from the application and interpretation of IHL in the context of internal armed conflicts like the
one in Colombia. It begins by confronting threshold problems arising under the hierarchy of humanitarian norms relating to noninternational conflicts, and by focusing on the critical question of
how and when the conditions for material application defined in
Protocol II are met. The Colombian case study is utilized to demonstrate how Article 1's scope of application criteria can be successfully analyzed with reference to a specific conflict. The latter half
of this part of the Article is dedicated to rebutting the allegations
that, even if they apply, existing norms of humanitarian law directed at non-interstate conflict represent an incomplete and deficient minimum of protection. It examines the nature and extent of

306. Carta del Estado Mayor de las A UC a los firmantes del Acuerdo del
Nudo de Paramillo en representaci6n de la sociedad civil (Aug. 20, 1998)
<http://wiiw.colonibialibre.org> (translation by author).
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the international responsibility generated by the violations of humanitarian law in Colombia, with a view to establishing the parameters of accountability covering the parties to the conflict. An
evaluation of the main violations and the corresponding responsibilities under international law produced in the course of the Colombian conflict will shed new light on the substance of humanitarian norms and reveal why, contrary to popular belief, they are
indeed sufficient to deal with the cruelty of modem civil conflicts.
A. THE SCOPE OF APPLICATION OF PROTOCOL II

The introduction to this Article signaled various obstacles that
contemporary commentators suggest make the application of humanitarian norms, especially those contained in Protocol II, difficult to manage. 0 7 The primary obstacle stems from the complaint
that the legal classification of internal conflicts by intensity is an
imprecise and unworkable mechanism for arriving at the determination of when Protocol II applies."" It is notoriously difficult, they
affirm, to establish when the humanitarian rules contained in this
instrument enter into effect in a given set of circumstances under
the existing hierarchy of conflict categorization. This view is
premised in large part on the widely held belief that Article 1 of
Protocol II enshrines an elevated threshold for material applicability which presumes the existence of a "civil war," and that this
standard is rarely if ever met by the "low-intensity" armed conflicts
prevalent todayY°9 As was already indicated, scholars and international lawyers routinely advance these arguments as a limitation on
the modem relevance and effectiveness of IHL."
It will be argued here that this problem springs more from an inappropriate interpretation of the relevant provisions than from the
inadequacy of 1HL as it pertains to internal conflict. The lack of
clarity and precision in the definition of "civil war" under international law is the source of many difficulties pointed to in the debate
on the contemporary significance of Protocol II. From a legal per-

307. See supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text.
308. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
309. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
310. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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spective, over reliance upon-and insistent reference to-this muddled benchmark has become the major obstacle to Protocol II' s application in theory. This is so because, as it turns out, the answer to
the question, "When is an internal armed conflict a civil war?" is
not per se determinative of the answer to the related but distinct
question of "When does an internal war become a non-international
armed conflict for purposes of Protocol II?" Keeping the two lines
of inquiry separate when referring to issues of applicability, as will
be shown, is the key to resolving the aforementioned difficulties in
a manner more favorable to optimizing the operation of humanitarian law in the internal sphere.
Reviewing the evolution of the concept of "civil war" is necessary to understand how and why its historical interpretation continues to impact negatively on the modern debate regarding the adequacy of humanitarian law.3"1' This first section of Part II begins,
therefore, by examining this evolution under traditional international law, including the central role which "civil war" has played
in the development of humanitarian law standards. It then goes on
to show why Protocol II's scope of application-once it is distinguished from the distracting discourse of "civil war"-is actually
broader and more flexible than commonly believed. Finally, Article
1 of Protocol II under this revised standard is applied to the Colombian case study as a means of demonstrating that Protocol II is applicable by its own terms to that conflict (and others like it) as a
matter of law.
1. The Evolution andBackground ofArticle 1 of ProtocolII
There is no precise definition of what constitutes a civil war" or
311. Id.
312. See HernAn Montealegre, Conflictos armados internos y derechos
humanos, in ETUDES ET ESSAIS SUR LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL HUMANITAIRE ET
SUR LES PRINCIPES DE LA CROIX-ROUGE

735, 735 (C. Swinarski ed., 1984). The

author states:
The traditional law of nations, preoccupied with war between States, has
failed to develop a generic concept to encompass all internal struggles not
rising to the level of [international] war, the effect of which has been that
authors do not employ a uniform terminology when referring to these conflicts.
Id. (translation by author).
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even a non-international armed conflict,"' although the latter concept has been the subject of more recent development. Common
Article 3 speaks of an "armed conflict not of an international character," which is broadly interpreted as meaning one in which armed
opposition groups operating in the territory of a state have a degree
of organization and are able to carry out a minimum of sustained
military activity. 14 A non-international armed conflict is best described as the range of conflicts that exists between two thresholds
in opposition to each other. The high end of the spectrum is occupied by international armed conflicts as defined by Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions." 5 The minimum threshold is set
by those "situations of internal disturbances and tensions" which
Article 1, paragraph 2, of Protocol II asserts "are not armed conflicts. 31 6 In broad terms, then, a non-intemational armed conflict is
everything in between, that is, any conflict taking place in the territory of a state that rises above the level of sporadic violence or
internal unrest, but falls short of inter-state war.
The question of when a non-international armed conflict becomes a civil war has long been the subject of debate among scholars and practitioners alike. 17 Traditional international law provided
guidelines for determining the legal status of civil wars, which
served essentially two purposes. On the one hand, international law
sought to define the duties and obligations of third party states with
respect to both the government and rebel parties, especially regarding when intervention by such states was prohibited or justified. On the other hand, international law was interested in pro-

313. See COMMENTARY ON THE PROTOCOL ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA
CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, AND RELATING TO THE PROTECTION OF
VICTIMS OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS (PROTOCOL 11) 1319, 1348

(Y.Sandoz et al. eds., 1987) [hereinafter COMMENTARY PROTOCOL 11].
314. See COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTION FOR

THE
AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK IN ARMED

FORCES IN THE FIELD 49-50 (J.Pictet ed., 1952) [hereinafter COMMENTARY
GENEVA 1].

315. See COMMENTARY PROTOCOL II, supra note 313, at 1349, 1351.
316. Id. at 1349.
317. See, e.g., Tom J. Farer, The HumanitarianLaws of War in Civil Strife:
Towards a Definition of "International Armed Conflict." in DROIT

HUMANiAiRE ET CONFLrrs ARMES (1976).
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moting the application of minimum humanitarian standards to internal conflict. Traditionally, such standards were reserved for the
conduct of hostilities of wars between states." 8 Accordingly, two
categories of civil armed conflict were recognized, each with its
own set of legal consequences:
Where a status of insurgency exists, there is in effect an international

acknowledgment of an internal war, but third parties are left substantially free to determine the consequences .... However, the criteria for
the recognition of insurgency are elusive .... Traditional international
law also speaks of the status of belligerency. This is rather more precise

than the status of insurgency, and entails the meeting of four criteria:
first, the existence within a state of a widely spread armed conflict; second, the occupation and administration by rebels of a substantial portion
of territory; thirdly, the conduct of hostilities in accordance with the
rules of war and through armed forces responsible to an identifiable
authority; and fourth, the existence of circumstances which make it necessary for third parties to define their attitude by acknowledging the

status of belligerency." 9

One set of legal consequences primarily addressed the obligations of third states vis-ci-vis the parties to the internal conflict. The
recognition of belligerency meant that the recognizing state was required to remain neutral, and, therefore, was barred from aiding
either the rebels or the government. 2 This is because recognition of
belligerency was governed by essentially the same principles recognizing states and governments under international law. 2 ' Naturally there was no similar duty where the status of insurgency was
invoked. Thus, in the circumstance "[w]here country A, noting civil
war in country B, acknowledges the rebels as insurgents, it is regarding them as contestants-at-law, and not as mere law' But in the absence of an acknowledged state of belligbreakers."322
erency, third party states were obliged only to desist from helping

318. See Rosalyn Higgins, International Law and Civil Conflict, in TiE
INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF CIVIL WAR 169 (E. Luard ed., 1972).
319. Id. at 170-71 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
320. See id. at 171.
321. See 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 249 (7th ed., H.
Lauterpacht ed., 1952).
322. Higgins, supra note 318, at 170.
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the rebels, though they remained free to aid the legitimate government.3 ' The obligations arising from the recognition of insurgency
status were even less clear than those relating to belligerency,
''
which was in itself a highly problematic concept.
Other legal consequences related to the conduct of hostilities
during internal war. International law in its traditional form could
only reach those situations of internal conflict rising to the intensity
and characteristics of inter-state war. Additionally, the standard required that the insurgents be, in fact, recognized as belligerents.?:
In this earlier epoch, recognizing the status of belligerency was a
means to bootstrap the insurgent movement onto the same playing
field as states. This enabled the full application of existing international rules to that conflict, including the laws of war.'2" As concerns HIL, the "recognition of belligerency constituted the first step
in the regulation of non-international armed conflicts," because it
was the only way, at least in theory, to extend international law
protections to the victims of large-scale civil disputes."'
This doctrine, however, proved to be too politically complex for
implementation in the sphere of international relations, causing it to
lose all practical significance. Historically, one finds only a few examples of the recognition of belligerency through a formal declaration of neutrality. One example is the case of British recognition of
the Confederate States in 1861 during the American Civil War. :" In
contrast, no such declaration was made during the Spanish Civil
War (1936-1939), 329 though it appears that the conditions were amply met. Governments in general did not wish "to harness themselves to the legal consequences of a recognition of insurgency or
belligerency ...
o The lack of clear criteria for determining the
status of either belligerency or insurgency was a recurring problem.
323. See id.
324. See COMMENTARY PROTOCOL II,supra note 313, at 1322.
325. See OPPENHEIM, supra note 321, at 248-50.
326. See COMMENTARY PROTOCOL II, supra note 313, at 1320.

327. Id. at 1322.
328. See OPPENHEIM, supra note 321, at 250-5 1.
329. See id. at 25 1.
330. Higgins, supra note 318, at 171.
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The impossibility of objectively verifying or corroborating a state's
claim of either condition was another."' Moreover, it was "common
practice" for states to violate the traditional principle of neutrality,
even in cases of clear-cut civil war, " 2 which undoubtedly contributed to the controversy surrounding the subject."
These reasons explain why the doctrine of the recognition of
belligerency "virtually lapsed": it was lacking in practical relevance
to most discussions of internal conflict, even by traditional legal
standards.3 4 Still, at another level, international law's struggle to
address the issues raised by civil conflicts continued to generate
heated debate. In particular, it led to the disparate use of key terminology by scholars and practitioners alike. This is especially true of
the term "civil war." For one set of authors and jurists, "[civil war]
allud[ed] specifically to what is an internal situation of belligerency."335 This view held that:
[i]t is preferable ....
to utilize the generic denomination of civil struggles ("luchas civiles") to designate all actions of force produced by a
group of persons that does not recognize the constituted authority; and
to reserve in particular the name of civil war for certain events which
present the material contours of war, such that it is possible to submit
them to a juridical regimen analogous, in large part, to international
336
war.

Technically, this definition best reflected the traditional legal
concept. At the turn of the century, the Institute of International
Law defined civil war as a conflict in which three basic conditions
justifying the recognition of belligerency were present. Article 8 of
the Institute's Regulations for civil war stated in relevant part as
follows:

331. See id. at 171-72.
332. See id. at 173.
333. See COMMENTARY PROTOCOL II, supra note 313, at 1322.
334. See Higgins, supra note 318, at 173.
335. Montealegre, supra note 312, at 736.
336. L. PODESTA COSTA, DERECHO INTERNACIONAL POBLICO 22 (4th ed.

1961), cited in Montealegre, supra note 312, at 736 (translation by author) (emphasis in the original).
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Third States may not give recognition to the belligerency of the insurgent party: if it has not won for itself a territorial existence by taking
possession of a given part of the national territory; it does not fulfill the
conditions which must be met to constitute a regular government tie
facto exercising in that part of the territory the ostensible rights belonging to sovereignty; and if the struggle waged in its name is not conducted by organized forces subject to military discipline and complying
with the laws and customs of war."'

It is important to note that these criteria, especially the elements
of territorial possession and de facto sovereignty, were understood
to be the necessary corollaries of "an organization purporting to
have the characteristics of a State.""' It was the insurgent's quasisovereign status that justified the recognition of belligerency in
cases of "genuine" civil war, and transformed an internal armed
conflict into one of an international character for purposes of the
juridical regimen applied."'
Yet in clear opposition to this interpretation, another set of
scholars and practitioners were referring to civil war "precisely as
the generic term ... inclusive of all internal conflict not rising to the
level of belligerency (contienda interna infrabbica)."' , Thus, Kelsen posited, "a civil war, the fight of a revolutionary group against
the legitimate government, is not an international war. There is an
exception to the rule that war can exist only in relation among
states: If in a civil war, the insurgents are recognized as a belligerent power."4' Oppenheim suggested a similar characterization:
In the proper sense of the term a civil war exists when two opposing
parties within a State have recourse to arms for the purpose of obtaining
power in the State .... As war is an armed contention between States,

such a civil war need not be war from the beginning, nor become war at
all, in the technical sense of the term. But it may become war through

337. COMMENTARY PROTOCOL II, supra note 313, at 1321-22.
338. See COMMENTARY GENEVA I, supra note 314, at 49-50 (listing convenient criteria for determining when a non-international armed conflict for purposes

of common Article 3 exists, derived from the deliberations and amendments presented during the Conference with respect to that Article).
339. See COMMENTARY PROTOCOL 11, supra note 313, at 1320-21.
340. Montealegre, supra note 312, at 736 (emphasis added).
341. HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 32 (1952).
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42
the recognition of the .... insurgents, as a belligerent Power.'

Implicit in both Kelsen's and Oppenheim's descriptions of civil
war is the belief that it is a conflict normally carried out either at a
level below that of full belligerency, or where the recognition of
belligerency is lacking.3 43 Contrasted with the first, more technical
definition cited above, the one suggested by Kelsen and Oppenheim
is surely the more common and utilized of the two in contemporary
international relations. The longstanding practice of the United Nations in its deliberations, decisions, and reports is to refer to precisely this type of sub-belligerent conflict as "civil wars" corroborates this proposition.3 Before turning to the contemporary
implications of this historical debate, it is necessary to first examine
its impact on the development of basic IHL standards.
There is no doubt that the legal concept of civil war was originally linked to the recognition of belligerency under traditional international law. It was the search for objective criteria to justify "a
situation of belligerency without committing the inadmissible act of
interfering with the internal affairs of [an]other State" that led to
the development of this concept.3 41 It is similarly evident, however,
that the decline of the doctrine of belligerency, coupled with the
generalized practice of states and observers of referring to largescale internal conflicts not of an international character as "civil
wars," led to a different and broader understanding of the term. The
intractable nature of this debate in diplomatic circles gave rise to a
new category of conflict under international law, the "armed conflict not of an international character," that was first adopted by the
Diplomatic Conference that drafted the Geneva Conventions of
1949.346
It is not surprising that the parameters of the international law
discussion on civil wars were also considered in the development of
the first humanitarian norms addressing internal conflict. The

342. OPPENHEIM, supra note 321, at 209 (emphasis in the original).
343. See Montealegre, supra note 312, at 736-37.
344. See id. at 736-37.
345. COMMENTARY PROTOCOL II, supra note 313, at 1321.
346. See Montealegre, supra note 312, at 737.
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Commentary to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 makes clear that
"civil war" was a principal concern of the drafters of common Article 3, but they were unable to arrive at a consensus on a definition,
for the reasons suggested in the preceding paragraphs. "4 ' The initial
discussion in the Diplomatic Conference, shaped by the extensive
preparatory efforts of the ICRC, was over which internal conflicts
the four Geneva Conventions under consideration would cover. "''In
light of the impasse reached on this point, the discussion was deliberately transformed into one about which specific norms and imperatives of the Conventions were applicable to all "armed conflict[s] not of an international character ... "' This shift in focus
away from the definition of civil war in favor of a blanket application of core principles was critical to the negotiations and facilitated
consensus on the final text of common Article 3. It also guaranteed
that the debate relating to a more precise definition of internal conflict would remain unresolved? °
Subsequent developments, culminating in the negotiation of
Protocol II in the mid-1970s, led to the progressive differentiation
of non-intemational armed conflicts from civil wars under international law. During the preparatory phase leading up to the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts (19741977), and in the early drafts of Protocol II, many experts and
country representatives proposed maintaining the same threshold of
application in this Protocol established by common Article 3, but to
define it more precisely."' This tactic was largely abandoned before
the Conference even began because of the perceived "tendency to
move towards a rather restrictive definition of non-international
armed conflict ... ".. In the ICRC draft Additional Protocol II that
formed the basis for the Conference's work, the proposed version
of Article 1 recognized that "common Article 3 and Protocol II

347. See COMMENTARY GENEVA 1,supra note 314, at 43-46.

348.
349.
350.
351.

See id. at 41-46.
See id. at 46-47.
See id. at 49-50.
See COMMENTARY PROTOCOL II, supra note 313, at 1327-29, 1331.

352. Id. at 1331.
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should co-exist autonomously: in fact, to link the Protocol to common Article 3 would have resulted in restricting the latter's
scope.""'3 As a consequence, the scope of application of Protocol II
became one of the most debated matters at the Conference, with the
very fate of the entire instrument riding on its final adoption."'
The enormous challenge facing the drafters of Protocol II was to
balance the wide range of divergent views expressed during the
Diplomatic Conference regarding the scope of its application. Most
of these views were already discussed in the course of the preparatory meetings leading up to the Conference organized by the
ICRC.355 "Taking the views that [had already been] expressed into
account, the ICRC attempted in its [original] draft [of Article 1] to
propose a formula defining the characteristics of non-international
armed conflicts, while remaining sufficiently general and flexible
to be able to apply to all such situations. 5' 6 The proposal was considered a reasoned attempt at finding a broadly acceptable middle
ground and circumventing the most radical positions from either
end of the political spectrum. On the one extreme were those seeking the broadest application possible of Protocol II, including coverage of low-level strife and internal disturbances. On the other side
were those wishing to keep the scope of application to "the narrowest possible definition covering only very intense conflicts with all

353. See id. at 1333; THE LAW OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 30
(Howard S. Levie ed., 1987) [hereinafter PROTOCOL II PROCEEDINGS] (reproducing the pertinent intervention by the ICRC in the meeting of the drafting
Committee).
354. See COMMENTARY PROTOCOL II, supra note 313, at 1348.
355. See id. at 1327-36, 1348-49.
356. See id. at 1349. The text of the draft article proposed by the ICRC is as
follows:
Article I.- Material field of application 1. The present Protocol shall apply to all
armed conflicts not covered by Article 2 common to the Geneva Conventions of
August 12, 1949, taking place between armed forces or other organized armed
groups under responsible command. 2. The present Protocol shall not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, inter alia riots, isolated and sporadic acts
of violence and other acts of a similar nature. 3. The foregoing provisions do not
modify the conditions governing the application of Article 3 common to the Geneva
Conventions of August 12, 1949.
PROTOCOL II PROCEEDINGS, supra note 353, at 23.
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the material characteristics of a war."'

7

The ICRC's initiative served as the starting point towards bridging the opposing positions and facilitating eventual compromise acceptable to the majority of the delegations present. The thrust of the
ICRC's proposal was to formally define the scope of application in
terms of the characteristics of a non-international armed conflict by
referencing specific objective criteria, both positive and negative.
The ICRC intended the Protocol to be applied when these elements
were met as a factual and practical matter, and without regard to
any other considerations."'
Although both the Committee and its Working Group charged
with drafting a text of Article 1 accepted this format and the principle behind it, participating delegations proposed numerous amendments to the ICRC draft article." 9 This led to the creation of a special Sub-Group charged with the sole task of processing these
amendments through "informal consultations among the delegations, on the basis of all the proposals that had been submitted to it
... "36The Sub-Group, with the participation of twenty-eight delegations in six sessions, proceeded to hammer out a compromise on
the elements and language of the text of Article I. The compromise
was adopted by the Committee and subsequently by the Conference
as a whole, with only minor changes.3"
In the plenary session of the Conference, the final text of Article
1 was adopted with some controversy, mostly relating to the objective nature of its elements. Many states, however, were of the view
that great pains had been taken to reach a worthy compromise after
lengthy and complicated negotiations. '; 2 Delegations expressed dif357. COMMENTARY PROTOCOL II, supra note 313, at 1349.
358. See PROTOCOL II PROCEEDINGS, supra note 353, at 29 (transcribing the
intervention of the ICRC representative in which she submits and explains the
ICRC proposal in Committee).
359. See COMMENTARY PROTOCOL II, supra note 313, at 1349. See generally
PROTOCOL II PROCEEDINGS, supra note 353, at 23-57.

360. PROTOCOL 11 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 353, at 67.
361. See id. at 57-78.
362. See PROTOCOL II PROCEEDINGS, supra note 353, at 82 (interventions of
Canada), 84 (Germany), 85 (Ghana), 89 (Italy); see also COMMENTARY
PROTOCOL II, supra note 313, at 1348.
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fering perceptions of the established threshold before and after the
final vote on the article. 63 It was evident that the elements of the
compromise solution produced in the Working Group and adopted
by the Conference elevated the threshold of Article 1, as originally
proposed by the ICRC, in order to respect "fully the sovereignty of
future Contracting Parties." At the same time, it was also clear to
many participants that they "could not raise the threshold of application to a prohibitive level." 3' 6 The following explanation of the
vote offered by the Canadian delegation best sums up the general
debate on this point:
Like any compromise, the text is subject to certain interpretations not
always of the same nature. Some delegations argue that because of the
number of qualifications contained in it, only conflicts of a very high
threshold such as civil wars are covered. Others, like [the Canadian]
delegation, underline that these qualifications are a reflection of the
factual and practical circumstances that would in fact have to exist if a
Party to the conflict could be expected to implement the provisions of
the Protocol. Furthermore, we do not agree that this necessarily means
that these conditions could exist only in civil war situations.

The text of Protocol II, including Article 1, was adopted by consensus at the end of the Diplomatic Conference in June 1977.166 The
article in pertinent part reads as follows:
This Protocol ...
shall apply to all [non-international] armed conflicts ...
which take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its
armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed
groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a
part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol." 7

The foregoing historical review goes a long way in explaining
why many international legal scholars continue today to read the
language of Article 1 as requiring a "civil war," despite the fact that

363. See PROTOCOL II
364.
365.
366.
367.

PROCEEDINGS,

supra note 353, at 74-90.

See id. at 62.
Id. at 82.
See COMMENTARY PROTOCOL II, supra note 313, at 1336.
Protocol 1I, supra note 13, art. 1(I).
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the term does not appear anywhere in the text of the Protocol. It
clarifies further the extent to which the criteria adopted in relation
to armed opposition groups were derived from the criteria associated with traditional definitions of civil war. It also confirms that
Article l's conditions do "restrict the applicability of the Protocol
to conflicts of a certain degree of intensity."' But these indisputable observations do not alone resolve the larger problem of application, as identified in the opening paragraphs of this section. In
particular, important questions remain as to how best to determine
what the "certain degree of intensity" should be and when it is present in situations of internal violence. It is to these questions that
the discussion now turns.
2. The Modern hIterpretationofArticle I of ProtocolII
The prevailing view in most legal literature seems to be that Article 1 basically speaks of civil war understood in the traditional
sense of the term, and that the intensity of a Protocol II noninternational armed conflict must be "virtually commensurate with
[that of] a classic civil war."369 Commentators maintaining this view
claim that the same characteristics, which under traditional international law would have justified the recognition of belligerency,
must be present in order for Protocol II to apply."" Their position is
that the Diplomatic Conference selected "that set of conditions
which, in addition to raising a very elevated threshold for the application of Protocol II, are, at the same time, the classic conditions of
belligerency. 3 71 The following quote exemplifies the foregoing understanding of the definition of civil war under Article 1:
[T]he notion of civil war does not correspond to that for internal armed
conflict. Civil war, of all internal armed conflicts originating at the heart
of the State, is the one most characterized by the widespreul division of
civil society and the military confrontation of one or more groups as
well as being qualified by a certain duration of the conflict, the intensity
of the military operations, the open character of the hostilities ...

.

the

size and organization of the armed groups and, finally, the dominion

368. Id. at 1349.
369. Meron, supra note 15, at 599 (citations omitted).
370. See MANGAS MARTiN, supra note 8, at 73-74.
371. Id. at 76 (emphasis added) (translation by author).
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over a sizable [notable] and significant part of the national territory."'

Not surprisingly, authors subscribing to this interpretation believe that since traditional civil wars, or those where the status of
belligerency could be formally acknowledged, are uncommon in
contemporary international society, Protocol II's chances of actually becoming applicable are remote. "[A] conflict which is characterized to such an extent by the accumulation of [the aforementioned] elements is an increasingly rare occurrence, and it is for that
reason that Protocol II, which is applicable to these situations, has
been much criticized. The notion of civil war is very strict.3 73 One
humanitarian law scholar who espouses this "strict" view of Article
1 asserts, for example, that the internal war in El Salvador is the
only case in the1 4 Americas where the Article's stringent conditions
have been met.
A variant on this theme is offered by authors who cite "civil war"
as the appropriate standard under Article 1, but do not define it
further. Indeed, it is not uncommon today to find references to this
article as dictating Protocol II's application "to situations at or near
the level of a full-scale civil war," without any explanation of what
is meant by this terminology nor an indication of how real conflicts
in contemporary context may or may not qualify.15 One author defines civil wars simply as those "[a]rmed conflicts arising within
states," adding that "[t]he application of moderating legal norms to
such a situation invokes very severe difficulty.",176 It remains unclear whether these observers are appealing to the "strict" definition
of civil war and its consequences, or to some other non-technical
understanding of the term, such as the ones reported in the preceding sub-section."' In other words, this terminology could very well
372. Id. at 59 (second emphasis added) (translation by author). Please note that
the word notable refers to the original Spanish term.
373. Id. at 59-60 (emphasis added) (translation by author).
374. See Goldman, supra note 8, at 64 (arguing that even if Colombia were a
party to Protocol II, the magnitude of the hostilities would have been insufficient
to meet the requirements of Article 1).
375. See Analytical Report, supra note 16, para. 79.
376. MCCOUBREY & WHITE, supra note 3, at 317.

377. See supra notes 340-43 and accompanying text.
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refer to large-scale civil conflicts that meet the Article 1 conditions
without rising to "classic" levels, but which are considered "civil
wars" for practical purposes by most commentators. This imprecision is not without substantive repercussions since Protocol II's
scope of application, as commented above, tends to contract or expand according to the "label" placed upon the type of conflict dictated by Article 1's conditions. In any case, it is apparent that
authors who subscribe to this version of the civil war standard also
tend to conclude
that Protocol II' s application is too problematic to
7
be practical.
There are several compelling reasons for arriving at the conclusion that interpretations of Article I founded on some notion of
"civil war" are not the most appropriate ones. First, while it is true
that the conditions required by Article I are descendants of the
elements associated with the traditional concept of civil war, there
is no conclusive argument, legal or otherwise, for why the two must
be considered to be substantially identical or interchangeable. Second, the express language of Article I as well as its negotiating
history provide evidence to the contrary and serve as the basis for a
different reading of the article more in line with Protocol II's unambiguous object and purpose. Finally, the historical evolution of
the civil war concept reveals the absence of a precise definition of
the term, and thus confirms the difficulties involved in ascertaining
and applying its different meanings.
A strong resemblance between Article 1's positive elements and
the classic civil war criteria does not, in the absence of clear language or intent to that effect, justify the assertion that the whole of
the latter was directly imported into Protocol II as the substantive
benchmarks by which its application is to be determined. Jean Pictet, former Director of the ICRC, agreed that Protocol II "applies
only to conflicts of a relatively high degree of intensity," but recognized that these "do not have to be typical civil wars since recognition of a state of belligerency is not required, nor the eristence of a
governmental power on the insurgent side."' By "governmental
power" Pictet meant the critical element of "de facto sovereignty"
378. See AnalyticalReport, supra note 16, paras. 79-82.
379. JEAN PICTET, DEVELOPMENT AND PRINCIPLES
HUMANITARIAN LAw 48 (1985) (emphasis added).
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which was one of the attributes of a State which insurgencies historically had to assert (and display) in order to qualify for belligerency status."O Pictet insisted that Article 1 is by its own terms "limited to armed conflicts between governmental forces and organized
armed forces under responsible command, which exercise such
control over part of the national territory as to enable them to carry
out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement
the Protocol."38 ' The crucial point being made is that the classic
civil war criteria, strictly speaking, are not valid in the Protocol II
context for purposes of determining applicability; only the conditions described in Article 1 are valid, and in the terms they are
drafted.
Nor can it be said that the two are substantially the same. The
Article 1 elements for a Protocol II non-interstate conflict and their
wording reflect a qualitative difference vis-a-vis those required for
"civil war" status under traditional international law. It simply is
not the same, for instance, to say that insurgents must "constitute a
regulargovernment defacto exercising in [a given] part of the territoy [they control] the ostensible rights belonging to sovereignty, ,112 as to say that they must "exercise such control over a
part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and
concerted military operations and to implement" humanitarian
law.3'8' The latter standard is, by its own terms, conditional and
clearly more restricted in scope and content than the first, narrowing it significantly. Nor can it be suggested that the condition to be
"subject to military discipline and [to comply] with the laws and
' when these referred to the body of traditional
customs of war,"384
jus in bello norms applicable to interstate conflicts, is substantially
similar to the condition of being able to implement the less developed provisions of Protocol II. Again, the latter fixes a markedly
more modest threshold than the former. Efforts to read, explicitly or
implicitly, the elements of "classic" civil wars directly into the in-

380.
381.
382.
383.
384.

See supra notes 337-39 and accompanying text.
PICTET, supra note 379, at48.
See supra note 337 and accompanying text (emphasis added).
Protocol II, supra note 13, art. 1(1) (emphasis added).
See supra note 337 and accompanying text.
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terpretation of Article 1 are, for these reasons, seriously misleading.
The problem with resting one's interpretation of this article on
the concept of civil war is that it artificially inflates Protocol II's
threshold of application to prohibitive levels not supported by the
text itself. Protocol II must be read in good faith and in accordance
with "the ordinary meaning" of its terms taken in context, always in
light of the Protocol's "object and purpose.""' Under established
principles of interpretation, Article 1 cannot be presumed to require
extraneous criteria or elements if they are not among those listed in
the text of paragraphs 1 or 2. For this very reason it is commonly
acknowledged that Article 1 does not specify the proportion of the
territory over which control must be exercised nor fix a specific duration for the conflict as elements necessary to trigger applicability3 1 6 Since neither "civil war" nor "belligerency" appear anywhere
in Protocol II, and given that the elements associated with these
concepts are in many respects qualitatively different than those
listed in Article 1, it is difficult to see how conditions derived from
the former, such as the "widespread division of civil society"", or
the exercise of "defacto sovereignty" by the insurgents, can be presumed to be incorporated into an analysis of applicability.
An examination of the preparatory work and the circumstances
of Protocol II's conclusion confirm the plain meaning of Article l's
terms, which is discernible once the interpretative rules enunciated
above are applied.388 As a legal matter, the positive and negative
criteria introduced in Article I of Protocol II, taken together with

385. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23,
1969, art. 31, U.N. Doe. A/CONF. 39/27 (1969). 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969) [hereinafter
Vienna Convention]; see also Farer, supra note 317, at 15-29 (providing a detailed discussion on the interpretation of international humanitarian law and its
scope of application under international law). In this regard, the author shares
Professor Farer's determination that "[w]hether one approaches these articles
from the perspective of a textualist, an intentionist or a teleologist, recognition of
the triumph of the 'plain meaning' school is unavoidable." Id. at 19.
386. See MICHAEL BOTHE ET AL., NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED
CONFLICTS: COMMENTARY ON THE Two 1977 PROTOCOLS ADDITIONAL TO THE
GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949, at 627 (1982) [hereinafter NEW RULES]; see

also discussion infira Part II.A.3.
387. See supra note 372 and accompanying text.
388. See Vienna Convention, supra note 385, art. 32.
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those established by Article 1 of Protocol I, permit the differentiation of only four categories of non-interstate conflicts for purposes
of IHL:
(a) internal disturbances and tensions to which international human
rights instruments are applicable;
(b) non-interstate armed conflicts [within the scope of] common Art. 3
of the [Geneva] Conventions
(c) non-interstatearmed conflicts defined in Art. I of ProtocolII;
(d) non-interstate armed conflicts falling under the definition of Art. I
of Protocol I (wars of national liberation) 8 9

It cannot be said that the concept of non-interstate armed conflict
integrated into the text of Protocol II was necessarily intended to be
synonymous with that of "classic" civil war. The travaux pr~paratoire of the Diplomatic Conference reveal the extent to which
lengthy and complex negotiations were carried out for the specific
purpose of reaching a compromise solution on Article 1. This goal,
in the view of many of the participating delegations, was achieved.
In the course of this process, amendments which would have restricted Protocol II's application to "only very intense conflicts
with all the material characteristics of a war" 39o-the very definition
of a "classic" civil war-were rejected in favor of less exacting
formulas like the one finally adopted. Although the compromise
embodied in Article 1 does set a certain threshold for application
elevated in comparison with that found in common Article 3, it
does so, as remarked above, in substantially more modest terms
than those relating to civil conflicts with "all the material characteristics of war." Any other reading of Article 1 not only is not supported by the text, it impairs the manifest intent of those delegations participating in the Diplomatic Conference who voted for the
"compromise solution."3' 9 It does so precisely because the compromise reached reconciled the call by sovereign states for a stricter
definition of Protocol II' s scope of application, with the objective

389. NEw RULES, supra note 386, at 624 (emphasis added).
390. See supra note 357 and accompanying text.
391. See SUTER, supra note 17, at 170-72 (describing the different approaches
during the Diplomatic Conference to the interpretation of the application threshold and the compromise outcome).
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need for application of its humanitarian protections to internal conflicts of significant intensity.
What, then, is the most appropriate interpretation of Protocol II's
scope of application? Given that the undisputed raison d'itre of the
Protocol is to "ensure a better protection for victims of noninternational armed conflict,""192 the interpretation most in conformity with the humanitarian object and purpose of Protocol II is the
one which, without deviating from the express language of Article
1, tends to provide the highest levels of protection to these victims.
All would agree (although for different reasons) that the "civil war"
standard probably does not fit this bill. The better interpretation,
therefore, is the one which advocates a textual or "plain meaning"
reading of the Article 1 criteria as reflecting merely "the factual and
practical chcumstances that would have to exist if a Party to the
conflict could be expected to implement the provisions of the Protocol. 3' 93 Under this view, which is essentially the same one espoused by Pictet in prior paragraphs:
[the] organized armed groups would need to have a responsible command, to exercise control over some territory, and to have sustained
military operations in order, practicallyspeaking to implement the Protocol. The key to the height of the threshold (...) lies in the expression
"to implement this Protocol," for the threshold of the Protocol [depends]
upon the contents of the Protocol.'4

This interpretation of Article 1 is not only the most appropriate,
it is also the most viable, as evidenced by the straightforward application of the "plain meaning" standard to the war in Colombia in
Part Il.A.3 below. In contrast, the complex evolution of the "civil
war" concept, as well as the divergent views under international
law and practice it has generated, ensure that specific reference to it
in the context of Article 1 raises more questions than it answers.
This is hardly surprising if one recalls that the criteria and procedures for determining belligerency status historically were the subject of intense debate, in addition to being virtually impossible to
392. Protocol II, supra note 13, Preamble, para. 3; see also COMMENTARY
PROTOCOL II, supra note 313, at 1341.
393. See supra note 359 and accompanying text (emphasis added).
394.

PROTOCOL

II

PROCEEDINGS,

supra note 353, at 82.
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implement. Professor Tom Farer has referred to this quest for ascertaining the contextual factors justifying the characterization of
civil war as an armed conflict of an "international character" in the
following terms: "On this critical issue, the Text's communications
are finally Delphic. The travaux pr~paratoiresdo little more than
supplement our uncertainty. And, as one would expect, the practice
of states contributes a rich harvest of ambiguity."3' 9 Although he
was referring to common Article 3 in years prior to the adoption of
Protocol II, his words ring equally true for those who embark upon
the parallel quest under Article 1 of the Protocol.
Skeptics of Protocol II insist that even where the "civil war"
conditions are satisfied, "it is unlikely that many states involved in
internal conflicts will be prepared to acknowledge it."' 96 At the
same time, they maintain that this is nevertheless the correct standard, since "certainly few Governments are prepared to admit the
application of the Protocol to situations of lesser intensity. 3 97 Apparently trumped by this Catch-22, most modern commentators
conclude that the existing norms are inadequate and turn their attention to the search for better alternatives. 98 The application below
of the "plain meaning" standard under Article 1 to the conflict in
Colombia will show why this apparent impasse is not insurmountable. Moreover, the analysis of the Colombian case study presented
in this Article contests the a priori assumption reflected in these
criticisms that the humanitarian law of non-international armed
conflict is unlikely to affect the way governments act, or have tangible effects on a society at war. The possibility or even probability
that states will not want to acknowledge Protocol II's legal applicability does not spell the end of its practical utility or relevance to
their internal armed conflicts. 99
In sum, the conventional wisdom on Article 1 applicability under
Protocol II is untenable for three reasons. First, it reinforces the
eclectic, confusing, and non-viable interpretation of Article 1 based

395. Farer, supra note 317, at 49.
396. Meron, supra note 15, at 600.
397. Analytical Report, supra note 16, para. 79.
398. See id. paras. 78-83, 89-107.
399. See generally discussion infra Part III.
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on traditional notions of civil war that is maintained, as far as this
author can tell, mostly by what one calls "the habit of international
lawyers to repeat received opinions. '"4 Second, it ignores the
golden rule of Article 1 interpretation, which states that the criteria
for application must be established objectively, and that Protocol II
applies automatically once it is determined that the stipulated conditions are met.4° ' It does so by suggesting-if not conceding-that
states' positions on the conditions for application are by and large
definitive as a practical matter. The role of scholars and other active
players on the field of international relations should be to promote
and reinforce II principles in favor of their greater effectiveness.42 As Professor Tom Farer has cogently remarked:
Where the application of legal techniques leaves a residuum of logically
defensible alternatives... , decision must then either be wholly arbitrary (flip of a coin) or policy guided. There can be little serious doubt
about which alternative will be chosen. Among the scholar's functions
is clarification of those policies, often covert, which will inevitably govem the processes of claim and of decision in the various international
arenas. By so doing, he [or she] both promotes rationality in the decision process and augurs the directions in which it will move."'

Insistence on the rule of objective interpretation with respect to
Article 1 of Protocol II, notwithstanding states' lack of political
will to recognize its applicability or to implement its provisions, is
at the heart of constructive humanitarian activism in this field today. This rule guides the proper standard of interpretation and provides the most legitimate foundation from which to launch a wide
range of positive initiatives-legal, political and social-directed at
achieving greater dejure and defacto application of humanitarian
norms during intense civil conflicts. It is necessary that these initiatives be undertaken with greater frequency at both the national

400. IAN

BROVNLIE,

SYSTEM

OF

THE

LAW

OF

NATIONS:

STATE

RESPONSIBILITY (PART I) 37 (1983).
401.

See hifra note 416 and accompanying text.

402. This is one of the conclusions echoed in Part Ill of this Article, which is
dedicated to the issue of implementation.

403. Farer, supra note 317, at 21.
404. See, e.g., discussion hifira Parts II.A.3 and llI.B. 1-3.
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and international levels in order to ensure heightened protection
under international law for the victims of internal wars, present and
future.
In keeping with this perspective, the third and final reason for
debunking conventional wisdom is that it tends to reinforce positions which, whether intended to or not, work against a greater application of humanitarian norms in civil conflict. In Colombia, the
persistent debate as to whether Protocol II applies by operation of
law is at the heart of the struggle for effective implementation of its
provisions.05 Moreover, the Protocol's legal applicability lays the
juridical groundwork for addressing the central question of what
international responsibility is generated by the transgression of its
provisions. ° Yet the experience in Colombia has been that certain
humanitarian law experts will quote several of the critical academic
arguments reviewed in this section in order to sustain that Protocol
II does not apply to the conflict there as a matter of law,4" despite
clear, objective evidence to the contrary.408 It is disingenuous to accept that state practice shapes international law without recognizing
405. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
406. See discussion infra Part II.B.1.
407. See, e.g., Rafael Nieto Loaiza, Algunas observaciones acerca del delito
politico y la aplicaci6n del DIH en Colombia, in DERECHO INTERNACIONAL
IUMANITARIO APLICADO: CASOS DE COLOMBIA, EL SALVADOR, GUATEMALA,

YUGOSLAVIA Y RUANDA 363-64 (1998). Mr. Nieto is a former Defense Ministry
advisor on human rights and humanitarian law who has contributed significantly
to the Armed Forces position on these subjects, reviewed in some detail in Part
I.C.2.a. He is fond of citing Professor Robert Goldman as stating that El Salvador
is the only conflict in the hemisphere to which Protocol II has applied by its own
terms. See supra note 374 and accompanying text. Similarly, Mr. Nieto has cited
Professor Goldman as holding that the objective conditions that must be met with
respect to Protocol II are essentially those constituting a civil war comparable to
the classic state of belligerency required under international customary law. See
id. at 364 n.42. Nieto concludes that Protocol II does not apply to the Colombian
case as a matter of law; it applies only because the Colombian government has
stated that it will do so as a matter of executive policy. See id. at 364-65. See su-

pra notes 184-90 and accompanying text for the Colombian government's position on Protocol II applicability.
408. See ICRC Special Report, supra note 244, at 4 (affirming that Protocol Ii

applies to the conflict in Colombia by its own terms); Interview with Reinaldo
Botero, Legal Advisor, Committee of the ICRC in BogotA, Colombia (July 28,
1998) (discussing the clear legal applicability of Protocol II to the Colombian
conflict); see also discussion infra Part II.A.3.
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the basic role of international law scholars in shaping this very
practice under certain circumstances. Unfortunately, the aforementioned experts provide the Colombian state with the grounds for
justifying its entrenched policy against acknowledging Protocol II's
legal applicability, and not the other way around.'
The ramifications of this debate are also apparent within the regional system for the protection and promotion of human rights under the Organization of American States ("OAS"). The InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights ("IACHR") in a recent
case argued before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights alleges that extra-judicial executions carried out by Colombian police
in the course of the internal conflict were violations of Article 3
common to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and custom under
410
MT.
In its petition, the Commission does not make specific reference to Protocol II, which is as pertinent to the American Convention on Human Rights4 " and as applicable to the case of Colombia as is common Article 3.'2 The IACHR's interpretation of the
American Convention as incorporating humanitarian law norms
409. As earlier noted, the government recognizes the factual existence of a
civil conflict, and has even committed itself to applying Protocol IIas an internal
politicalmatter. This means, however, that it does not recognize that the war is a
non-interstate conflict for purposes of Article 1,thus denying Protocol l's automatic applicability and trumping the operation of its binding force under conventional international law. This distinction is critical from a legal point of view.
If there is no binding obligation, there can be no breach of duty and, therefore, no
international responsibility for the acts committed in violation of the treaty's specific provisions.
410. Comisi6n Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, Demanda ante la Corte
Interamericana de Derechos Humanos contra el Estado de Colombia Caso de
Artemio Pantoja Ordofiez y Otros 2, 9 (1998) (unpublished brief, on file with
author) [hereinafter IACHR Case]. It should be evident that this finding was in
addition to that relating to the violations of the American Convention determined
by the IACHR, especially Article 4 (the right to life). See id.
411. American Convention on Human Rights, "Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica,"
openedfor signature Nov. 22, 1969, 144 U.N.T.S. 123, 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970) (entered into force on July 18, 1978) (ratified by Colombia on May 28, 1973 and
adopted by Law 16 of 1972 (D.O. 33,780)).
412. See IACHR case, supra note 410. at 10-12. The Commission itself has
recognized Protocol II's relevance and applied its provisions to the conflict in
Colombia in its Third Report on the Human Rights Situation in Colombia. See
supra note 189 and accompanying text (relating the Commission's findings that
common Article 3 and Protocol II apply).
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and authorizing their application to member states is legally sound
and unavoidable where violations arise in the context of civil armed
conflict.4"3 It is unfortunate, therefore, that the Commission fails to
take this reasoning to its logical conclusion by recognizing neither
the objective applicability of Protocol II to the war in Colombia,
nor the corresponding violation of its provisions on the facts of this
case. 41 4 This omission not only weakens the Commission's own position with respect to the case before the Court, it undermines the
regional rule of law.
3. Article 1 Analysis of the Colombian Conflict
Outside the world of academia, most practitioners and observers
having direct contact with Colombia's internal war assume that it
meets Protocol II's conditions for applicability. The ICRC, Human
Rights Watch, the United Nations, the United States Department of
State, in addition to most Colombian NGOs and academics, for example, all exercise their oversight of the Colombian situation with
reference to the provisions of Protocol II on the premise that Article
1's conditions have been amply met. 4" And they are absolutely
right to do so because, as a legal matter, the application of Protocol
416
II does not "depend on the discretionary judgment of the parties:,
[Paragraph 1] lays down a number of objective criteria for determining
the field of application of the Protocol ....

The Protocol applies auto-

matically as soon as the material conditions as defined in the article are
fulfilled. [This principle] is one of the cornerstones of international humanitarian law and already applied [even before the drafting of Protocol
II] to Articles 2 and 3 common to the 1949 Conventions.41 '

413. See IACHR THIRD REPORT, supra note 103, ch. IV, paras. 12-13.
414. See id., ch. IV, para. 20.
415. See supra note 408 and accompanying text; HCHR Report, supra note 68,
para. 22; WAR WITHOUT QUARTER, supra note 1, at 26; see also U.S. Depart-

ment of State, Colombia County Report on Human Rights Practicesfor 1998,
Feb. 26, 1999, sec. I.g. <http://www.state.gov/www/global/human-rights/
1998_hrpjreport/colombia> [hereinafter Colombia Country Report for 1998];
CCJ 1996, supra note 82, at 55-81.
416. COMMENTARY PROTOCOL II, supra note 313, at 1351.

417. Id. (emphasis added). See also NEW RULES, supra note 386, at 628.
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As previously established, Protocol II refers to internal armed
conflicts between governmental forces and armed groups organized
under responsible command that exercise such control over territory as to permit them to maintain a certain level of military activity
and to apply the Protocol's humanitarian provisions. Article l's applicability turns on an analysis of the actual circumstances prevailing in such conflicts in order to determine if, as a practical matter,
the armed groups in opposition to the Contracting Party can be expected to implement the provisions of Protocol II and are in fact
capable of doing so.' 8 Thus, aside from the existence of an internal
conflict between official and dissident forces or rebels, there are
four other factual conditions which must be established in this regard: the organized armed groups must (i) be under a responsible
command, (ii) exercise control over any part of the national territory sufficient (iii) to carry out sustained and concerted military operations, and (iv) to apply the provisions of the Protocol. "'
What follows is a step-by-step application of the individual criteria set out in paragraph 1 of Article I to the case study of Colombia's internal war presented in Part I. Each element is addressed
(though not in its original order) and explained before making specific reference to the situation in the country. In light of the expressly interrelated nature of the stipulated conditions, they must be
considered and weighed in conjunction to each other. "[These]
conditions... correspond with [the] actual circumstances in which
the parties may reasonably be expected to apply the rules developed
in the Protocol, since they [would] have the minimum of infrastructure required therefore. 420 Given these parameters, it is difficult to imagine a modern day conflict more appropriate for Protocol
II coverage than Colombia's.
a. Ability to Implement the Protocol
Since this is the "fundamental criterion" of the applicability
equation,42' this is where Article 1 analysis should begin. The other
418. See Protocol H, supra note 13, Article 2,para. 1.
419. See COMMENTARY PROTOCOL 11,
supra note 313, at 1353.
420. Id. at 1353.
421. See id.
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elements are considered explicitly in relation to the armed groups'
factual capacity to apply the Protocol I provisions. Without organization and a responsible command, or in the absence of territorial control and continuous military activity by rebel groups, Protocol II could not be applied and thus would lose all practical
relevance for purposes of the conflict. Furthermore, the condition
that adverse armed groups possess this capacity to apply the Protocol is the basis for their "obligation to do so. ' 422 As a practical mat-

ter, then, Protocol II applies because armed groups in opposition to
government forces are in a position to implement its provisions in
the course of an intense war effort. This means, for example, caring
for the wounded and the sick, or detaining prisoners and treating
them decently in accordance with Articles 4 and 5 of Protocol II. 412
There is no doubt that the Colombian guerrillas can apply IHL
including Protocol II and that, on occasion, they have expressly
done so. The ELN has long recognized the need to impose humanitarian restrictions on the conduct of hostilities and has even
promoted the signing of a humanitarian agreement by all the parties
to the conflict.

14

It has publicly affirmed that the ELN is a "politi-

cal-military organization with responsible command and territorial
control [which give it] the capacity to apply Protocol II for purposes of regulating the internal conflict. "4' 2

After it signed an

agreement with representatives of civil society committing itself,
inter alia, to restrict its practice of kidnapping for ransom, it released several elderly and infirm captives as a sign of its intention
and capacity to comply.4

6

It is worth recalling that the ELN tradi-

tionally have been much more receptive and vocal than their colleagues from the FARC regarding the application of IHL to the
Colombian conflict.
Yet the FARC have also displayed an incontrovertible capacity
to apply IHL and Protocol II in the course of their war effort. After

422. See FRITs KALSHOVEN, CONSTRAINTS ON THE WAGING OF WAR 139
(1987); see also infra Part II.B.2.
423. See Protocol II, supra note 13, arts. 4-5.
424. See supra notes 275-77 and accompanying text.
425. See supra note 278 and accompanying text.
426. See supra notes 283-85 and accompanying text.
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capturing 60 soldiers in an assault on the jungle outpost of Las Delicias (CaquetA. department) in August of 1996, the FARC issued a
statement inwhich they claimed to be providing their captives with
the humane treatment dictated "by the provisions established in
Protocol II additional to the Geneva Conventions for prisoners of
war [sic]." 4'27 The captives, who were safely released ten months
later under the auspices of the ICRC and other international observers, showed no signs of abuse or mistreatment. It should be recalled that the FARC currently hold upwards of 400 police and
army personnel captive for purposes of negotiating an exchange of
prisoners with the government, presumably under the same humanitarian conditions as their predecessors from Las Delicias. ' w
The undisputed ability to capture significant numbers of enemy
agents in combat and to keep them under detention in accordance
with humanitarian standards for months on end is conclusive evidence of the FARC's capacity to apply Protocol II.
-

b. Control Over a Part of the Territory
Article 1 does not specify the exact part or proportion of the territory to be controlled 3 During its drafting, various attempts by
states to specify the proportion of territory that should be subject to
control were expressly rejected by the Diplomatic Conference.""
"In practical terms, if the insurgent armed groups are organized in
accordance with the requirements of the Protocol, the extent of territory they can claim to control will be that which escapes the control of the government [sic] armed forces." ' 2 This element is de427. Farcproponeentrega de rehenes, EL ESPECTADOR, Oct. 16, 1996, at 8A.
428. See Guerrilla, SEMANA, June 9, 1997 (discussing the FARC's demonstrated ability to respect international humanitarian law by releasing the captive
soldiers in good health). "The laws of war applicable in Colombia give captured
combatants no special status, but provide for their humane treatment and safe
release, which the FARC respected." WAR WITHOUT QUARTER, supra note 1,at
133.
429. See Colombia Countr, Report for 1998, supra note 415, at sec. l.d; see
also supra 48 and accompanying text.
430. See Commentary Protocol II,
supra note 313, at 1352.
431. See id. (detailing proposals advocating a "substantial" or a "nonnegligible" control of territory).
432. Id. at 1353.
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fined in purely functional terms because the extent of the control
"must be only such 'as to enable' the armed groups to carry out
sustained and concerted military operations and to apply the Protocol. Control under Article 1, in other words, need not be absolute; it
can take the form of a sustained presence by members of the armed
group that allows them to operate in both military and humanitarian
terms within a given part of the national territory.
Most objective observers today do not dispute that the main Colombian guerrilla groups exercise significant control over large areas of the country in the terms stipulated by Article 1. According to
the IACHR, the FARC alone "control or maintain a strong presence
in 40 to 50% of the 1,071 municipalities in Colombia."4

The U.S.

State Department estimates that "the FARC and the ELN, along
with other smaller groups, exercised a significant degree of influence and initiated armed action in nearly 700 of the country's...
municipalities during [1998], roughly comparable to their level of
activity in 1997.... Guerrillas supplanted absent state institutions
in many sparsely populated areas of the national territory.4 , 4 The
main guerrilla organizations themselves often refer to this territorial
control in their public statements, as did the ELN in the statement
defending their capacity to apply Protocol II quoted above. Manuel
Marulanda, the FARC's maximum leader, described the situation
even more bluntly:
[W]e are the defacto authority in a large part of the national territory.
You can observe it visually on all our [military] fronts.... The authority in these territories is the guerrillas. The mayors cannot work unless
they speak with the guerrillas about how they should govern. As a prac-

tical matter, we are like a government within the government. " '

An expert confirms the substance of Manilanda's statement in
the following terms: "[The] guerrillas are a kind of primitive state
structure: They... have territorial control, and control over the
population, and as they apply some primitive law, ... they have a

433. IACHR THIRD REPORT, supra note 103, ch. I, para. 29.
434. Colombia CountryReportfor 1998, supra note 415, Introduction.
435. 'Tirofijo' se destapa, SEMANA, Jan. 18, 1999 (translation by author).
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vocation of being a state apparatus."4 The scope of the control exercised by the FARC and ELN guerrillas, as was seen, covers
roughly 70% of the national territory.*' This explains in large part
their capacity to apply Protocol II and other humanitarian law
norms as examined above. It also explains how they manage to
carry out the sustained military operations that have characterized
their activity in the course of the conflict for almost a decade.
c. Sustained and Concerted Military Operations
The essence of this element is that the military operations should
be continuous and persistent, and the product of strategic planning
and organizational coordination. "Thus, we are talking about military operations conceived and planned by organized armed
' Isolated, sporadic or unrelated acts of violence have
groups."438
been expressly excluded by paragraph 2 of Article 1. It is important
to note what else has been omitted from the text of this article. The
criteria of duration and intensit, "were not retained as such in the
definition" in order to keep the assessment of applicability as tied
to objective conditions as possible.39 By this point in the analysis,
setting out to show that the Colombian guerrillas maintain high levels of organized military activity is largely a redundant exercise,
not least because the concerted war effort led by the guerrillas was
already examined in some detail in Part I of this Article. '
It is insightful, nonetheless, to canvass recent opinion testifying
to the fact that the Colombian guerrillas continue to carry out "sustained and concerted" military operations by virtue of their control
over parts of the territory. The IACHR in its March 1999 report
remarked that the FARC's military power had increased in recent
years, and cited a string of devastating FARC victories since 1996,
including those at Las Delicias, Patascoy and Miraflores, all of

436. Reyes, supra note 23, at 6 (translation by author). Reyes is a highly respected Colombian researcher who has worked extensively on the subject of political violence and guerrilla activity throughout the entire country.
437. See Colombia Country Reportfor 1998, supra note 415, Introduction.
438. COMMENTARY PROTOCOL II, supra note 313, at 1353.
439. Id. (emphasis added).
440. See discussion supra Part L.A and B.
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which resulted in the capture of numerous military personnel.44' In a
similar vein, the U.S. State Department pointed to the nation-wide
joint guerrilla offensive (FARC and ELN) in August of 1998 in
which army and police posts in 18 of the country's 31 mainland departments were attacked more or less simultaneously. "In some areas, guerrillas shut down basic utility services, such as electricity
and water, and attacked infrastructure facilities such as hydroelectric plants and power lines." 42 Three months later, in a major strategic victory, the FARC guerrillas overran the Vaup~s departmental
capital of Mitii and took dozens of police and army prisoners.4 '
Once these tours deforce are viewed in the context of the belligerent activity carried out by the guerrilla forces on a regular basis,
there can be little question that these armed groups meet even the
elevated standard for military activity under Article 1.
d. The Responsible Command
This element speaks to some degree of organization on the part
of the armed opposition group that allows it to carry out sustained
military activity and impose internal discipline under a structured
authority. 4" Otherwise, they could not meet the other conditions
stipulated under Article 1 and examined above. It does not mean
that the insurgent or dissident armed groups should be arranged in a
hierarchical military organization mirroring that of regular armed
forces, but they must "possess organs [and] have a system for allocating authority and responsibility." 5 As is evident from both the
description of the FARC and the ELN guerrilla organizations outlined in Part I and the foregoing discussion, these armed groups
clearly possess a responsible command structure in the pertinent
sense, and thus satisfy the requirement." 6 Indeed, the substantial
fulfillment of the preceding criteria by these groups-the capacity

441. See IACHR THIRD REPORT, supra note 103, ch. I, paras. 31-33; see also
supra note 428 and accompanying text.
442. Colombia Country Reportfor 1998, supra note 415, sec. I.g.
443. See id.
444. See id. at sec. 1.g.

445. NEw RULES, supra note 386, at 626.
446. See supra notes 37-58 and accompanying text.
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to apply the Protocol, territorial control and a sustained military activity-is as much a consequence of this fact as it is a corroboration.
e. Conclusion
This case-based analysis of the Article 1 criteria confirms what
most organizations and activists working on Colombia already
know to be true: Protocol II applies because its requirements are
objectively and substantially met under the circumstances of the
ongoing war there. These circumstances, however, did not arise
overnight. It is apparent that they have been present for years,"' despite repeated denials by the Colombian Government and those
8 As a matter of international law, Protowho have argued its case.4"
col II applies by its own terms to the war in Colombia, as it almost
certainly has since its ratification and entry into force in early 1996,
at the very least. As we have seen, some scholars maintain that the
"classic civil war of the type to which Protocol II would be applicable is today an anachronism or an exception as might be the war
in El Salvador." 449 They are half-right--classic civil wars are rareand half-wrong-Protocol II applicability is not limited to that type
of conflict. But when they suggest that "the Spanish Civil War...
was the last civil war to which application of the 1977 [Protocol]
would have been useful ,,451 they are plainly mistaken. The case
study analyzed in Parts II and III of this Article aims to set that record straight.
B. THE INTERPRETATION OF IHL IN THE COLOMBIAN CONFLICT
In addition to threshold problems, the other major issue raised by
the conventional wisdom relating to IHL cited in the Introduction is
the "unsatisfactory state of affairs" perceived by many to exist with
447. See VALENCIA VILLA, supra note 220, at 83-90 (arguing persuasively that
the conditions for Protocol II's applicability were already met in 1990).
448. See supra notes 407-09 and accompanying text.
449. MANGAS MARTIN, supra note 8, at 76 (translation by author).
450. Id. (translation by author); Green, supra note 9, at 17 (stating that Protocol II's threshold is so high that the Protocol does not really apply until the conflict takes on the form of a civil war, similar to the one waged in Spain between
the Republican government and the Nationalist authorities).
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respect to the sufficiency of humanitarian law as applied to civil
strife. Common Article 3 is viewed as "insufficient and imprecise
for the case of the intense and widespread hostilities that characterize the classic civil war., 452 Even with respect to lesser conflicts,
it is viewed as too bare a minimum since, "for example, it is silent
on issues relating to freedom of movement, does not expressly prohibit rape, and does not explicitly address matters relating to the
methods and means of warfare., 45 3 Nor does it cover relief agencies. 454 The general perception with respect to common Article 3,
then, is that it is "not sufficient to the needs of civilians or of combatants in cases of internal strife." 5
Protocol II's protections fare no better because "measured
against the rules for inter-state wars, they are still quite basic. The
most serious omissions concern the many specific protections for
civilians against the effects of hostilities found in Protocol U ''
Another view in the same direction is:
"[the] difficulty with Protocol II is that it provides third parties with few
or inadequate rights. For example, there is no provision for third party
resolution of competing or conflicting claims under the Protocol; nor are
there any rules pertaining to third party supervision or the conduct or
implementation of the law." '

So deficient is Protocol II from a normative point of view, that
one author concludes, "it does very little by the way of filling the
lacunae in Common Article 3. If anything, it 458probably weakens
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.,
The absurdity of this final comment highlights the principal
weakness of these criticisms: they seem more concerned with conceptual purity than concrete reality. It will be argued here that, al451. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
452.
453.
454.
455.
456.
457.

supra note 8, at 68 (translation by author).
Analytical Report, supra note 16, para. 74.
See ASIL INSIGHT, supra note 10, at 2.
Id.
Analytical Report,supra note 16, para. 77.
KWAKWA, supra note 3, at 22.
MANGAS MARTIN,

458. Id. at 22.
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though valid perhaps from an academic perspective, these criticisms lose much of their persuasive force and relevance when
viewed from the perspective of a contemporary internal armed conflict such as the one in Colombia. Existing norms not only cover
the vast majority of serious humanitarian law violations occurring
in the course of the war there, they provide a more than adequate
theoretical groundwork for scholars, government officials and activists striving to promote greater compliance with humanitarian
principles. It will be argued that these norms should be measured
by their practical utility and potential effects in real civil conflict
situations, not by their normative deficiency in comparison with the
much more developed rules applicable to wars of an international
character.
In other words, the "omissions" and other deficiencies pointed to
above do not speak to the heart of the problem. In order to show
why this is so, the present section begins by reviewing the status of
state and individual responsibility under international law for violations of IHL. It will explain why, even in a complex and multilateral military confrontation like Colombia's, existing humanitarian norms will encompass the actions of all armed groups that are
parties to the conflict, regardless of whether they are in opposition
to the legitimate authority of the state or not. This section will then
re-examine the humanitarian law situation in Colombia in order to
demonstrate how, as a practical matter, current norms provide ample grounds upon which to construct comprehensive legal diagnoses of the conduct of the parties. It emphasizes the extensive international and national practice with respect to Colombia founded
upon the application and analysis of IHL to the war there in order
to conclude that, although far from perfect, IHL is equally as far
from insufficient.
For purposes of the following discussion, it will prove helpful to
keep the three paradigmatic cases presented below in mind and to
refer back to them while addressing the various questions relating
to international responsibility examined in this section:
1. On the 20th of June, 1997, in the Department of Bolivar, Colombia, an Army unit summarily executed six ELN guerrillas
wounded in combat with state forces, along with two civilians, including a police inspector, who were in the process of transporting
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the injured guerrillas for medical attention. The civilians were Linarmed, and the guerrillas were hors de combat. No resistance was
made to the capture by military forces. After they were executed,
their bodies were transferred to a military base in a different department where they were presented to the public as guerrilla fighters killed in combat.5 9
2. On the 15th of July, 1997, 200 well-armed paramilitaries from
the Autodefensas Campesinas de C6rdoba y Urabf ("ACCU") took
control of Mapiripdn, a rural town in the Department of Meta in
Colombia. With a list in hand, they sought out and detained several
of the town's inhabitants who were then taken to the local slaughterhouse. There they were tortured and executed, and their mutilated bodies thrown into the nearby river. Over the next five days
the paramilitaries imposed a reign of terror in Mapiripfn by continuing to detain, torture and execute persons suspected of being
guerrilla sympathizers. By the time the authorities showed up, on
the 21 st of July, at least fourteen persons had been brutally tortured
and killed, or disappeared, by the paramilitary group. The complicity of the local police and military authorities, which ignored repeated calls for assistance from the town's judge during the rampage, was notorious.4 6
3. In the early morning hours of Sunday, the 18th of October,
1998, an explosion was heard in the small rural mining town of
Machuca, Department of Segovia, Colombia. Guerrillas from the
ELN, which operates in the region had blown up a section of the oil
and gas pipeline that ran through the municipality only a short distance from the village. Minutes later, a river of flame poured
through Machuca, setting fire to the frail huts and to many of the
towns' sleeping residents. The ELN admitted to the sabotage but
alleged that Army units in the area had set the fire, charges denied
by both the authorities and the locals. A total of 69 men, women
and children died in the conflagration.46'
459. See NOCHE Y NIEBLA, Apr.-June 1997, supra note 71, at 125.

460. See NOCHE Y NIEBLA, July-Sept. 1997, supra note 71, at 84; see also
WAR WITHOUT QUARTER, supra note 1, at 118.
461. See Marisol G6mez Giraldo, A Machuca la arras6 elfitego, EL TIEMPO,
Oct. 19, 1998, at Al; see also El Eln es el responsable,EL ESPECTADOR, Oct. 30,

1998 <http:/Avww. elespectador.com>.
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1. State Responsibility
Traditional state responsibility is based on the acts or omissions
of state organs that give rise to the breach of an obligation or standard of conduct incumbent on the state, whether it is by virtue of a
treaty or some principle of customary law. 2 States are also responsible for ultra vires acts of their officials when these are committed
within their apparent or general scope of authority." "It is beyond
dispute that the state may be held responsible for the acts of officials, even when a private [or illegal] motive was operating...."
This is because the general principle under international law is one
of objective responsibility: "provided that agency and causal connection are established, there is a breach of duty by result alone.'
It is also well settled that states will be responsible for the conduct
and harm caused by private persons or groups if "it is established
that such person or group of persons was in fact acting on behalf of
that State.. . ." 466The International Court of Justice ("ICJ") in the
Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and
Against Nicaragua (Merits)46(Nicaragua) determined that the basic
question is whether the relationship between the governmental
authority and the alleged defacto agents "was so much one of dependence on the one side and control on the other that it would be
right to equate [the two], for legal purposes .... "' The "dependency and control" test for agency sets a high threshold which has
been construed in practice as requiring "great dependency" in

462. See BROWNLIE, supra note 400, at 132; see also Report of the International Law Commission 48th Sess., ch. II, arts. 5-11, U.N. Doc. A/51/10 (1996)
[hereinafter Draft Articles].
463. See BROWNLIE, supra note 400, at 145; see also Report of the International Law Commission, supra note 462, ch. 3, art. 10.
464. BROVNLIE, supra note 400, at 162. See also IACHR THIRD REPORT, sa-

pra note 103, ch. I, para. 4.
465. BROWNLIE, supra note 400, at 38.
466. Report of the InternationalLaw Commission, supra note 462, ch. 111, art.

8(a).
467. See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14

(June 27).
468. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Opinion and Judgment, No. IT-94-1-T, para. 585
(May 7, 1997), excerpted in 36 I.L.M. 908, 927 (1997).
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conjunction with "effective control." '69 This elevated threshold led
the ICJ in Nicaragua and a majority of the Trial Chamber of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
("ICTY") in Prosecutorv. Tadic (Tadic) to find in their respective
judgments that the alleged agency relationship had not been established on the facts of each case. 7° More recently, however, the Appeals Chamber in the Tadic case has determined that a less stringent standard than that established by Nicaragua applies when
organized or military groups are alleged to be acting as defacto organs of a state:
One should distinguish the situation of individuals acting on behalf of a
state without specific instructions from that of individuals making up an
organized and hierarchicallystructured group, such as a military unit
or, in case of war or civil strife, armed bands of irregulars or rebels. (...)
Consequently, for the attribution to a State of acts of these groups it is
sufficient to require that the group as a whole be under the overall control of the State.4'

In addition to these sources of responsibility, a state may be held
accountable for acts committed by private persons when they are
"based upon some ultimate default by the organs of the state.4 72
Generally, the illegal actions that are not imputable to the state do
not compromise the state's international responsibility. Yet, when

469. Id. at 928-31, paras. 588, 600. But see Prosecutor v. Tadic, Separate and
Dissenting Opinion of Judge McDonald Regarding the Applicability of Article 2
of the Statute, Case IT-94-1-T, paras. 3-4 (May 7, 1997), 36 I.L.M. at 970-71
(concluding that the evidence supported a finding of effective control).
470. See Military and Paramilitary Activities, supra note 467, at 159; see also
Prosecutor v. Tadic, supra note 468, para. 607. The Appeals Chamber in Tadic
reversed on this issue, for the reasons explained below.
471. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Judgment of the Appeals Chamber, No. IT-94-1,
para. 120 (July 15, 1999) (emphasis in the original). Overall control under international law "may be deemed to exist when a State (or, in the context of an
armed conflict, the Party to the conflict) has a role in organising, coordinating
or planning the military actions of the military group, in addition to financing,
training and equipping or providing operational support to that group." Id. para.
137. The adoption of this new standard by the Appeals Chamber led to the holding in Tadic that the Bosnian Serb Forces or VRS were indeed acting as organs
of the Yugoslav Army under international law. Id. at para. 156.
472. Military and Paramilitary Activities, supra note 467, at 159; see also Report of the InternationalLaw Commission, supra note 462, ch. III, arts. 8, 11.
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there is a duty to exercise due diligence v-is--vis private actors in
some particular respect or context, responsibility may arise if a
state fails to do so. Thus, depending on the nature of the pertinent
norms, the violent acts of private individuals may constitute "the
objective conditions which give rise to a breach of a principle, or
standard, of general international law, or relevant treaty provisions,
on the part of the state. 473
The Colombian State is responsible for the actions of its officials
and agents in direct violation of common Article 3 and Protocol II.
There is, of course, no question of the responsibility generated by
violations of humanitarian and human rights law where state officials, military or otherwise, are the perpetrators. This is the first of
the three paradigmatic cases presented above.4 ' Before addressing
the key issue of state responsibility for the conduct of the paramilitary groups in Colombia, it is helpful to make two basic distinctions. The first is that between paramilitary groups acting in conjunction with state officials, and those acting with the acquiescence
of state authorities. Within the first category, there are two types of
collaborative efforts between paramilitaries and state officials. On
the one hand, there are cases of state agent participation in joint
military operations carried out with paramilitary groups ("direct
collaboration"); on the other, there are cases where the paramilitary
groups are the material authors of a violation the commission of
which depends upon the contribution or support of state agents in
an active way ("indirect collaboration"). This is the second basic
distinction.
Where there is either direct or indirect collaboration, paramilitaries are deemed to operate as defacto state agents. With respect to
direct collaboration, if paramilitaries and military personnel engage
in "joint activity between the military and paramilitaries, particularly when carried out with knowledge by [military] superiors," the
members of the paramilitary groups are acting as state agents and
violate both human rights and humanitarian law obligations incum-

473. Military and Paramilitary Activities, supra note 467, at 159, 16 1.
474. See supra notes 69-124 and accompanying text. see also supra notes 11016 and accompanying text.
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bent upon the state."' There is substantial and credible evidence
from a variety of sources of the "marked collaboration" between
military personnel and paramilitaries in certain parts of the country;
for example, soldiers and paramilitaries patrol together or provide
S
471
each other with mutual support during military operations. In
cases of indirect collaboration, the paramilitary groups act separately from military and police personnel but count upon the active
contribution or support from state officials in order to define or
guarantee the success of the action. Under these conditions, the paramilitaries are still considered to be acting on behalf of the state:
These people act with the cooperation and support of [official] State
agents and often receive information about possible [civilian] targets
from members of the State's security forces. They also receive protection from these State agents against investigation and [criminal] sanction. The persons whom they act against with violence or threats generally understand that the paramilitaries enjoy special strength and
authority derived from their collaboration with the State. The members
of these paramilitary groups [in these cases] thus effectively act under
color of official authority. Their actions must therefore be judged by the
standards set forth in human rights law as well as humanitarian law.47"n
sum, when the paramilitaries operate under circumstances of direct or
indirect collaboration to violate human rights and humanitarian principles, they are acting as auxiliaries of the Colombian military apparatus
and on behalf of the state itself. Under these circumstances, the levels of
dependency and control required by the international law regime for
state responsibility are readily established. Unlike the situation of the
"contras" in Nicaragua or the Bosnian Serb Forces ("VRS") in BosniaHerzegovina, the paramilitary groups in Colombia exist almost unencumbered within the national territory of the state accused of sponsoring
them. They operate freely in heavily
militarized zones where they carry
478
out the majority of their crimes.
As a consequence, Colombian paramilitaries in most cases are utterly dependent upon state collaboration
and active complicity in order to maintain their scorched earth antiinsurgency campaign.

Where paramilitary groups like these rely upon the direct or indi475. IACHR THIRD REPORT, supra note 103, ch. IV, para. 258.
476. See id. ch. IV, para. 250; HCHR 1999, supra note 82, para. 36; see also
supra notes 68, 88 and 115 and accompanying text.
477. IACHR THIRD REPORT, supra note 103, ch. IV, para. 262.
478. See id. ch. IV, paras. 250-70.
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rect collaboration of the security forces in order to carry out their
atrocities, they must be deemed to be under the overall control of
the state. In this regard, establishing the degree of control that is required by international law in the context of internal conflicts like
Colombia's may be substantially easier than in those cases where
the paramilitary groups alleged to be de facto organs of a state were
operating in conflicts waged entirely on foreign soil. The Appeals
Chamber in Tadic justified its ratcheting down of the Nicaragua
test by underscoring that "the whole body of international law on
State responsibility is based on the realistic concept of accountability, which disregards legal formalities and aims at ensuring that
States entrusting some functions to individuals or groups of individuals must answer for their actions." ' The judges of the Appeals
Chamber "fail[ed] to see why in each and every circumstance international law should require a high threshold for the test of control[,
and held instead that the] degree of control may (...) vary according
to the factual circumstances of each case."4' 1 Such reasoning would
seem to dictate a similarly flexible approach to applying the control
standard in situations of internal conflict, such as the one in Colombia. 8'
In any case, it is evident that the Colombian authorities through
direct and indirect collaboration have maintained sufficient control
over the paramilitary groups so as to hold the Colombian State accountable for the latter's actions in violation of international human

479. Id. para. 121.
480. Id. para. 117 (emphasis in original).
481. Oddly enough, the Appeals Chamber, in dicta, seems to suggest a different conclusion. It states that if "the controlling State is not the territorialState
where the armed clashes occur (...), more extensive and compelling evidence is
required to show that the State is genuinely in control of the units or groups ......
Id. at 138 (emphasis in original). The Appeals Chamber then goes on to say,
however, that "[t]he same substantial evidence is required when, although the
State in question is the territorialState where armed clashes occur, the general
situation is one of turmoil, civil strife and weakened State authority." Id. at 139
(emphasis added). It is unclear why the standard should be substantially the same
in these two very different situations. As this case study amply demonstrates, the
means, methods and opportunities for state forces to exercise the requisite control
over organized groups operating within their own territory may in fact be multiplied and facilitated in situations of internal armed conflict, especially where
they are fighting a common enemy.
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rights and humanitarian law, whatever the standard applied. Most
major paramilitary groups in Colombia have been organized,
trained and/or directly supported for over a decade by state forces
and authorities inside the country." 2 Their ideological, tactical and
physical proximity place each squarely on the same side in the war
against the insurgency. The two collaborate constantly through
military actions designed and executed in order to achieve shared
strategic and political objectives, all of which take place-it bears
repeating-wholly within the national territory. In addition, the
Colombian State has persistently proved unwilling to combat the
paramilitary phenomenon in an effective manner. Not surprisingly,
when it does announce measures to counteract the paramilitary
violence, these are either insufficient or simply not implemented."'
Most independent commentators agree that the militaryparamilitary partnership is a "new form of exercising illegal repression with no strings attached [for state agents] called, quite rightly,
violence through delegation. ' 84 Accordingly, the Colombian State
is directly responsible under international law for the criminal actions of such paramilitary groups, and must answer for them before
the community of nations. +
Even in those cases or situations where agency cannot be established, the state is responsible for actions by paramilitary groups
carried out with the acquiescence of its officials and resulting in the
abuse of human rights and humanitarian norms. "[T]he State becomes responsible for the illegal acts of private protagonists when
it has permitted such acts to occur without adopting the pertinent
measures to avoid them or to subsequently punish those who per-

482. See supra notes 59-68 and accompanying text; HUMAN RIGHTS
COLOMBIA'S KILLER NETWORKS: THE MILITARY-PARAMILITARY

WATCH,
PARTNERSHIP

AND THE UNITED STATES chs. I1-IV (1996).

483. See IACHR THIRD REPORT, supra note 103, ch. IV, paras. 236-49. "Even
as the State has expressed increased interest in combating the paramilitaries over
the last several years, the [Inter-American] Commission has continued to receive
information regarding cooperation between paramilitary groups and the State's
public security forces. This information calls into question the State's commitment to eliminating the paramilitaries." Id. para. 249.
484. IV INFORME, supra note 88, at 59-60.
485. See, e.g., IACHR THIRD REPORT, supra note 103 ch. IV, sec. I (Recommendations).
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petrate them., 486 This occurs because the state is under a duty to exercise due diligence to prevent abuses of human rights and humanitarian law within its jurisdiction by private persons and
groups. 87 Thus, the Colombian State is bound under international
law not only to respect its obligations in this regard, but also to ensure that the paramilitary groups do not engage in harmful conduct
in violation of these norms. 481 When such abuses by private persons
or groups do occur, the state is furthermore bound to initiate serious
judicial investigations with a view to bringing the perpetrators to
justice.8 9 Failure to comply with these duties constitutes a separate
basis for state responsibility.
As concerns the situation in Colombia, there is abundant evidence that systematic and widespread acquiescence by state officials in open violation of their public duties facilitates the activity
of the paramilitary groups in many regions of the country.' In
most of these cases, acquiescence takes the form of acts or omissions not amounting to the direct or active collaboration with paramilitary groups described in prior paragraphs. It nonetheless entails
levels of complicity with the illegal actions taken by private persons and groups sufficient to ground state responsibility for failure
supra note 103, ch. 1, para. 4.
487. See Veldsquez Rodriguez Case (Honduras), Case 68, Inter-Am. C.H.R.
61, OEA/ser.C./4 (1988), reprinted in HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON,
486. IACHR THIRD

REPORT,

INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS

94648

(1996). The parallel duty of due diligence under IHL derives from the obligation
of states party to the Geneva Conventions and their regulatory regime to "undertake to respect and ensure respect" for humanitarian law, especially within their
own territory. GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949, supra note 12, common Article 1.
See also Roberts, supra note 156, at 29 (interpreting the language of Common
Article 1 of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions).
488. See Draft Articles, supra note 462, art. 14. Note that under international
law, this duty probably would not extend to insurgent groups for two reasons.
First, by the very nature of their opposition to the "legitimate authority," they are,
under most circumstances, expressly exempted from the state responsibility regime. See id. Second, IHL expressly contemplates the existence of insurgent
groups and directly addresses their actions, thereby establishing the grounds for
the international responsibility of these groups for the failure to comply with
their humanitarian law obligations. See Part II.B.2 inlra (discussing the responsibilities of the guerrilla and paramilitary groups pursuant to IHL).
489. See Veld.squez Rodriguez Case, supra note 487, at 947.
490. See IACHR THIRD REPORT, supra note 103, ch. IV, paras. 263-70.
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to act against them. It is for this reason that "[t]he State becomes
internationally responsible for harm caused to individual rights by
private actors when it acquiesces in the acts of those private actors
or when it fails to take reasonable measures to prevent the violation
or, subsequently, 49
to investigate and sanction those responsible for
'
caused.,
harm
the
The massacre in Mapiriptin, depicted in the second paradigmatic
case above, is a chilling study of state acquiescence (and probably
indirect collaboration) in relation to paramilitary atrocities. It was,
in effect, a chronicle of death foretold. The AUC had announced
that they would initiate an offensive in the southern part of the
country, to the government's mostly mute indifference. "Many organizations and even state officials have found significant evidence
' Carlos
that the State could have but did not stop the massacre."492
Castafio flew 60 of his men by private plane to the area of operations, landing and passing through the heavily militarized town of
San Jos6 del Guaviare, without leaving the slightest trace or record
(the plane's departure had been registered at the point of departure). "93 Once in the area, the paramilitaries traveled some distance
through an area controlled by the army to reach the town of
Mapiripdn, where they initiated their campaign to terrorize the
population. The first day they arrived, the town judge called the
nearby military battalion for help, repeating his plea eight times
over the next five days, before the soldiers finally appeared on the
last day of the massacre. As a result of this tragedy, several members of the mentioned battalion are under arrest for their complicity
in the crime.94
The foregoing discussion explains why the Colombian State is
responsible not only for the acts of its officials in violation of international human rights and humanitarian law, but also for the vast
majority of the abuses of these same norms committed by the principal paramilitary groups in Colombia. Indeed, the legal framework
for state responsibility outlined in the preceding paragraph covers

491. Id. ch. IV, para. 271.
492. Id. ch. IV, para. 264.
493. See id. ch. IV, para. 265.
494. See id.
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most, if not all, of the actions taken by the paramilitary groups in
Colombia. State responsibility arises where the paramilitaries act as
de facto state agents to violate international norms, just as it does
when state officials violate these norms directly through their own
acts or omissions. Moreover, Colombia has a duty under international law to adopt reasonable measures aimed at guaranteeing respect for human rights and humanitarian norms by private persons
and groups, and to take serious steps towards their judicial enforcement when they are violated.9 5 Similarly, acquiescence on the
part of military personnel and state officials, which permits paramilitaries to carry out their criminal activity with impunity, also
gives rise to state responsibility under international law.
2. Guerrillaand ParamilitariResponsibilit ' under IHL
It is well settled that IHL, which is applicable in internal conflicts speaks to the actions of certain private individuals. Common
Article 3 states that its provisions shall be respected by "each Party
to the conflict," while Protocol II expressly contemplates and encompasses the conduct of "organized armed groups" in opposition
to the security forces of the State. It seems evident, furthermore,
that humanitarian law governs the conduct of private individuals
participating in the hostilities as combatants, whether or not they
are in opposition to the government. " Combatants are viewed collectively under certain circumstances as the armed forces of a party
to the conflict. The key issue is how to determine when a group of
combatants becomes a party to the conflict such that it may be expected to comply with the applicable dictates of humanitarian
law.497 This determination is similar to, but qualitatively distinct
from, that made under Article 1 analysis for purposes of Protocol II
applicability. 498 It should be obvious that the main Colombian guer-

495. See supra note 487 and accompanying text.
496. See Thomas Graditsky, hIdividual Criminal Responsibilin-fbr Violations
of International Humanitarian Law Committed in Non-international ,4rmed
Conflicts, 322 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 29, 31 (1998).
497. See IACHR THIRD REPORT, supra note 103, ch. IV, paras. 13, 45-46, 61,
84, 234.
498. See, e.g., WAR WITHOUT QUARTER, supra note 1, at 184-87. An armed
group may well meet the criteria for constituting a party to the conflict without
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rilla groups are parties to the internal armed conflict; it is less clear
whether the same can be said with respect to the paramilitary
groups.
The guidelines for determining when private persons and groups
become combatants and armed forces in an internal conflict, respectively, are "inferentially" drawn from the basic provisions of
Protocol I. 499 A combatant may be defined as a member of the

armed forces of a party to the conflict, or anyone else who takes a
direct part in the hostilities.' Traditionally, the general characteristics of any armed forces are that they be organized under a responsible command, and linked to one of the parties to the conflict. ' ' "[C]ombatants are obliged to distinguish themselves from
the civilian population while they are engaged in an attack or in a
military operation preparatory to an attack."' '° Under circumstances
where it is difficult to mark this distinction through the use of uniforms, for example, the combatant distinguishes him or herself by
carrying his or her arms openly during military engagement or in a
military deployment preceding the launch of an attack.50' One important consequence of this principle of distinction is that it seeks
qualifying under the higher standard established by Article I as an "organized
armed group" for purposes of Protocol II applicability. This is the case in Colombia, where the EPL (Popular Liberation Army) guerrillas do not control a
portion of the national territory sufficient to carry out sustained and concerted
military operations, but clearly are considered a party to the conflict for all other
intents and purposes. See id.
499. See NEW RULES, supra note 386, at 672; see also Protocol I, supra note
233, arts. 43-44, 50 (defining a civilian as a person who does not fit one of the
categories of combatants defined in Article 4 A (1), (2), (3) and (6) of the Third
Convention and Article 43). It is accepted practice to refer to certain provisions
of Protocol I, which is relevant to inter-state wars, as reflecting a codification of
basic humanitarian concepts under customary international law and, therefore, as
a "'substantive guide" for purposes of interpreting Protocol II and IHL principles
applicable to internal wars. See IACHR THIRD REPORT, supra note 103, ch. IV,
paras. 44-46.
500. See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 12, arts. 4 A (1), (2), (3) and
(6); Protocol I, supra note 233, arts. 43-44, 50; Protocol II, supra note 13, art. 4;
see also IACHR THIRD REPORT, supra note 103, ch. IV, paras. 43-46.
501. See NEW RULES, supra note 386, at 673; Third Geneva Convention, supra note 12, art. 4(A).
502. Protocol I, supra note 233, art. 44 (3).
503. See id.
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to guarantee that the fundamental protections afforded the civilian
population are observed and respected, at the same time that it
serves to identify those actors participating in the hostilities to
whom the restrictions of IHL will apply in a given conflict situation.50 4
The findamental distinction between civilian and combatant is
important for another reason: it helps define when an armed group
is a party to an internal armed conflict. Essentially, such a group
will be a military organization comprised of armed forces under a
responsible command structure and displaying some distinctive
sign that identifies its members as combatants for that organization.0 5 These combatants should wear a distinctive sign and/or
carry their arms openly, as well as conduct "their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war." This final elementthe capacity to implement the rules of humanitarian law-presupposes an obligation to do so, and serves as the foundation upon
which the obligations for a party under international law are derived. 0 7 It should be emphasized that being recognized as a party to
the conflict for purposes of IHL in no way affects the legal status of
the armed groups under international law."" It does not constitute
recognition of the status of belligerency on the part of the insurgents, nor does it raise the armed opposition groups, or any other
armed group for that matter, to the same level as the state under international lawic0
Once a group meets these criteria, its members who are combatants will be held to the humanitarian standards established by the

504. See IACHR THIRD REPORT, supra note 103, ch. IV, paras. 43-44.
505. See NEw RULES, supra note 386, at 672: Protocol 1, supra note 233, arts.
43-44, 50; Third Geneva Convention, supra note 12, art. 4 A (1), (2), (3) and (6);
see also IACHR THIRD REPORT, supra note 103, ch. IV, paras. 13, 45-46, 61, 84,
234.
506. See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 12, art. 4 (A).
507. See KALSHOVEN, supra note 422, at 139: see also discussion supra Part
II.A.3.
508. See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 12, art. 3; COMMENTARY
PROTOCOL II, supra note 313, at 1344.

509. See supra notes 337-39 and accompanying text, see also 1ACHR THIRD
REPORT, supra note 103, ch. IV, paras. 17-19.
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rules that are applicable to the internal conflict under both convention and custom: "As parties to the conflict, these groups are directly covered by the laws of international humanitarian law and
their belligerent acts fall within the provisions of this normative
' Colombia's active insurgent organizations-the FARC,
body."511
the ELN, and even the small Popular Liberation Army ("EPL")
guerrillas-clearly meet these conditions.' By now it should be
evident that the AUC and several regional paramilitary groups like
the ACCU also meet the criteria utilized under IHL for purposes of
identifying parties to a conflict. 13 The ICRC in Colombia maintains
that the principal paramilitary groups are parties to the internal conflict because in fact they meet the objective conditions recognized
by Protocol I and analyzed in this sub-section. For this reason, the
ICRC in its dealings with these groups holds them accountable for
the full range of humanitarian law norms applicable to the conflict,
to wit, Protocol II, common Article 3, and custom 14 The only
question that remains is what type of responsibility accrues to these
actors for the violation of the applicable IHL norms.
3. InternationalCriminalResponsibilityfor Individuals
Recent developments in international law already noted confirm
an "increasing readiness to recognize that some rules of international humanitarian law once considered to involve only the responsibility of states may also be a basis for individual criminal re' This readiness is rapidly being translated into law,
sponsibility."515
on at least two fronts. The Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugo510. See IACHR THIRD REPORT, supra note 103, ch. IV, paras. 84, 234; see
also WAR WITHOUT QUARTER, supra note 1, at 16-41.
511. IACHR THIRD REPORT, supra note 103, ch. IV, para. 84.
512. See discussion supra Part II.A.3; WAR WITHOUT QUARTER, supra note 1,

at 184-91.
513. See IACHR THIRD REPORT, supra note 103, ch. IV, paras. 61, 234; see
also WAR WITHOUT QUARTER, supra note 1, at 16-41.

514. See Interview with Reinaldo Botero, Legal Advisor, Committee of the
International Red Cross, in Bogotd, Colombia (July 28, 1998) (explaining why
the ICRC treats the paramilitary groups in the same way as it does the other parties to the conflict); see also Part I.B.2.c.
515. War Crimes Law, supra note 7, at 467. See also supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.

1999]

HoRs DE LOGIQL.E

slavia has conclusively held that Article 3 common to the Geneva
Conventions of 1949, is "a reflection of elementary considerations
of humanity," and forms a fundamental part of the laws and customs of war made justiciable under its Statute.5" The Tribunal concluded that customary international law "imposes [individual]
criminal liability for serious violations of common Article 3, as
supplemented by other general principles and rules on the protection of victims of internal armed conflict, and for breaching certain
fundamental principles and rules regarding means and methods of
combat in civil strife."5"" The Appeals Chamber of the Tribunal had
previously found that Article 3 of its Statute ("Violations of the
laws or customs of war") grants jurisdiction over any and all serious violations of IHL not already covered by the other articles of
the Tribunal's Statute on grave breaches, genocide and crimes
against humanity."' These would include serious violations of humanitarian law rules established by custom or under a treaty when
the required conditions are met, which entail the individual criminal
responsibility of the person breaching the rule."
The second active front is that involving the establishment of an
International Criminal Court ("ICC") constructed upon the pioneering work of the International Law Commission, which has recognized the principle of individual criminal responsibility for violations of humanitarian law applicable in internal conflicts.'
Article 8 of the ICC Statute reflects the progress made in international criminal law by incorporating into the definition of war
crimes both serious violations of common Article 3, and "other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflicts not of an international character, within the established
framework of international law."52 ' The list of prohibited acts giving rise to individual criminal responsibility under Article 8 covers
516. Prosecutor v. Tadic, supra note 468, para. 609.
517. Id. para. 613.
518. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, No. IT-94-1-AR72, Appeal on Jurisdiction,
paras. 89-91 (Oct. 2, 1995), 35 I.L.M. 32 (1996) [hereinafter Interlocutory Appeal].
519. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, supra note 468, par. 610.
520. See generally Graditsky, supra note 496, at 39-41.
521. ICC Statute, supra note 126, art. 8, para. 2(c), (e).
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a wide spectrum of protections ranging from the most basic guarantees reflected in common Article 3, to prohibitions on deliberate
attacks against the civilian population, medical personal and civilian installations. Sexual crimes, including rape, and the conscription of children under 15 years of age as combatants also figure
prominently on this list. 22 It is no exaggeration to state that inclusion of internal atrocities as war crimes under international law is
one of the most significant advances achieved by the Rome Statute
and the establishment of the ICC.
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, in the context of its recent study of the human rights and humanitarian law
situation in Colombia, made reference to these developments in the
following terms:
The international community has sent a clear and unmistakable message
through [these] recent actions. It will not tolerate serious infractions of
norms that consecrate the elementary considerations of humanity. The
international community has considered serious violations like these of
the laws and customs of war, as in the case of crimes against humanity,
to be infractions with universal jurisdiction, and has catalogued the perpetrators as international criminals."'

4. The Myth of Insufficiency
The purpose of this final sub-section is to demonstrate why the
criticisms of common Article 3 and Protocol II summarized at the
outset fail to state a case against the sufficiency of IHL as applied
to internal conflict. The first two components in the case for a more
favorable perspective have already been put forward: a revamped
reading of Protocol II's scope of application, and an evolving system of international responsibility that not only encompasses state
authorities and their agents but also extends to individuals from any
armed group who commit international crimes. The third and final
component addressed here rebuts the myth of insufficiency from a
normative and functional point of view. It maintains that existing
rules under common Article 3 and especially Protocol II cover a
vast portion of the most grievous violations that can occur in an in522. See id. art. 8, para. 2(e).
523.

IACHR THIRD REPORT, supra note 103, ch. IV, para. 346.
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ternal war, and thus are a central ingredient in the productive study
and evaluation of states' compliance with their obligations under
international law.
Suppose for a moment that the "minimum" principles contained
in common Article 3 were fuilly applied in the Colombian conflict
and enforced to perfection: over two-thirds of the violent deaths
produced year
after year as a result of the war would simply cease
2
to tabulate.

Assuming this best-case scenario for argument's sake,

common Article 3's protections relating to the life and integrity of
persons not taking active part in the hostilities alone would effectively impede the massacres, political homicides, tortures, forced
disappearances, hostage taking and internal displacement (achieved
through death threats and intimidation) affecting several thousand
Colombian civilians and non-combatants every year.f25 Not only are
524. See supra notes 69-83 and accompanying text. Common Article 3 reads
textually as follows:
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in
the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provision: (I)
Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed
forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by
sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances
be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, color,
religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. To this
end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in
any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons: (a) \olence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel
treatment and torture; (b) taking of hostages' (c) outrages upon personal
dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment. (d) the passing
of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment
pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples. (2) The
wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for. An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, may offer
its services to the Parties in conflict. The Parties to the conflict should further endeavor to bring into force, by means of special agreements, all or part
of the other provisions of the present Convention. The application of the
preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to the
conflict.
First Geneva Convention, supra note 12, ch. 1, art. 3; Second Geneva Convention, supra note 12, ch. I, art. 3; Third Geneva Convention, supra note 12, pt. 1,
art. 3; Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 12, pt. I, art. 1.
525. See discussion supra Parts L.A and I.B; see also IACHR THIRD REPORT,
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these the most egregious violations human cruelty can conceive of
under the circumstances, they also represent the primary violations
actually occurring in the course of the conflict in Colombia. In light
of the nature and extent of the covered violations, the silence on
freedom of movement, to name one example of the "deficiencies"
cited above, can hardly be considered a debilitating weakness.
The legal framework erected upon customary and conventional
sources of IHL provides ample grounds for the monitoring, analysis
and censure of abusive conduct occurring during civil conflicts like
the one in Colombia. In that country, it is clear that the normative
combination of Protocol II and common Article 3 has been more
than adequate to deal with the vast majority of the abuses committed by the parties to the conflict.526 Where important actions constituting serious violations are not covered by common Article 3, such
as the indiscriminate attacks affecting the civilian population or
against civilian targets, these omissions are either addressed by
Protocol 11,527 or oftentimes can be resolved through interpretation.
The process of interpreting existing norms can be utilized by
scholars and activists to fill in many of the gaps that might still exist within this legal framework, whether taken in part (just common
Article 3) or as a whole. Certainly this is a practice in which those
of us who work on Colombia have had to engage. 28 For instance, it
was suggested that the lack of an explicit reference to rapes is a
weakness of existing humanitarian instruments. Yet the express
provisions of common Article 3, as well as Articles 4 and 5 of
Protocol II, clearly would prohibit rape despite the fact that it is not
expressly mentioned in these instruments. Just as kidnapping for
ransom is deemed a hostage taking and therefore illegal under

supra note 103, ch. IV.
526. See supra notes 69-83 and accompanying text; CCJ 1996, supra note 82,
ch. I(III); Colombia Country Reportfor 1998, supra note 415, sec. 1(g); HCHR
Report, supra note 68, passim; IACHR THIRD REPORT, supra note 103, ch. IV;
WAR WITHOUT QUARTER, supra note 1, passim.
527. See Protocol II, supra note 13, arts. 13-15.
528. See Carrillo-Sudrez, supra note 107, at 181-82 (describing how international law has been interpreted to apply to situations of kidnappings for ransom
by the guerrillas in Colombia).
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JHL 29 sexual violence of any sort is, to say the least, "violence to
life and person ... , cruel ... , humiliating and degrading treatment,"
and probably rises to the level of torture, which is explicitly prohibited. 30
Protocol II's perceived deficiencies, much like those regarding
common Article 3, do not pan out as negatively under conditions of
practical application as its critics would believe. It is true, as many
commentators point out, that the Protocol's final text and articles
(only 28) were severely pruned down from the working draft under
consideration by the Diplomatic Conference during most of the negotiations, doing away at the last minute with many of its most ambitious provisions."' Nonetheless, what remains-and this is worth
repeating-is more than adequate for addressing the most egregious
and widespread violations of basic humanitarian guarantees taking
place during internal conflicts similar to the one in Colombia.
The basic problem reflected by the conventional criticisms of
Protocol II is not the deficiency of the humanitarian norms per se,
but rather the choice of standard or reference utilized by those
commentators to determine whether IHL norms are "sufficient" or
not. At this point in the evolution of the IHL regime, the standard
for measuring the sufficiency of IHL applicable to non-interstate
conflict should not be the humanitarian law of international armed
conflict, against which, in comparison, it is bound to fail. A more
appropriate standard by which to measure these norms is the utility
and practical relevance to actual hostilities ongoing in those civil
conflicts where it applies. We should aspire to achieve the same
level of theoretical protection under the latter regime as has been
reached with respect to the former, but not at the expense of undermining its potential for effectiveness, as is.
As it stands, Protocol II and the rest of the IHL regime are well
suited for addressing the tactics utilized by armed groups engaged
in "dirty war." Armed groups that carry out this "war" through

529. See IACHR THIRD REPORT, supra note 103, ch. IV, paras. 122-23.
530. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 12, art. 3. In addition, rape can be
viewed as physical abuse that discriminates on the basis of sex, an act that is also
clearly prohibited. See id.
531. See, e.g., Kalshoven, supra note 162, at 2.
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massacres, forced disappearances, torture, arbitrary executions and
other forms of intimidation and abuse directed against the civilian
population, will be covered. In this type of conflict, it is unrealistic
to limit any legal characterization of the term "hostilities" to conventional combat situations where the guerrillas directly square off
against the army. Hostilities under these conditions have a distinctly broader connotation and thus are more correctly viewed as
including all actions that are taken by any of the parties for military
or political purposes, or which otherwise have a nexus to the conflict.3 These actions would include paramilitary commandos gunning down victims in their exclusive uptown apartment in the heart
of Bogotd at 2:00 a.m., just as they would the execution by guerrillas of an injured, unarmed soldier hors de combat. " ' It is for this
reason that distinguishing between a low intensity conflict and a
high intensity conflict only in terms of battlefield casualties misses
the point altogether
and renders any such classification largely ir4
relevant.
The irregular nature of the hostilities in modem civil conflicts
like Colombia's is also part of the reason why existing IHL can be
surprisingly sufficient with regard to war's atrocities. Where internal armed conflicts degenerate into "dirty wars," humanitarian law
merges with that of human rights such that many IHL violations
overlap with those traditionally managed under the international

532. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, supra note 468, para. 632; IACHR THIRD
supra note 103, ch. IV, para. 53. Both the Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia and the IACHR refuse to limit the definition of hostilities to conventional combat between armed forces. Instead, they focus on the circumstances
and the intent of the actions to inflict harm on the enemy or otherwise contribute
to the war effort of one of the parties.
REPORT,

533. See CCJ 1996, supra note 82 (in memoriam). The CCJ dedicates its report
to two human rights workers (and the father of one of them) who were assassinated in May of 1997 under the circumstances described, presumably for maintaining links with the guerrillas.
534. See Analytical Report, supra note 16, para. 18. This influential report
noted that "in 1996, there were 19 situations of internal violence in which at least
1.000 people were killed (high intensity conflicts) and another 40 "internal situations causing between 100 and 1,000 deaths," which were deemed low-intensity
conflicts. Id. In cases like Colombia's, where most of the victims are not killed
on the battlefield and thus are not counted for purposes of this classification, the
distinction between low and high intensity conflicts can prove utterly misleading.
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human rights regime." 5 In other words, "[a]t these crucial junctions
of life and death, human rights law runs over the same tracks as
humanitarian law, seeking the protection of the same people at the
same time for the same sort of armed abuses." : And where they do
not overlap, regarding abuses by the guerrillas and certain paramilitaries, for instance, IHL literally fills the gap. In Colombia,
where nearly two-thirds of the killings by the parties in the context
of an internal conflict occur illegally off the battlefield,"" IHL plays
a crucial role. It addresses abuses by non-state actors at the same
time that it covers similar actions by state agents. It thus provides a
separate basis for finding international responsibility, which results
from violations of its provisions. Under these circumstances, international humanitarian law, which reaches beyond the limits of traditional human rights to cover abuses by non-traditional actors,
takes on a whole new significance.
Another alleged failing of Protocol II in particular appears to be
that "it prescribes no method for its implementation and is silent on
enforcement. Nor is there any provision as to breaches or their
punishment ... .""' These criticisms are not persuasive for at least
three reasons. First, mechanisms established originally for other
purposes such as the Article 90 Fact Finding Commission may be
adapted for use under the Protocol II regime, a solution being actively promoted in the case of Colombia. " " Other international
mechanisms, like a United Nations' peace forging mission, may be
established and specially tailored to fulfill a monitoring function
with respect to human rights and humanitarian law."" Second, the
international criminalization of international atrocities, which finds
its maximum expression in the Statute of the ICC, provides solid
grounds for optimism towards the future enforcement of humani535. See discussion supra Parts 1.C.2 and II.B. 1.
536. GEOFFREY BEST, WAR AND LAW SINCE 1945 69 (1994).

537. See discussion supra Part I.B.
538. Green, supra note 9, at 17.
539. See discussion supra Part l.C.2.b.
540. See LAWYERS CoMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, IMPROVISING HISTORY:
A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS' OBSERVER MISSION IN EL
SALVADOR (1995) (providing a detailed and critical analysis of the Human
Rights Division and its role within ONUSAL).
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tarian principles where war crimes and crimes against humanity are
committed in the internal sphere.141 Certainly the fact that certain
violations of humanitarian law applicable in non-international
armed conflict have been elevated to the status of war crimes under
international law is an enormous step forward in the future suppression of illegal conduct under this regime. Finally, states are bound
under international law to comply with their treaty obligations in
good faith, which means that they must adopt the necessary measures internally to implement and enforce the relevant provisions,
regardless of whether 542
this obligation is made explicit in the pertinot.
or
instrument
nent
Seen in this light, the question of the sufficiency of existing IHL
norms should take on a more positive hue. At the very least, it
should become more apparent that the direct comparison of international conflict with internal war from the point of view of the
normative regulation under IHL is not necessarily the most appropriate. The question of implementation is much more complex and
multi-faceted than that covered by formal provisions or legal enforcement, as the next and final Part of this Article explains in
some detail. The idea here is not to suggest that the normative development of IHL is so adequate as to leave no room for improvement. On the contrary, the conflict in Colombia also reveals some
practical shortcomings and thus suggests certain areas in which the
further evolution of existing norms is required in order to optimize
humanitarian protections in real conflict situations. One such area,
for instance, relates to the capture and exchange of prisoners by insurgent forces.5 43 Another, undoubtedly, relates to the means and

541. See supra notes 520-23 and accompanying text (noting that the provisions
contained in the ICC Statute apply to crimes committed during internal conflicts).
542. See Vienna Convention, supra note 385, arts. 26, 27; see also discussion
infra Part III.C. 1.
543. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. No express provisions are
made for the exchange of prisoners under the IHL regime for non-international
armed conflict, although the ICRC has gone on record as stating that such an exchange could be arranged under the special agreements clause of common Article 3. See Canje no implica beligerancia, EL TIEMPO, Apr. 28, 1999, at Al. In
the meantime, captured soldiers and police offered in exchange for political prisoners must be considered hostages held in violation of basic IHL guarantees.
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methods of waging war. But on the whole, there is no need to dismiss the framework in place for internal wars as "unsatisfactory"
because it is not yet as complete as that in place for international
conflicts.
To conclude, the constant reference in this Article to a variety of
recent publications applying humanitarian law derived from common Article 3 and Protocol II to the war in Colombia offers eloquent testimony to the broad utility of these norms."" The cited
works of scholars, activists, intergovernmental agencies, nongovernmental organizations and other observers concerned with the
situation on the ground in Colombia would not have been possible
without a viable normative framework and the desire to put it to
work. Although far from perfect, it is equally far from insufficient,
and it serves to comprehensively analyze and evaluate complex
conduct in violation of international principles by all the parties to
the Colombian conflict. The IACHR's innovative use of humanitarian law as a source of guidance in interpreting the American
Convention on Human Rights, in addition to its direct application
of the legal framework to the general situation there, is a particularly instructive example of how the common Article 3/Protocol II
regime can be utilized quite effectively to promote greater protection for victims of internal wars."' In these situations, as in the
many others cited in this Article, the capacity to apply humanitarian
law in a rigorous and systematic fashion, and demand accountability for its violations under conditions of internal war, is of paramount importance.

III. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF HUMANITARIAN
LAW IN CIVIL CONFLICT
A. THE COLOMBIAN CASE STUDY REVISITED

The human rights and humanitarian law crisis in Colombia
seems to confirm the conventional view held by most legal scholars
544. See, e.g., HCHR 1999, supra note 82; IACHR THIRD REPORT, supra note
103; CCJ 1996, supra note 82.
545. See IACHR THIRD REPORT, supra note 103, ch. IV, paras. 10-16.
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that humanitarian rules applicable to non-interstate armed conflicts
are largely unenforceable and almost universally disregarded. 4" The
atrocities committed in the course of the war in Colombia, outlined
in Part I, section A, and graphically depicted in Part II, section B,
of this Article, substantiate the view that "[t]he increase in the intensity of the conflict has not led to a greater commitment by the
parties to respecting international humanitarian law; if anything, the
frank disrespect shown by all the actors towards humanitarian
norms is ostensible. 54 7 Rampant massacres by the paramilitary
groups, widespread kidnapping and hostage taking by the guerrillas, and a practice of executing guerrilla sympathizers on the part of
the armed forces, are among the most common violations of humanitarian law carried out by the parties to the Colombian civil
conflict. A near total breakdown of the rule of law guarantees that
very few of
the persons responsible for these crimes will be brought
548
justice.
to
What has been done in the way of substantive implementation
and legal enforcement of IHL by the Colombian authorities is
minimal in comparison with the scope and magnitude of the humanitarian crises suffered by the country. Despite recent initiatives
in the right direction, including the government's decision to recognize the existence of an internal armed conflict to which IHL applies, specific legislative or regulatory measures implementing humanitarian norms have not yet been adopted. Courts and other
judicial authorities, in the absence of implementing legislation, will
not apply humanitarian norms as law, despite their express constitutional stature. Even the enforcement of existing criminal law
when it overlaps with humanitarian norms is sporadic and problematic, while impunity for such violations reigns. Although the Public
Ministry, the ICRC and national NGOs have made progress in the
way of education and dissemination of IHL, the violations continue
unabated. The Colombian Armed Forces, despite an official shift in
policy, maintain a staunch resistance to the practical application of
international human rights and humanitarian law norms to their
members and to the conflict itself. Members of the paramilitary
546. See sup-a note 22 and accompanying text.

547. CCJ 1996,

supra

note 82, at 55 (translation by author).

548. See Cunaraswamy,supra note 134, para. 156.
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groups receive instruction on IHL from ICRC representatives, but
then systematically massacre hundreds of civilians, frequently with
the assistance or acquiescence of the military.
At the international level, no legal mechanism yet exists for
monitoring compliance with humanitarian law in Colombia, nor is
there any procedure for sanctioning the persistent, widespread, and
egregious violations currently taking place in the country." Efforts
to engage the Article 90 Fact-Finding Commission established under Protocol I have not advanced since Colombia formally recognized the Commission's competence in 1996. The recent establishment of an International Criminal Court to try war crimes and
crimes against humanity, although an important step, is still far
from becoming a reality of any kind in Colombia. Part II of this
Article demonstrated that humanitarian norms applicable in Colombia substantially cover the most serious abuses committed by
the parties to the conflict. It was demonstrated further that these
violations of humanitarian law give rise to forms of international
responsibility for which the parties can be held accountable. Unfortunately, this theoretical groundwork has yet to find an institutional corollary in the establishment of an international mechanism
or procedure created for the purpose of enforcing compliance with
H1L.
The Colombian case, in other words, appears to be exemplary of
the widely held belief that IHL, generally speaking, is disregarded
in and by states with internal conflicts. The purpose of this third
and final Part is to show why this characterization of the Colombian situation, while accurate in some aspects, does not reflect the
full impact of humanitarian law on the conduct of the parties to the
conflict. In particular, this conventional view overlooks the fundamental role 1I-IL plays in the national debate on the search for
peace, and in the efforts undertaken by the parties to negotiate a
political solution to the conflict. To better evaluate this critical dimension of humanitarian law in the Colombian context, a nonconventional view of enforcement under international law is required. The basis for this alternative perspective will be a novel
theory of compliance with international regulatory agreements de-

549. See generally Roberts, supra note 156.
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veloped by Abram and Antonia Chayes and adapted to the focus of
this case study. "0
The two Chayes, Abram and Antonia, advance an unorthodox
but insightful theory of compliance with international regulatory
agreements based on a "managerial" rather than an "enforcement"
model.' They develop a paradigm for the analysis of compliance
that is not premised on coercive or adversarial legal measures, but
rather on the complex interaction of a dense network of factors
constituting the very fabric of international relations. Foremost
among these factors are the oversight activities of intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, in addition to those of
states. The dynamic sketched by Abram and Antonia Chayes
stresses cooperation, persuasion, and "peer pressure" as a means of
motivating and managing the compliance of states with their international commitments. The following sections of this Article will
borrow freely from their theory-and add to it-in order to understand why in Colombia, despite the desperate situation just described, compliance with IHL is being slowly constructed in nonconventional ways.
B. CONSTRUCTING COMPLIANCE IN COLOMBIA

Under the Chayes' model of international regulatory regimes,
acceptable levels of compliance are not coerced, they are constructed; substantial deviance from treaty norms is not "punished,"
it is made the subject of explanation and justification."'2 Numerous
factors are identified which further contribute to "managing compliance" and creating the conditions necessary for states to comply
with their obligations under regulatory treaty regimes. Among these
factors are transparency in the requirements and expectations imposed on states under a given regime, capacity building and cooperation through discourse with other parties, and the persuasion or
pressure produced through the action of international actors, in-

550. See ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW
SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS
1-28 (1995).

551. See id. at 3.
552. See infra note 563 and accompanying text.
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eluding intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations."'
Thus, once the lawyer's tendency to "think in terms of enforcement
through legal processes after a violation" is set aside," a more
comprehensive approach to understanding the dynamic behind the
implementation of humanitarian norms in specific countries with
internal conflicts is possible. Colombia provides a perfect example
of why this is so.
In keeping with this view, Professor Frits Kalshoven has remarked with respect to the development of IHL that:
The sequence of events ...from the [1977 Diplomatic Conference] of
the 1970s to Colombia in the 1990s, leads me to this first comment that
a change of attitude [on the part of the Government] could hardly have
been more radical. The step from Colombia's initial refusal to even sign
the Protocols of 1977 to its unqualified adherence to these instruments,
completed with acceptance of the competence of the International Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission [under Protocol 1],
surely qualifies
as a quantum jump.5"5

The central observation here derives from the fact that, before
1988 when discussion on the Protocols was first revived, practically
no one was talking about humanitarian law in Colombia.5" Very
few people outside the Colombian Ministry of Foreign Affairs were
even aware that this body of international law existed. The painstaking and persistent work of visionary individuals, both within and
outside of government, was necessary to set the bases for the "radical" change observed by Kalshoven. This change required a lengthy
struggle, as was evidenced by the story behind the ratification of
the two Protocols additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949
summarized in Part I of this case study.5"
Professor Kalshoven argues that in Colombia, progress has been
made with respect to the implementation of IHL, and suggests that
it continues. "[This] progress is agonizingly slow, at times barely

553. See CHAYES & HANDLER CHAYES, supra note 550, at 22-28.
554. See Roberts, supra note 156, at 16.
555. Kalshoven, supra note 162, at 16.
556. See Valencia Villa, supra note 220, at 73.
557. See discussion supra Part I.C.2.b.
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noticeable, and occasionally interrupted by veritable setbacks.
Yet... a higher speed could hardly have been expected in a country w[h]ere violence and terror have reigned for over forty years."""
The latter conclusion is certainly debatable, ' but it points up
nonetheless a key distinction inherent in the concept of compliance
that is frequently overlooked and sorely undervalued. It is the distinction between acceptance and observance. Little doubt remains
that the observance of humanitarian law in Colombia has been and
remains poor, a consequence in great part of the lack of legal implementation and effective enforcement described at length in this
Article. But it is in the tremendous degree of acceptance of IHL
that has been achieved in just over a decade in Colombia where,
according to Kalshoven, the true achievement lies.
And he has a point. It is axiomatic that observance must be preceded by some degree of acceptance, just as compliance entails a
substantial level of observance. Colombia's express recognition of
the applicability of humanitarian norms including Protocol II to the
internal armed conflict is of enormous practical import, even if it is
presented as a purely political decision by the government, and not
as the objective and automatic operation of international law"' ° It
represents a significant development in the progressive evolution of
IHL's acceptance in the country, and is closely linked to the prior
ratification of the two Protocols and the recognition of the Article
90 Fact-Finding Commission's competence under Protocol I. As
was already seen, there is an important (though still insufficient)
practice by state and government officials that reveals the increasing interpretation and application of humanitarian law by national
authorities.16' The legislative initiative currently pending before the

Colombian Congress that would incorporate humanitarian principles into the Colombian Penal Code is another critical step forward
in the implementation process, however far it may still be from
reaching its objective.

558. Kalshoven, supra note 162, at 20.
559. See discussion infra Part III.C.1 (explaining that lack of political will on
the part of successive governments is the principal source of non-compliance).
560. See supra notes 188-90 and accompanying text.
561. See discussion supra Part I.C.2.a.
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The first step on the path to compliance under any international
regulatory regime is acceptance by the state of that regime's rules
and the progressive integration of the rules into the national legal
and political order. The progress achieved with respect to the acceptance of IHL in Colombia must be understood as a direct consequence of the internal and external pressures that have been brought
to bear over the past decade upon national authorities and policy
makers. "[M]uch of the compliance process consists of a kind of
discourse among states, international organizations, and, to some
extent interested publics, elaborating the meaning of [the pertinent]
norms and specifying the performance required in particular circumstances. ' 62 As will be shown below, the complex interaction
between and among states, international agencies, and nongovernmental organizations has been a motivating force behind the
realignment of government policy in Colombia with respect to humanitarian law. This crucial dynamic and its impact are undoubtedly behind the meteoric growth in acceptance of IHL by the Colombian authorities.
In order to complete the Colombian case study and fully engage
the Chayes' theory of regime management, it is necessary to present additional information on the activities of key international actors and their impact on national authorities and civil society. This
analysis of compliance would not be complete without prior reference to at least three international players whose activities have
been definitive in shaping the scope of IHL discourse in Colombia:
(1) other states, in particular the United States of America given its
enormous impact on policy makers and society in general; (2) international organizations including intergovernmental institutions
such as the United Nations and the Organization of American
States; and (3) international non-governmental organizations. For
purposes of this analysis, the information presented in the following
three sub-sections should be taken as complementary to that which
was presented in section C of Part I on national implementation
measures.

562. CHAYES & HANDLER CHAYES, supra note 550, at 110.
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1. The Role of the United States
The state parties to a treaty regime are primarily responsible for
monitoring the conduct of their peers. The leverage that states can
exercise bilaterally and multilaterally vis-6-vis another state whose
activities do not conform to shared commitments under a regulatory
agreement can be significant. Membership in today's international
community dictates that states are presumed to comply with their
international obligations "in the absence of strong countervailing
considerations;" they are, consequently, subject to the demand of
"justifying departures from treaty norms that is both a practical and
' State parties to a
a legal requirement in the international system."563
regime can promote compliance through a series of means at their
disposal, such as persuasion and advocacy, or protest and exposure,
depending on the circumstances."" "This process works because
modem states are bound in a tightly woven fabric of international
agreements, organizations, and institutions that shape their relations
with each other and penetrate deeply into their internal economic
and politics. 5 65 This is the general framework within which the
following discussion should be considered.
Colombia receives more security assistance from the United
States than any other country in the Western Hemisphere, with aid
levels reminding policy analysts of those under U.S. involvement in
El Salvador in the mid 1980s. ' 6 Until recently, one issue-counternarcotics-dominated the bilateral agenda between the two coun-

563. Id. at 110, 118-23.
The dynamic of justification is the search for a common understanding of
the significance of the norm in the specific situation presented. The participants seek, almost in Socratic fashion, to persuade each other of the validity
of the successive steps in the dialectic. In the course of this debate, the performance required of a party in a particular case is progressively defined
and specified. Since the party has participated in each stage of the argument,
the pressures to conform to the final judgment are great. The process by
which egoists learn to cooperate is at the same time a process of reconstructing their interests in terms of shared commitments to social norms.
Id. at 123 (citation omitted).
564. See id. at 109-11.
565. Id. at 26.
566. See YOUNGERS, supra note 32, at 9.
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tries and all U.S. security aid was explicitly funneled in that direction. The United States had no qualms about throwing its enormous
political weight around on the issue, and as a result Colombia was
"decertified" in 1996 and 1997 under congressional procedures
unilaterally evaluating the effectiveness of countries' efforts in the
war against drugs. 67 By the end of 1996, however, a reformulated

U.S. policy opened the door to a broader and more comprehensive
bilateral agenda. By mid-1998, one high-ranking official listed U.S.
priorities in Colombia as "combating drugs, getting the economy
back on track, and promoting human rights, democracy and
peace. 5 68 The election of Andr~s Pastrana as President in June of
1998 guaranteed that relations between the two nations would improve markedly. 69
The shift towards emphasis on human rights and peace in U.S.
policy towards Colombia, and the commensurate impact on promoting respect for IL, has been tangible. The U.S. Congress on
human rights grounds has on various occasions conditioned the
sales of military equipment to the Colombian army, as well as direct counter-narcotics assistance. "Under congressional pressure,
aid to the Colombian army was reprogrammed in FYI 994 and was
not resumed until FY1997," although assistance to the National
affected. 5
Police and other branches of the Armed Forces was not
The strongest example of human rights conditionality is the Leahy
amendment to legislation appropriating U.S. foreign assistance for
FY1997, which states that no anti-narcotics assistance can be "provided to any unit of the security forces of a foreign country if the
Secretary of State has credible evidence to believe such unit has
committed gross violations of human rights," unless the responsible
parties are brought to justice."
The Clinton administration committed itself to applying the
Leahy amendment (which was strengthened in 1998) to all kinds of
security assistance, and sent strict guidelines to the relevant embas-

567. See id. at 1-2.

568. Id. at 3.
569. See id. at 3-4.
570. Id. at 11.
571. YOUNGERS, supra note 32, at 11.
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sies as to the measures to be adopted to comply with the amendment.172 When Human Rights Watch and especially Amnesty Inter-

national went public with solid evidence that Colombian army units
responsible for some of the worst human rights violations in the
early 1990s had received either U.S. weapons or training, the relevance and urgency of conditionality were confirmed. 57 At the very

least, the scandal contributed to the Clinton administration's decision to obtain a formal written agreement with the Colombian government to abide by the Leahy amendment, a demand that infuriated the Colombian army. 74 The army's refusal to go along held up
the release of U.S. military assistance during all of 1997, until a
change in the military command led to the signing of a "memorandum of understanding" between the United States and Colombian
governments in August of that year.17

Nearly 300 million dollars of aid were released to the Colombian
military for 1999, primarily "out of concern that the leftist Marxist
guerrillas pose a serious threat to the State-and hence to American
efforts to staunch the flow of drugs."" 6 But the massacre campaign
by paramilitary forces in early January, 1999, re-ignited the debate
"of whether the United States funded Colombian military, which
has long been accused of supporting the paramilitary groups, is
willing to crack down on them and their drug networks.,1 77 Attacks

by these illegal bands on human rights defenders in February, 1999,
led to further, energetic protests by both the U.S. State Department

572. See id.

573. See id. at 11-12.
574. See La Otra certificaci6n, SEMANA, July 14, 1997.
575. See Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the Re-

public of Colombia and the Government of the United States of America Concerning the Transfer, Use, Security, and Monitoring of Articles, Services, or Re-

lated Training that may be Furnished to the Government of the Republic of
Colombia by the Government of the United States of America, Aug. 1, 1997
[hereinafter MOU] (on file with author) (providing that the United States will not
furnish counter-narcotic assistance if it has "credible evidence" that the Colombian security forces have committed human rights violations); see also
YOUNGERS, supra note 32, at 12.
576. Douglas Farah, Massacres Imperil U.S. Aid to Colombia: Paramilitary
Groups Linked to Army, WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 1999, at Al.
577. Id.
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and a bipartisan coalition of congresspersons from the House and
Senate, including an urgent demand that concrete action be taken
by the government of Colombia to combat the paramilitary
groups."' Failure to do so, U.S. officials fear, could once again put
U.S. military aid to Colombia in check. Unfortunately, numerous
obstacles make the verification of compliance with the Leahy
amendment and the executive memorandum extremely difficult, not
least of which is the U.S. government's refusal to provide information on how the security assistance is actually disbursed.'
There is no doubt that a very strong message is being sent to the
Colombian civilian and military authorities through various channels, some of them quite public. Newly appointed Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Harold
Koh, shocked the Colombian authorities in April of 1999 by openly
criticizing the armed forces' human rights record and their partnership with the paramilitary groups.'5 He made his statements in Colombia while attending a conference on human rights sponsored by
the American Embassy. In May of 1998, the State Department
spokesman chided the Colombian army commander for disputing
reports of human rights violations by the Colombian armed forces
made by Human Rights Watch and the Washington Post: "We disagree with the general's decision to single out those who express
criticism over the extremely serious human rights situation in Colombia. We do not believe that this is a helpful approach to dealing
with the very real problems identified by these critics, problems
which the Colombian military itself has acknowledged. ""' The U.S.

578. See Sergio G6mez Maseri, E.U. Pide Acciones Contra "Paras',EL
TIEMPO, Feb. 3, 1999, at Al.
579. See YOUNGERS, supra note 32, at 13-14 (discussing the lack of policies
and procedures for monitoring anti-drug support to Colombia). A detailed follow-up to the Leahy Amendment's application with respect to the recent release
of aid to the Colombian military is urgently needed in Congress, as well as in the
non-governmental sector that provides crucial oversight in these matters. It is beyond the scope of this Article, however, to do more than signal the importance of
this research and of the role it should play in further shaping U.S. foreign policy.
580. See Bibiana Mercado and Francisco Jaramillo, Dura pohvnica por regano
de E.U., ELTIEMPO, Apr. 13, 1999, at Al.
581. Press Statement by James P. Rubin, U.S. State Department Spokesman,
May 12, 1998 (on file with author).
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government in 1998 also began revoking the visas of military officials notoriously implicated in human rights violations, a practice
that in the past had
been reserved for officials implicated in nar82
cotics trafficking.
A particularly effective tool for making the Clinton Administration's new policy felt has been the U.S. State Department's Country
Reports on Human Rights Practices that include a section on violations of IHL and which are required for all countries receiving
American aid.18 1 One commentator noted that these reports under
President Clinton began to "provide strong and well-documented
critiques of Colombia's human rights crisis, prompting strong re'
bukes from Colombia's military high command."584
The 1997
Country Report, for example, states that:
[t]he Government's human rights record continued to be poor, although
there were some improvements in certain areas. Government forces
continued to commit numerous serious abuses, including extra-judicial
killings .... There were targeted killings by elements of the Army, notably the 20th Intelligence Brigade. Security forces were responsible for
several instances of forced disappearance, and police and soldiers continued to torture and beat some detainees. At times the security forces
collaborated with paramilitary groups that committed abuses.'

In response to this particular report, top military commanders did
not hesitate to lash out again in defense of their institution. In a
"harshly worded statement, [they said] the report violated the 'dig-

582. See Youngers, supra note 32, at 17.
583. This report is submitted to the Congress by the Department of State in
compliance with secs. 116(d) and 502(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
(FAA), as amended, and sec. 505(c) of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended. As
stated in sec. 116(d)(1) of the FAA: 'The Secretary of State shall transmit to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, by January 31 of each year, a full and complete report regarding the status of internationally recognized human rights, within the meaning
of sub-section (A) in countries that receive assistance under this part, and (B) in
all other foreign countries which are members of the United Nations and which
are not otherwise the subject of a human rights report under this Act.' U.S.
STATE DEP'T, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1997 xI

(1998) [hereinafter COUNTRY REPORTS 1997].
584. YOUNGERS, supra note 32, at 17.

585. COUNTRY REPORTS 1997, supra note 583, at 452.
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nity and institutional honour' of all those who serve in Colombia's
military and contained 'a series of baseless accusations."' " The
Colombian Government through its Foreign Ministry dispatched a
formal reply to the 1997 Report criticizing its "unilateral" character
and taking issue with several of its conclusions. " But continued
U.S. pressure on the Colombian authorities eventually led to the
disbanding in June of 1998 of the 20th Intelligence Brigade, linked
to selective killings of human rights defenders and others accused
by military officials of being guerrilla members or sympathizers. '
It is extremely important that the U.S. Country Reports on Colombia critically analyze the state of compliance with IHL by all
parties to the conflict.5 9 The 1999 Report, for instance, emphasizes
violations of the laws of war by the guerrillas, as well as the paramilitary groups acting with state "collaboration," and the illegal reliance of these parties on massacres, internal displacement, and the
use of landmines in the furtherance of the war effort. " The technical analysis of these violations and those of state agents in the
Country Reports by the State Department is a novel and effective
application of international humanitarian norms to the situation in
Colombia. The specific attention paid to human rights and humanitarian law issues in the bilateral relations between the two
countries, in a broader sense, is a laudable and constructive feature
of U.S. foreign policy.
The tremendous leverage exercised by the United States on these
issues through its foreign policy toward Colombia, and the tangible
impact it has had in governmental circles, undoubtedly have been
key factors in the move towards greater implementation and compliance in Colombia. All of the activity described above receives

586. Colonbian Military Slams U.S. Human Rights Report, Reuter News
Serv., Feb. 5, 1998.
587. See Declaraci6n del Gobiemo Nacional acerca del "Informe sobre derechos humanos, Colombia: 1996" elaborado por el Departamento de Estado de los
Estados Unidos (1997) (on file with author) (issued in response to the U.S. State
Department's Country Report).
588. See YOUNGERS, supra note 32, at 18.
589. Cf Colombia Country Reportfor 1998, supra note 415, at 557-61, with
COUNTRY REPORT FOR 1997, supra note 583, at 461-65.
590. See Colonbia Country Reportfor 1998, supra note 415, at 559-60.
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wide press and media coverage in the country. By mid-1997, one
Colombian weekly summarized the shift in U.S. policy this way:
"The subject of human rights is gathering great strength in the
United States. Absolute respect for the principles of International
Humanitarian Law [sic] is a fundamental part of the [American]
Democratic [Party's] platform .... [Under Clinton's Presidency, it]
is probable that the subject will [continue to] move up notches
within the American diplomatic agenda, and, consequently, in the
agenda with Colombia."5 9' The accuracy, completeness, and objectivity of the 1999 State Department's Country Report on Colombia
confirms that the Clinton Administration's official policy on human
rights and humanitarian law continues to move in the right direction.
2. InternationalOrganizations
Ideally, international organizations play a strong and effective
role in overseeing the implementation of a treaty regime. The number of organizations competent to act with respect to a given regime
will vary according to its nature and the commitments assumed under its provisions. In most cases, however, these organizations perform similar functions, such as the collection and processing of
data through reporting and other fact-finding procedures; they also
play a key role in the identification and verification of
unconformity in the conduct of state parties. ' 92 Moreover, international organizations provide a natural multilateral arena within
which states can exercise their discourse and diplomatic leverage in
the interactive process of managing compliance with treaty regimes. The good standing of states in these organizations will frequently depend on the status of their compliance with the pertinent
international obligations, or their ability to justify serious nonconformity or deviance from established treaty norms.9 ' The potential for effective action on the part of these organizations is palpable in the following description of the international scrutiny
given the Colombian human rights and humanitarian law crisis.

591. La otra certificaci6n,supra note 574 (translation by author).
592. See CHAYES & HANDLER
593. See id. at 27.

CHAYES,

supra note 550, chs. 7, 8 & 12.
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Scrutiny of the Colombian conflict by international organizations
is relatively recent. In the late 1980s, the human rights situation began to attract the focused attention of the United Nations ("UN")"'
and the Organization of American States ("OAS"), " as well as

non-governmental organizations such as Amnesty International and
Human Rights Watch.!" Today, the observations and recommendations on the Colombian situation formulated by the UN and the
OAS are alone sufficient to fill a book.5" Many of them directly address the dire humanitarian consequences of the conflict and the
need to promote observance of IHL by the parties to the conflict.
The UN Commission on Human Rights has been outspoken in this
regard, expressing concern for violations of human rights and IHL
in Colombia every year since 1996.'9"The Human Rights Committee recently addressed the broader but largely overlapping problem
of political violence in its conclusions resulting from the periodic
review of Colombia's compliance under the regime established by

594. See UN Doc. EICN.4/1990/22/Add. 1 (1990) (noting that in 1989, the UN
Special Rapporteur on Summary and Arbitrary Executions visited Colombia for
the first time and presented his report to the UN Commission on Human Rights

the following year). The UN Special Rapporteur on Summary and Arbitrary Executions was preceded by the U.N. Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary
Disappearances in 1988. See U.N. Doc. EICN.4/1989/18/Add. I (1989).
595. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights carried out its second
in situ visit to Colombia in 1990, although its report was not published until
1993. See INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, REPORT ON THE

SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS INCOLOMBIA, OEA/ser.L'V 1.84, doc. 39 rev.
(1993) [hereinafter IACHR REPORT].
596. See, e.g., AMERICAS WATCH, THE CENTRAL-AMERICANILATION OF
COLOMBIA? (1986); AMERICAS WATCH, THE KILLINGS IN COLOMBIA (1989);
AMERICAS WATCH, THE DRUG WAR IN COLOMBIA: THE NEGLECTED TRAGEDY
OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE (1990). The work of these organizations with respect to

Colombia is the subject of the next sub-section.
597. See, e.g., DEFENSORiA DEL PUEBLO Y EL COLOMBIAN COMMISSION OF
JURISTS, CONTRA VIENTO Y MAREA: CONCLUSIONES Y RECOMENDACIONES DE LA
ONU Y LA OEA PARA GARANTIZAR LA VIGENCIA DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS EN

COLOMBIA: 1980-1997 (1997) [hereinafter CONTRA VIENTO].
598. See id. at 47, 50; HCHR 1999, supra note 82, para. 1;Elizabeth Olson,
Colombia: Rights Abuses Condemned, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1999, at 10A
(summarizing the 1999 statement on the human rights problem in Colombia
made by the Chairman of the UN Commission on Human Rights).
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the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. "9 The
Committee went on record in 1997 as deploring "the extra-judicial
executions, the assassination, the torture and other degrading treatment, the enforced disappearances and arbitrary detentions carried
out by members of the armed forces, the police, paramilitary groups
and the guerrillas."''
Extremely important in this regard is the permanent monitoring
of human rights and humanitarian law carried out in Colombia by
the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights ("HCHR"). The authority to monitor alleged violations of
IHL by all the parties to the conflict was insisted upon in the negotiations of the underlying agreement between the High Commissioner and the government of Colombia, and was expressly provided for in the text of the Office's mandate.6° ' Accordingly, a
significant portion of the HCHR's annual report to the Commission
on Human Rights is dedicated to analyzing violations of humanitarian law, 6°2 many of which are brought to the Office's attention
through the complaints that the office regularly receives from
"State institutions, non-governmental organizations ...and private

individuals. 6 3 In the HCHR's 1999 report on the Office in Colombia, specific attention is given to the "deterioration of the human
rights situation [and] the disregard for international humanitarian
law on the part of both the guerrilla and the paramilitary forces."""
A section dedicated to the "main breaches of international humanitarian law" covers murders, threats, hostage taking, attacks on the
civilian population, forced displacement, torture and ill-treatment,
violations of the general protection afforded sanitary personnel and
transports, the recruitment of children, the use of anti-personnel

599. See Concluding Observations by the Human Rights Committee: Colonbia, U.N. Human Rights Committee, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.75 (1997), Part
IV.
600. Id. para. 15.
601. See Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
on Colombia, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1997/1 1, para. 8, annex.
602. See generally HCHR Report, supra note 68, paras. 21-73, 86-116, 174,
192.
603. Id. para. 24.
604. HCHR 1999, supra note 82, para. 40; see also id. para. 33.
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mines, and attacks on civilian property.i The visit by the High
Commissioner herself to Colombia in October of 1998 provided a
high profile boost to the Office's presence and work in the country.606

The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has in a
similar fashion repeatedly expressed concern over the persistence
of serious violations of IHL in Colombia. 0 ' Immediately after its
record third in situ visit to the country in December of 1997, the
IACHR issued a lengthy press statement in which it sharply criticized the lamentable state of respect for IHL in the conflict by the
different armed groups, including state forces. ' This position was
greatly reinforced and substantiated by the comprehensive report on
the human rights and humanitarian law situation in Colombia released by the IACHR in March of 1999. This groundbreaking report and its observations form the backbone for much of the analysis on international responsibility presented in Part II.B. of this
Article. Moreover, in a major advance under the regional system,
the IACHR recently determined that it is empowered to apply IHL
in individual cases arising under the American Convention on Human Rights, and asked the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
to do the same.& The basis for this landmark decision is a case
from Colombia involving the extra-judicial execution of civilians
by the Colombian Police in the context of a military operation.
Colombian officials feel obliged to respond, both privately and
publicly, to the findings made by the human rights organs of these
regional and universal intergovernmental organizations. One telling
example is the Colombian Government's public response to the
first report by the HCHR's Permanent Office in Bogotd, in which it

605. See id. ch. IV.H.
606. See id. paras. 19-26.
607. The IACHR has visited Colombia a record three times since 1980. See
Report on the situation of Human Rights in the Republic of Colombia, Inter-Am.
C.H.R., OAS/Ser.L/VJII.53, doc. 22 (1981); IAHCR REPORT supra note 595;
IACHR THIRD REPORT, supra note 103.
608. See Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Press Communique
No. 20/97 (visited Sept. 26, 1999) http://www.cidi.oas.org/Coiunicados/English
/1997/Pres%2014-21.htm [hereinafter IACHR Press Release).
609. See supra notes 410-13 and accompanying text.
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underscored the "shared concern of the Colombian Government,
human rights organizations and the international community to find
ways of resolving the issue of violations of human rights and of international humanitarian law in our country." 6 ° Although it took issue with many of the reports' affirmations, it accepted that "the Office of the High Commissioner in Colombia has devoted its efforts
to cooperation, support, observation and advice in the search for
solutions that will improve the situation of human rights and international humanitarian law in Colombia ... and has made a valued
contribution to the country."6 ' Since most of the reports and statements issued by the IACHR and its UN counterparts receive significant press coverage, this kind of public discourse on the issue of
Government compliance with human rights and humanitarian
norms is a frequent consequence of international oversight.
3. InternationalNon-governmental Organizations
Within a given regulatory regime, NGOs fulfill basic functions
such as (1) setting objective standards and defining the levels at
which compliance is "acceptable," (2) providing independent
monitoring and reporting on party performance, (3) performing independent evaluations and assessments of party compliance, and
(4) where noncompliance is at issue, marshalling public opinion
through exposure and "shaming" in order to generate the corresponding political backlash.6 2 Many of these tasks can also be performed by intergovernmental organizations or specialized bodies
recognized by treaty regimes for that purpose. Experience has
shown, however, that international institutions tend to be extremely
bureaucratic, and can sometimes fall prey to inefficiency. 6 1' At
610. Letter dated 10 March 1998from the Deputy Ministerfor Foreign Affairs
of Colombia addressed to the United Nations High Commissionerfor Humnan

Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/135, at para. 1 (1998).
611. Id. para. 198.

612. See CHAYES & HANDLER CHAYES, supra note 550, at 17-22 (defining acceptable compliance as tolerating those violations which pose little or no threat to
the overall agreement based on the nature of the situation); id. at 250-70 (citing
the successes of NGOs in enhancing information collection, verification, and
compliance, and presenting several case studies in which NGOs played an important role in these capacities).
613. See id. at 271,283-84.
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other times, the controlling hand of states in the process of monitoring and verification through intergovernmental organizations
may lead to an undesirable politicization of the compliance process. 614 It is for this reason that, within the interactive international
community, the "deficiencies of public organizations are supplied
in part by the growth in importance and influence of nongovernmental organizations. '1
The relatively recent attention focused on the situation in Colombia by governments and intergovernmental agencies is a consequence, in large part, of the concerted efforts by NGOs working at
international levels.1 6 NGO participation in the UN Commission on
Human Rights throughout the 1990s has contributed substantially
to the deliberations among government delegations on violations of
human rights and humanitarian law by the parties to the conflict in
Colombia. The concern for this situation on the part of the European Union and other key delegations was critical to promoting the
adoption of strong public statements by the Commission's Chairman on numerous occasions already mentioned. The EU and delegations such as Canada's relied heavily on NGO information for
their negotiations with other governments carried out during the
sessions of the Commission, including Colombia's. In the regional
system for the protection and promotion of human rights, the constant participation of both local and international NGOs is crucial.
When the JACHR visited the country in December of 1997, local
NGO data on human rights and IHL violations was an essential
source of invaluable input.' International NGOs like the Center for
Justice and International Law ("CEJIL") litigate extensively before
the JACHR and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and
generally provide a constant and reliable source of information for
614. See Carlos Lozano Bedoya & Arturo Carrillo Sudirez, La protecci6n
internationalde los derechos humnanos, in CONTRA VIENTO, supra note 597, at
13 (noting that the UN Commission on Human Rights is often criticized for being too politicized and, consequently, for lacking objectivity).
615. CHAYES & HANDLER CHAYES, supra note 550. at I 11.
616. As attorney for United Nations Affairs with the Colombian Commission
of Jurists from 1994 to 1998, the author personally participated in the lobbying of
intergovernmental agencies both in Colombia and abroad, and was responsible
for coordinating this work with international NGOs.
617. See IACHR Press Release, supra note 608, para. 5.

AM. U. INT' L. REV.

[15:1

the different mechanisms and procedures under the regional system.
The role of international human rights NGOs in generating concern and eliciting positive reactions from the international community is paramount. The intensive lobbying and litigation described
in the previous paragraph is possible only through close-knit cooperation between international human rights NGOs and their national
NGO counterparts. Without organizations like Human Rights
Watch, Amnesty International, the Lawyers Committee for Human
Rights, and others, Colombian NGOs would have a difficult time
by themselves getting the message across at the international
level.6 8 One clear example of this was when Colombia went before
the UN Human Rights Committee in 1996 under the periodic review procedure established by the International Covenant on Civil
and Political rights.6 9 Coordinated efforts led by the Lawyers
Committee for Human Rights resulted in a strong Colombian NGO
presence at the preliminary hearings arranged by the Committee as
a channel for non-governmental input. It is safe to say, furthermore,
that the international NGOs' periodic publications and press statements provide a constant stream of up-to-date information on the
situation in Colombia which concerned governments, as well as the
inter-governmental agencies mentioned, frequently find pertinent
and extraordinarily useful.
The interwoven effects of the activities carried out by the international actors studied in this section strongly impact upon Colombian policy makers and civil society representatives working on
human rights and humanitarian issues inside the country. These activities provoke strong reactions and responses from government
officials, the general public, and even the armed groups in conflict.
One startling manifestation of this reality occurred when the ELN
618. Other NGOs that play a crucial role in this respect are the Washington
Office on Latin America (WOLA), the International Service for Human Rights in
Geneva, and the Federation Internationale des Ligues de Droits de I'Hommcs
(FIDH), based in Paris.
619. See 999 U.N.T.S 171, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1968). Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on Dec. 16, 1966 (G.A. Res. 2200, 21 GAOR,
Supp. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316, at 52) (entered into force on Mar. 23, 1976). See
Part IV of the ICCPR on the Human Rights Committee and its procedure for periodic reviews.
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guerrillas, in a letter to Amnesty International, stated that they were
willing to adopt the NGO's recommendations made in a 1994 report criticizing the groups conduct in violation of humanitarian
law.620 Disclaimers and debate are common in the press after one of
the aforementioned actors-whether it be the United Nations, the
U.S. State Department or Human Rights Watch-releases a report
criticizing the human rights and humanitarian law situation in the
country. 6, ' The point here is that the impact of these organizations
within Colombia has been, and continues to be, crucial to promoting consciousness and comprehension of humanitarian norms in the
country.
C. AN ANALYSIS OF COMPLIANCE AND ITS FUTURE PROSPECTS

Before returning to the discussion of how the compliance process
has been initiated in Colombia through the burgeoning acceptance
of IHL instruments and principles, a diagnosis of the reasons for the
persistent lack of greater formal implementation and substantive
compliance by the Colombian State is in order. Only by going to
the root of the problem and examining its causes can a possible
path to its resolution be discerned and mapped out.
1. The Causes of Non-compliance with IHL
International law is very clear on the nature of the conventional
obligations assumed by governments when they enter into agreements with other states. Pacta sunt sei-'anda-treatiesare to be
obeyed-is the rule, and in general "states acknowledge [the] obligation to comply with the agreements they have signed.""" At an
international level, this legal obligation to execute treaties in good
faith gives rise to a "presumption of compliance, in the absence of

620. See WAR WITHOUT QUARTER. supra note 1, at 163.
621. A recent controversial report presented by Human Rights Watch on December 3, 1988 received extensive coverage in EL ESPECTADOR, Dec. 4, 1998.
See Los violentos no distinguen civiles de comibatientes (visited Dec. 4, 1998)

<http://www.elespectador.com/9812/04/genotici.htm>.
622. CHAYES & HANDLER CHAYES, supra note 550, at 4, 8; see also Vienna
Convention, supra note 385, arts. 26, 27: see also Vienna Convention, supra note
385, at 4.
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strong countervailing circumstances. ' '621 Within most countries, the
provisions of ratified international agreements become national law
entailing a similar legal obligation to obey, and acting as a presumptive "guide to action" in the domestic sphere. 24 As we have
seen with respect to the case of Colombia, the IHL regime for noninterstate armed conflict is no exception. This regime is unconventional, however, insofar as it covers the conduct of non-state actors,
such as insurgency movements and certain paramilitary groups,
when these are considered parties to an internal armed conflict that
meets the thresholds established, respectively, by common Article 3
and Protocol II.
Although it may sound somewhat optimistic, "the general propensity of states [is] to comply with international obligations."''
The main sources of non-compliance with international regulatory
regimes like the one established by IHL are a "lack of capability or
clarity or priority. 626 One central factor contributing to noncompliance is the "temporal dimension of the social, economic and
political changes contemplated by regulatory treaties. ,,117 It is argued in reference to international human rights treaties and their
corresponding regimes that these, "like other regulatory treaties,
were designed to initiate a process that over time, perhaps a long
time, would bring behavior into greater congruence" with the ideals
embodied in those instruments. 2 ' The other key factors influencing
non-compliance by states are ambiguity and indeterminacy of treaty
language, in addition to that of a frequently limited capacity of the
parties to carry out their express undertakings.6 9 These factors
serve, individually and in combination, to illuminate and explain
most cases in which states fail to live up to their commitments.
All three factors identified are valid with respect to Colombia's
basic problem of substantive noncompliance under the humanitar623. CHAYES
624.
625.
626.
627.
628.
629.

& HANDLER CHAYES,

See id.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 17.
See id. at 10.

supra note 550, at 8.
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ian law regime regulating internal armed conflict. With respect to
the factor of textual "clarity," it should be recalled from prior sections how debates on the scope of applicability and on the political
and legal consequences of Protocol II held up the ratification process in that country for almost two decades. The lack of greater precision in the text provided opponents of Protocol II in Colombia
with ample grounds on which to construct their resistance, despite
the fact that many proponents of Protocol II would argue (and, in
fact, did) that its provisions are not ambiguous. Debate on the scope
of application and on the legal consequences of many of its provisions continues to this day, well after ratification, though it is still
largely politicized. 6 0 The guidance of international organizations
such as the ICRC and the major human rights NGOs on the proper
interpretation and application of IHL has contributed to orienting
this debate in positive directions, but has not succeeded in ending
it.
Regarding the "capability" factor, it is evident that the institutional weakness characteristic of many national authorities, in addition to the breakdown of the rule of law, plays an undeniable role
in ensuring that positive initiatives toward greater implementation
or enforcement do not get very far. How can one expect investigators from the Prosecutor General's Human Rights Office to bring
paramilitary warlord Carlos Castafio to justice when neither the
Police nor the Army will execute any of the several warrants out for
his arrest?6 1 Other related factors shed further light on the question
of governmental non-compliance. The "time lag between undertaking and performance ' 632 cited in relation to human rights treaties
is equally as applicable to humanitarian law instruments; it may explain (though not justify) the absence of greater and more immediate implementation of IHL in the internal sphere. It is also true that
"a cross section [of the situation] at any particular moment may
give a misleading picture of the state of compliance." " ' It is arguable, therefore, that the relatively recent ratification of Protocol II is

630. See discussion supra Part I.C.2.b.
631. See IACHR THIRD REPORT, supra note 103, ch. IV,paras. 23940.

632. CHAYES & HANDLER CHAYES, supra note 550, at 16.
633. Id. at 15.
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a factor contributing to the absence of greater formal implementation of its provisions under domestic law. This, of course, would
not be true with respect to common Article 3, which has been applicable in theory, though not in practice, for decades.
In any case, it would be wholly disingenuous to maintain that
either textual ambiguity or institutional incapacity is at the heart of
the Colombian government's substantive non-compliance with
IHL. These are aggravating factors that complicate a more fundamental problem: the lack of priority given humanitarian law obligations by Colombian authorities under the difficult circumstances
generated by the civil conflict. Historically, it has been the lack of
political will on the part of successive administrations and state institutions to confront the military establishment and its allies, which
underlies the nation's long-standing resistance to implementing and
enforcing IHL.634 Although there have been notable exceptions to
this general rule in recent times, support among Colombian
authorities for the effective implementation and enforcement of
humanitarian norms within the domestic legal order is still uneven
and lukewarm at best.
Although this conclusion may appear to echo the pessimistic
opinions cited in the Introduction criticizing the effectiveness of
IHL, there is an important difference. Recognition that a lack of
political priority exacerbated by other factors is at the heart of Colombia's non-compliance with IHL is a diagnosis that suggests that
there is room for improvement under the existing regime. It accepts
that a wide range of humanitarian norms applies to internal wars
like Colombia's, and that these rules are sufficient to cover many if
not most of the major evils associated with modem civil conflicts.
More importantly, it acknowledges that, despite the lack of formal
implementation and legal enforcement, significant advances can be
made at a national level that contribute directly to improving the
situation. As will be argued below, the express recognition of the

634. See, e.g., HCHR 1999, supra 82, paras. 151-53. "The High Commissioner

regrets that many of the recommendations of the various United Nations mechanisms have still not been acted on, despite the fact that they are specific recommendations which have been reiterated for a number of years." Id. para. 153.
Foremost, among these recommendations are those aimed at harmonizing the
Colombian penal and military justice codes with international standards.
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applicability of IHL by government authorities and civil society
alike gives rise to conditions that are crucial to the process of generating political will and redefining official priorities.
2. Why Acceptance of IHL Matters
Professor Kalshoven was right: the introduction of IHL into the
political and legal discourse of the nation is undeniably a marked
improvement over the situation only a decade ago, notwithstanding
a persistent non-compliance with its provisions on the part of the
Colombian state. The "regime management" paradigm allows us to
see how and why this change came about, or at least to understand
many of the circumstances that led to its realization. In this respect,
the Colombian case study is a credit to the work of the universal
and regional systems for the protection of human rights, and vindicates the often underestimated role of NGOs in this process, at both
national and international levels. Similarly, the persistent scrutiny
and pressure by third states, bilaterally and through multilateral action, contributed enormously to promoting official acceptance of
IL in Colombia. The process of ratification in Colombia of the
Protocols additional to the Geneva Conventions 1949 is a case in
point. Once the government finally revived this process as a consequence of international pressure, the legitimacy brought to the relevant debates by the ICRC, and to a lesser extent by the United Nations and the OAS, greatly advanced the goal of ratification. The
campaign by Colombian NGOs and members of the concerned
public added local flavor and force to these efforts. All of these
factors, acting separately and in concert, were the impetus behind
the "quantum jump" of ratification and acceptance applauded by
Kalshoven.
But acceptance is not per se the same as compliance, and without
the requisite political will needed to convert it into effective action,
the impact of government receptivity to the subject of humanitarian
law in Colombia will continue to be extremely limited. Further
progress must be made, and official acceptance of IHL converted
into full implementation and substantial compliance with all its
pertinent provisions. The diagnosis of the causes of noncompliance presented above provides a useful starting point. As
concerns the Colombian government, the national and international
actors who comprise the lIL regime must intensify the process of
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"managing" compliance analyzed in this Part. The force of the
compliance dynamic should be channeled and focused squarely on
those factors impeding further progress on legal implementation
and enforcement. Concerned governments like those represented in
the European Union, as well as that of the United States, must continue to monitor the Colombian Government's compliance with its
legal obligations under the IHL and human rights regimes, making
effective use of the bilateral and multilateral channels at their disposal.
Using acceptance as a stepping-stone to compliance under the
IHL regime means, among other things, supporting and strengthening the work of the Inter-American system and its organs, as well
as those under the United Nations umbrella. The monitoring function they fulfill from both a human rights and humanitarian law
perspective is absolutely crucial to maintaining the ground that has
been won, and to ensuring that further progress can be made.
Similarly, the fundamental role of non-governmental organizations
within this process must be recognized and encouraged. Publications like those by Human Rights Watch, which place IHL at the
center of their legal analysis, are critical to promoting a stronger
and more effective compliance dynamic within this regime. The
work of national NGOs in this same vein, carried out despite the
enormous personal risk involved, have proved to be the foundation
upon which much, if not most, of the international monitoring of
IHL is based. Once the conjugation of forces represented by these
actors is understood to be a motivating factor behind the important
changes in Colombia with respect to IHL, it becomes evident that
continued progress-and the march towards substantive compliance-depends upon the reinforcement and intensification of these
forces.
Professor Kalshoven may not have been aware of the extent to
which his calculations of a "radical change" would extend when he
made his insightful observations. There is no denying that in Co-

635. One critical area for attention relates to the legislative initiatives-past,
present, and future-that seek to incorporate humanitarian law into the domestic
legal order. A close scrutiny of the process underway to reform the Colombian
Penal Code, for example, is essential to guarantee that some effective implementation and enforcement of humanitarian norms may still be achieved.
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lombia today, IHL is at the forefront of the search for a political
solution to the conflict and thus at the top of the national agenda. In
the context of the peace process, where it has assumed cardinal importance, humanitarian law is, in one form or another, an express
priority of each of the parties to the conflict. The parties and most
observers agree, for example, that the humanization of the war
through some sort of agreement, which would include the component of impartial verification, is the surest step down the path to
peace. Even the paramilitary groups have stated that they are willing to limit their conduct in violation of IHL if the ELN guerrillas
do the same, a proposal that has served as a basis for direct talks
with the insurgent groups on the subject of a humanitarian agreement.636 At the very least, this unorthodox initiative by the paramilitary groups, the worst violators of IHL in the war, testifies to
the extent to which humanitarian law is considered political currency in the process of bargaining for peace.
But acceptance of humanitarian law is not limited to the Colombian Government or even to the context of the peace talks. High
levels of general acceptance are to be found in modem Colombian
society, ranging from government and military officials trained in
humanitarian law by the ICRC, to school children and internally
displaced persons counseled by the Human Rights Ombudsman on
their rights and how these are violated by parties to the conflict. A
case in point was made by the "civil society" representatives who
signed (quasi) humanitarian agreements with the ELN and the
paramilitary groups on behalf of all Colombians."' These and other
civilian sectors of Colombian society have repeatedly insisted on
the need to "humanize" the conflict as a necessary first step in the
peace process they envision. It is civil society looking out for itself in a way that simply was not possible ten years ago. The parties
further reflect this reality in the wide press and media coverage of
636. See Juan Carlos Escobar, La historia del didlogo secreto entre ELV y
Castahio, EL TIEMPO, Dec. 13, 1998, at Al.
637. See Patricia Lara Salive, A Dulcificar la Guerra, CAMBIO 16, July 20-27,
1998, at 23.
638. See Colomnbianos iNo Wds!, EL ESPECTADOR, Oct. 25, 1999, at Al.
Anywhere between five and ten million Colombians demonstrated to protest the
war and political violence with three basic demands: a cease-fire, uninterrupted
negotiations and respect for IHL.
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the war that makes constant reference to IHL and to the alleged
violations of its norms. Indeed, it is impressive to see the range and
relative depth with which Colombian journalists today incorporate
humanitarian
law considerations into their reporting of the con63 9
flict.
Incredible as it may seem, more or less the same holds true for
the other parties to the conflict. The status of IHL as political if not
legal currency in the peace talks is a direct consequence of the advanced degree of recognition by the guerrilla and paramilitary
groups of humanitarian law's relevance to the conflict and their
own war effort. The increased recourse to humanitarian law terminology by these groups may be considered cynical and largely motivated by political expediency, but it nevertheless represents an
ostensible if rhetorical improvement over past attitudes. It also
points to the possibility of further progress in the future. This Article has demonstrated how the Colombian guerrillas and paramilitary groups are in some way receptive to-or at the very least affected by-the monitoring of their actions performed by
international and national actors under the IHL regime. Like the
Colombian Government, they have been frequently pressed to explain and justify their abuses in contravention of humanitarian
norms, obliging them to come to terms with their responsibilities
under international law:
A crucial element in the process by which international norms operate
to control conduct, is that, as a matter of international practice, questionable action must be explained and justified-sometimes in advance,
but almost without exception after the fact. Accountability ... is a critical rule-and norm-enforcement mechanism .... The fact that people
are ultimately accountable for their decisions is an implicit and explicit
constraint on virtually everything they do. Failure to behave in ways for
which one can construct acceptable accounts leads to varying degrees of
censure-depending of course on the gravity of the offense and the
norms of the organizations.64O

The very same forces of persuasion and justification which
"shame" state deviance from the IHL regime have, at times, a sur-

639. See, e.g., id.; Primerpasocon eIELN, ELTIEMPO, July 16, at Al.
640. CHAYES & HANDLER CHAYES, supra note 550, at 118-19.
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prisingly similar effect on the guerrillas and, to a lesser extent, on
their paramilitary enemies. Given that they both purport to speak
for broad sectors of Colombian society and profess political legitimacy as popular movements acting in the public interest, the guerrillas and the paramilitary groups are obliged to engage in the public debate on IHL, to develop policy positions on it and, above all,
to explain and justify their aberrant conduct. This introduction into
the national and international "discourse" within the IHL regime
ensures that these armed groups become susceptible to many of the
same forces promoting compliance which mold the conduct of
states. In light of the fact that these non-traditional subjects of international law purport to exercise certain characteristics of sovereignty normally reserved for the state,' this progressive development in international law and relations is neither inappropriate nor
unwarranted. Needless to say, the monitoring of the guerrillas and
the paramilitary groups by the state and non-governmental actors
participating in the compliance process must be maintained if not
intensified in order that their conduct may also be brought more
into line with the dictates of IHL.

CONCLUSION
The bottom line remains that the parties to the conflict in Colombia generally do not respect humanitarian principles on the battlefield or in practice. Thousands upon thousands of Colombians
continue to fall victim to the violation of the most basic humanitarian guarantees, with little legal protection or recourse. Such
abuse and constant threat from all the armed groups participating in
the conflict converts the Colombian civil conflict into a full-fledged
humanitarian crisis. The worst perpetrators, by and large, go free,
and are even considered heroes by their sympathizers. In light of
the prevailing situation, one might well ask: "Why does acceptance
of IHL matter?"
I have argued that despite the harsh and undeniable realities of
the war in Colombia, there has been progress made in the advancement of the humanitarian cause. It has not been my intent to
paint a rosy picture of the Colombian situation. My objective has

641. See supra Part II.B.2.
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been simply to place the case in proper perspective, coming at it
from an alternative angle that emphasizes the progressive construction and management of compliance with IHL rather than its enforcement in conventional terms. The broad acceptance of IHL by
the parties, and within Colombian society in general, despite the
practical difficulties that continue to impede its application, is a
tangible step in the right direction. It is also a condition sine qua
non for achieving the twin goals of full implementation of IHL and
substantial compliance with its norms. It is likely that this paradigm
will be equally as relevant to the analysis of other internal conflicts
taking place in the world today-or in the future.
One final observation is in order concerning the conventional
wisdom relating to the issues of application and interpretation addressed in Part II. The Colombian case study as analyzed indicates
that the formulation of new rules is not necessarily the most viable
solution to the problems examined with respect to these issues. It
suggests that efforts are better directed at deepening the interpretation and promotion of existing humanitarian norms, rather than emphasizing their deficiencies or dismissing them as unsatisfactory.
The fact is that the observance of even the most basic guarantees
reflected in existing instruments would represent an enormous contribution in practical terms to the protection of civilians and other
potential victims of internal armed conflict. It is imperative that
greater scholarly analysis be brought to bear on issues arising from
the application of these humanitarian norms in order to lay the
theoretical bases for a clearer understanding of the real potential for
practical application which they possess. The potential of existing
humanitarian law to protect the victims of internal wars should not
be minimized; it should be recognized, developed, and eventually
made reality.

